The challenges
of the democratic
management in Brazil

participation

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
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THE CHALLENGES OF THE DEMOCRATIC MANAGEMENT IN BRAZIL — PARTICIPATION

ANA CLÁUDIA TEIXEIRA (ORG.)

Presentation

Brazil has been considered a cradel of participatory experiences. Many formal arrangements have been created since the 70s, such as the Public Policy Management Councils, Participatory Budgetting (one of the most well-known experiences in the world), and Participative Government Planning. Brazil has also experienced the rise of a number of innovative experiences in governance carried out in creative ways by municipal governments, driven as much by progressive governments as by organized civil society.

Over the last 20 years, Polis has undertaken several studies in an attempt to determine the extent to which the reality of the funtioning dynamic of these new participatory arrangements has, or has not, permitted that these experiences translate themselves into innovative policy practices in the sphere of managing public matters. Or even, to what measure have these new institutional designs in fact favoured an effective and autonomous participation of social actors in the formulation of policies, and which are the elements that favoured or created obstacles in this process. Even though these experiences are relatively recent – and as such the studies should not be considered conclusive or definitive – Polis considers it important to promote the critical assessment of these experiences, not so much as to highlight them, but particularly to understand them and identify possible ways of strengthening them.

The texts in this compilation should be understood in this context. They were produced between 2004 and 2007, in an attempt to demonstrate the progress and challenges of participatory democracy experiences, in particular in the city of São Paulo.

The first text, "Social movements and the political system: challenges of participation," aims to analyse how the process of decentralized management, initiated with the implementation of sub-city halls (*subprefeituras)*, had an impact on the form in which citizen participation took place in the city of São Paulo. The limites and possibilities of citizen participation as well as the extent of social control in the local sphere were analyzed in three *subprefeituras*. The text is a result of an exploratory investigation that tried to raise themes and issues related to the political practice of social movements in the city. On the one hand it looked at the changes in the configuration and the forms of participation of the social movements, and on the other, to the patterns that structured the relationships between the social movements and the political system. Towards the end, the text attempts to sistemize the questions raised during the research, building an agenda that can be used for research purposes as well as for political action.

The second text, "Participatory and representative democracy: complementarity or subordinated combination?," is a subproduct of the first text. It deepens the discussion on the complementarity between participatory and representative institutions, trying to demonstrate that Brazilian democracy, although it recognizes and inaugurates an infinity of new spaces of interaction between government and society, it does not include them as elements in a renovated institutional architecture capable of offering new and alternative paths to the democratic reform of the State, and that may be the guarantee of governability.

The third and forth texts, with the Evaluation of the Municipal Housing Policy and the Municipal Housing Council, are part of the same research and should be read in conjunction. In the text about policy evaluation, the municipal housing policy of the city of São Paulo was analyzed in the period of January 2005 through December 2006. In this study, some aspects of municipal housing policy are tackled, in particular the elements of continuity and discontinuity of actions and programs in relation to the previous political term (2001-2004). It deals with an especially delicate period of transition due to the change of political parties in power. The study about the Municipal Housing Council looks at the correlation between public policy and the actions of the council, in order to understand the extent to which the council has functioned as an instance of public policy formulation, and what has been its capacity to influence state action.

Lastly, the text "Challenges in the construction of a participatory democracy in Brazil" evaluates the councils' practices, aiming to critically assess them and the challenges found in building participatory democracy in Brazil. The themes dealt with in this text are about representation in participatory arrangements, de facto deliberative power, political projects that crosscut these experiences, and how they articulate (or not) with a necessary reform of the Brazilian political system.

Summary

Social Movements and political system: the challenges of participation

ANA CLÁUDIA TEIXEIRA[1] Y LUCIANA TATAGIBA[2]

The research Social Movements and political system: the challenges of participation has been conceived aiming the comprehension of how the process of decentralization, which has begun with the implementation of the submunicipal governments along the government of Marta Suplicy,[3] has impacted the way in which citizens' participation take place in the City of São Paulo. The limits and possibilities of citizens' participation in the submunicipal governments and the scope of social control of local municipal policies have been analyzed. Moreover, the present study has been motivated by the expectations of the return of a candidate of the PT (Workers Party) in the municipal government of São Paulo.

The present study has sought to involve local social leaders, connected to forums and movements represented in the Management College of the Observatory for Citizens' Rights (Colegiado de Gestão do Observatório dos Direitos do Cidadão).[4] In this work of collective production and dissemination of knowledge, the leaders in the College have participated of the whole process of elaboration of the research design and have also contributed in the discussion of the preliminary version of the text, during a workshop which has counted with the presence of the authors and specialists in the topic.[5]

As proposed in the Organic Law of the Municipality of São Paulo in 1990, the Law for the Implementation of the Submunicipal Governments – which would substitute the regional administrations – was only approved in 2002, during the mandate of Marta Suplicy, through the Municipal Law 13.339, in August 1st, 2002. The 31 submunicipal governments approved have been inaugurated – although working precariously – in 2003. The Representatives' Council, also proposed in the Organic Municipal Law – and that

should have been installed in every submunicipal government as a tool of social control – have been approved as a law in July 2004 (Law 13.881). However, until the moment when this study has been finished, despite a lot of social pressure, they have not been implemented. Because of this present situation, the process of decentralization in the submunicipal governments was still incipient when this research was realized.

The election of the Representatives' Council should have taken place in April 2005, but it was suspended by a preliminary injuction of the Justice Court. The president of the Court has accepted an Unconstitutionality Direct Action (ADIn), moved by the Public Ministry[6] (MP). In the Action, it was defended that the Municipal Organic Law, approved in 1990, would go against the principles of the Brazilian Constitution taking the initiative of creating the Representatives' Council to the Municipal Chamber. The Public Ministry has understood that this initiative belonged to the Executive Powers. Until the moment when this study was concluded, the final trial of ADIn had not taken place.

It is also important to mention that the process of decentralization in submunicipal governments, in the first semester of 2005, during the government of José Serra,[7] has stepped back. Instead of investing in this new design for the city management, the decentralization, this government has begun a process of re-centralization, disabling the local coordination of health and education in most of the 31 submunicipal governments. Only five of the 31 coordinations of health have been kept, one for each region of the city and only 13 education coordination centers have been maintained. Consolidating the weakening of the submunicipal governments, the budget proposal for the year 2006, sent to the Municipal Chamber by the mayor, planned the withdrawal of budget of local coordinations of health and education, reallocating the money to the main secretariats.

As showed in the next pages, and already advancing one of the results of this research, we have detected a non-concluded process of decentralization, in which the design was still uncertain and being experimented. For this reason, its effects in the participation could only be partially noticed by the ones interviewed and analyzed by our study. Frequently, the people interviewed, when commenting the process of implementation of the submunicipal governments and the participation in these spaces, would discur over the management of Marta Suplicy and how the participation process took place during her mandate. Although this was not the main focus of the research, the investigation has gathered many elements of the management of the

City by the Workers Party, of the channels of participation implemented and of social movements and civil organization. We believe that this goes beyond our initial goal, but it reveals a lot about a more general context of democracy and the ways of making politics nowadays. It is important to mention that the research questionnaires have been fulfilled between September 2004 and April 2005, in the same period when municipal elections have taken place and the transition of mandates of Marta Suplicy and José Serra was occurring. This fact has collaborated even more with the fact that part of the people interviewed would make, at some point, a general balance of the management of the City by the Workers Party.

The present text addresses, therefore, the form in which the citizens' participation has taken place during the government of Marta Suplicy, inside a scenario where decentralization had already begun with the implementation of the submunicipal governments. The fact that this process was recent by the time of the research makes it into a variable – not the only one – that interfere in the design and conditions of participation in the City.

Regarding the research methods, the investigation has been realized through a list of questions for interviews with leaders, other for the ones working in the executive government, and another one for the city councilors. Since it would not be possible to investigate the 31 submunicipal governments due to a lack of resources and time, we have chosen to pick three of them: Capela do Socorro (South Zone of the City), São Mateus (East Zone) and Sé (Central Zone).[8] These three submunicipal governments were chosen because they are known as zones of the city with great social mobilization and history of active participation. We have also chosen these areas because of their differences in terms of population, environment, economics and politics, providing a good picture of the participation of citizens in the new model of management. Militants of different social movements, city councilors of different political parties and public agents of the three submunicipal governments (submayor, coordinator of health and coordinator of social action) and central administration (of the coordination of popular participation, in the mayor's cabinet and in the Municipal Secretariat of Submunicipal Governments) have been interviewed, summing a total of 50 interviews. Among the ones interviewed, there were 27 men and 23 women.

In the tables below, one can see the total distribution of the samples in the submunicipal governments, separated by field of action:

Table I

Field of Action	N	%
Civil Societ	35	70,0
Local Executiv	09	18,0
Municipal Executive	02	4,0
Legislative	04	8,0
Total	**50**	**100,0**

Table II

Submunicipal Government	Civil Society	Government	Total
Sé	12	03	15
São Mateus	12	03	15
Capela do Socorro	11	03	14
Total	**35**	**09**	**44**

As seen above, 70% of the people interviewed are members of the civil society. The interviews with leaders of regions and public local agents addressed three blocks of questions: a) characteristics of the zone related to the economic and social profile, its problems and changes in the last years; b) characteristics of the process of decentralization in the region, stressing the advantages and disadvantages of the implementation of the submunicipal governments and its impacts; c) the participation in the region, exploring its movements, how it takes place, which are the main channels of participation and the impact of the submunicipal governments in the participation.

Part of the people interviewed related to organizations and social movements in each of the three submunicipal governments were pointed by local leaders, therefore, they are connected to questions such as housing, health, social assistance, children and

youth. People who are active in other important subjects for each region such as culture, women, recycling cooperatives, etc, were also interviewed. When the College did not have anyone to point, other people related to movements in each region would indicate someone, or the ones interviewed would point other leaders.[9] The table below shows the final distribution of interviews, separated by specific field of action:

Table III

Fields	Sé	São Mateus	Capela do Socorro	Total
Hunger	1	•	•	1
Informal Economy	1	•	•	1
Environment	•	1	•	1
Women	1	•	•	1
Black People	1	•	•	1
Homeless	1	•	•	1
Management Council in Telecentro (digital inclusion)	•	1	•	1
Mova (Movement for Literacy of Youth and Adults)	•	1	1	2
Recycling Cooperative	•	1	•	1
Health	2	3	2	7
Culture	1	2	1	4
Housing	3	1	2	6
Children and Adolescents	1	2	5	8
Total	**12**	**12**	**11**	**35**

This sample has a few analytic limits. First, it is important to mention that it has been conceived by indications. There was no exhaustive research of all relevant actors in each region, and there are certainly other actors that have not been interviewed. Second, one person of each social movement or organization has been interviewed, which does not mean that the whole movement or organization in that region share the same opinion of the one interviewed. Third, given the sample profile, it is difficult to compare distinct subjects (with experiences in different fields of action such as housing, health, education, etc.) in three very distinct contexts (Capela do Socorro, Sé and São Mateus). Two variables always change: the subjects (organizations) and the context.

Taking into account these restrictions, we have decided to consider this research an exploratory one. It is an effort to gather and point questions for a broad agenda that could also be a research agenda or a problematization agenda to be deepened by social movements and entities. As it is going to be noticed along this text, the interviews open a set of questions, impossible to be solved alone. This is why this study is built as a form of pointing problems, concerns, and possibilities of deepening into questions.

It is also important to mention that the region of Capela do Socorro is the one where we found more limitations to proceed the research. It was not easy to find local leaders willing to talk about the theme, and the interviews have resulted in a material comparatively less dense than the ones collected in the other regions. Besides this problem, there was another one: no one interviewed was part of social movements related to the environment, although it was a subject mentioned by many actors of this region.

The following analysis, taken from the interviews, is divided in four axes: actors and territories; experiences of participation in the government of Marta Suplicy; participation and democracy: old and new challenges; agenda for research and action.

ACTORS AND TERRITORIES
IMAGES OF TERRITORY

How do the movements describe their territory? In this effort of characterization, which are the most emphasized dimensions? How the representations about the regions are related with the evaluations about the nature of their struggles (individual and collective ones) and of their challenges and potentialities? With no pretension of answering these questions, we are going to point in the interviews some evident aspects.

In the three submunicipal governments, the description of the territory was associated to the evaluation of the *life's condition of its population*, particularly in the lower budget classes. In this registry, the people interviewed have mentioned unemployment; the lack of universal social and inclusive policies; the lack of an efficient transportation policy, which limits the possibilities of access to other regions of the city; the restrictions of access to leisure and culture; the violence of the drug dealers and policemen, among others. All these struggles show the giant contrasts between the material wealth and shortage. As a consequence, when describing the territory, the interviewed ones point unemployment, violence and drug trafficking as phenomena which have been affecting the daily life of people. One could ask how the organized sectors deal today with these factors related to material life, when we are aware that in the 70s and 80s the movements against charesty, for instance, have appeared. However, we have no means of deepening into this discussion. The challenge of noticing how these questions affect the organization of the population and if new movements and new forms of struggles are emerging around them is going to be left for a new research.

Nevertheless, an evaluation highlighting the social contribution of the government of Marta Suplicy has followed the recognition of these shortages. In the three submunicipal governments, the recognition of how the social work and urban policies have favored the excluded ones is clear:

> *Improvements in health, in transportation. […] Everyone can see the changes, […] can see the relation with the homeless […]. Some of them are even cleaner. This is a form of citizenship. [Civil Society (9) – Sé]*

> *The Center of São Paulo during the government of Luiza,[10] has improved a lot. It looked like a city center that belonged to everybody. […] In the second mandate of the PT, with Marta […] the city center had much more life than 16 years ago. [..] I believe there are qualitative and quantitative inputs. [Civil Society (10) – Sé]*

> *We have been feeling a different look, an effort of the municipal government to make things work […] Take for instance, the two CEUs[11] built in this region. [Civil Society (4) – São Mateus]*

Even the health system has improved a lot. It was not enough, but this municipal government has invested a lot. [...] Transportation has improved. If we think about the equipments... I have mentioned the Renda Minima[12] [...] Not to mention the neighborhoods that were paved, [...] I am not sure how many kilometers were, [...] but it was a good part. [...] The public lighting has been improved, one can notice the city is clearer [...] there are neighborhoods that have been completely illuminated. [Civil Society (8) – São Mateus]

Three CEUs in this region have given new opportunities in terms of leisure, culture and access to certain stuff. [...] Many people who had never been to a theater, had never watched a movie at a cinema... CEU has given to this population the opportunity of accessing more culture and education, although they are still restricted. [Civil Society (1) – Capela do Socorro]

In the mandate of Marta, these regions have been favored with the construction of CEUs [...] the government plan, I would say, has focused on the low-budget income population. [Civil Society (7) – Capela do Socorro]

I have been living in that area for approximately 23 years and no other government has done so much, [...] has invested so much in our area. Pavement, improvement of transportation for people living there, better buses, brought more quality of life for the population. This was something very respectful made during the last government. [Civil Society (3) – Capela do Socorro]

The life profile of the people interviewed – individuals with a long history of militancy – the importance of the *political struggle,* as a way of dealing the daily problems, was much emphasized in the narratives of description of the territory.

In the submunicipal government of São Mateus, this association of needs, struggle, organization and conquest has been particularly present in the interviews, modeling the memory of the region, a collective memory that implies meaning and importance to the individual stories. In the following fragments, we have identified this proud look that gives politics a place of individual and collective recognition:

The leaders' capacity of organizing themselves and their path are very good for São Mateus. São Mateus is the CEBs'[13] syndical movements and political movement's birthplace, and has contributed to the creation of the Workers Party, CUT (main union of workers) and the strengthening of "pastorals" (social movements related to the Catholic Church). Therefore, the capability of leadership in São Mateus is a very strong point for us. [Civil Society (4) – São Mateus]

São Mateus' main characteristic is the leadership struggle, people's struggle and union. […] We've had social movements aiming the construction of a hospital here, movements for more buses… It is a very strong battle and the population is really united. [Local Executive (1) – São Mateus]

This area is very poor […] there are 45 slums […] the people can easily be manipulated even because they are extremely poor. But they are also strugglers. São Mateus is the place where everything begins. The local population is made of claimers, people that really struggle. We don't always get what we ask for, but we claim. We don't give up. [Civil Society (12) – São Mateus]

The role of the political struggles is very clear in the description of the territory in the many references to the possible conquests acquired through participation. Conquests that have to do, in their majority, with more access to public places such as health centers, daycare, schools and hospitals. This information was registered in many interviews of local public agents and social leaders:

The social movement has inaugurated the health center, there was an official plate with our name on it. So, 14 health centers were built at once, the Hospitals of São Mateus and Sapopemba were the results of struggle. The São Francisco mutirão,[14] where many families live, is also the result of struggle. In the last 20 years, the number of daycares has grown. We have seven youth centers. We can tell exactly where they are located in the three districts. [Civil Society (2) – São Mateus]

It is the speech made by a population that suffers with everyday life, but it is aware of the improvements that social struggles provide... We can really tell, because the Metropolitan Program of Health (PMS) has begun here. […] There are not many centers here, they were built all over the city. […] But I think it is good to know that a broader discussion about health took place here. [Local Executive (2) – São Mateus]

In the regions of Sé and Capela do Socorro, politics is also in the center of the effort of characterization of the territory; however, the speech focuses on the peculiarities of a place seen as *subject of disagreements* between different sectors that seek to occupy it, leaving its marks on it. It is a material and symbolic battle, which is many times described with the strong colors of the conflicts of social classes.

The region of the city center is described as a plural place, full of contradictions. One of the people interviewed sums it: the main trace of São Paulo is the "density of richness and poorness". On the one side, "you see Banespa,[15] symbol of development and wealth, on the other, misery "stamped everywhere you look in the city center" [Civil Society (1) – Sé]. A great offer of services and products, many of them are public ones – "you can find everything you look for in the city center" [Civil Society (1) – Sé] – in which the enjoyment strikes against social exclusion, "everything is near […] but one lives in a exclusive city […] so you can't access anything", it is "close, but not accessible" [Civil Society (9) – Sé]. The conditions of access, or the lack of these conditions, do not only concern the lack of financial resources, but are also related, according to the interviews, to other dimensions which are the basis of an exclusive society:

I see people living in the region and not accessing the services. There are many opportunities of leisure and culture, shows, everything is free... and people don't go because they think they can't go in. Have you ever heard of that invisible exclusion wall? [Civil Society (7) – Sé]

There might be a free concert in the Municipal Theater, but the general population feels bothered because they don't know what to wear to go to a concert in the Municipal Theater. [Civil Society (6) – Sé]

This "invisible exclusion wall" which segregates and distinguishes people through the concrete and symbolic affirmation of to who the public spaces in the city belongs, has become an important issue in the interviews in the region of Sé, especially when talking about the upgrading policies conducted by Marta Suplicy. The City Center, according to many people interviewed, is not only the arena where the conflicts are developed, but also a place of dispute:

> *I believe the city center is a stage, or an arena, inside a big battle. […] And this dispute lasts 24 hours/day. […] It is a battle for space, power and survival. […] And sometimes, we can see that the bourgeoisie, owner of the final word when it regards the city center, has resigned; in other times, it advanced. And when it advances, the working class, the poor and the miserable ones are the ones to pay for this advancement. [Civil Society (10) – Sé]*

It is a struggle between the working class and the bourgeoisie that, although it also takes place in the city suburbs, say the interviewed one, has peculiar characteristics in the city center:

> *This dispute is a lot stronger in the city center because this place is, in a certain way, the first one to be seen […] and it should be beautiful for international visitors. The way of cleaning the center, is taking the dirty away, and the poor is considered as something dirty. The way poor people look is not pleasant for rich eyes […]. This is why the battle is stronger in the city center […]. The disputes that take place in the suburbs are more equal, it is not like a miserable one fighting with Silvio Santos[16] to be in the Center. [Civil Society (10) – Sé]*

Two important movements in the city are a good example of what is involved in this battle: Viva o Centro and Centro Vivo,[17] Many of the people interviewed referred to these movements (some of them mixed the names, although they were aware of their differences) when arguing about the public disputes around the public spaces in the center:

They [the members of Viva o Centro] also have a proposal for making the city center a beautiful place. But what is the price for that? Who is going to pay that price? Is that for everyone? Is it for a small group of people? Who is it for? Is it for the banks? For the colleges that have just been built? Is it for all of us? [Civil Society (11) – Sé]

The city's architecture, "the exclusion architecture", was also reminded as a clear element in this dispute: "the fences under the bridges, the stones and the non flat benches to avoid homeless are an example of this exclusion's architecture" [Civil Society (1) – Sé]. Besides, there are several criticisms to the lack of public toilets, the restoration of the Municipal Market ("for the joy of the upper crust") and the restoration of Estação da Luz (subway and train station).

The vision of a struggle for a territory, as we mentioned, was very present in the interviews made in Capela do Socorro. However, in the region of Sé this dispute is noticed in the debates about the policies of the recovery of the city center, and in Capela the conflict is shown in the debate related to a peculiar characteristic of the region: the fact that great part of Capela is located in a protected watershed area. In his description of the area, the submayor explains the dimensions of the problem:

The first peculiarity of Capela is that it is the most crowded area of all the 31 submunicipal governments [...] [with] approximately 620 thousand inhabitants. The second one is that it is located in the very south of the City of São Paulo, inside a protected watershed area. So, 82% of Capela do Socorro responds to the Law for the Protection of Watershed, with its criteria. Which criteria? 430 of the 700 regions we have inside São Mateus are irregular because of the form that occupation happened here. [Local Executive (3) – Capela do Socorro]

A "disordered occupation", says the submayor, was a result of the total lack of public power in the area from 1975 to 1985:

Capela do Socorro was an area that belonged to the old Regional Administration of Santo Amaro until 1985. Only in 1985 [...] the Regional Administration of Capela do Socorro was created [...] and this "delay" avoided the presence of any public power here in the first ten years of implementation of the Law for the Protection of Watershed

in 1975, which stated that [...] the region would have [...] better houses [...]. It was created in 1975 and there was no public power until 1985. The law prohibited, with its legal instruments, the occupation of small territories by industrial plants. There were series of norms because the region should be well protected. However, there was no way to ensure the law was going to be followed and the land was undervalued. So, considering the needs of people who worked in the industrial area of Santo Amaro and this neglect, some people found a way of getting profit over the situation [...] turning the region into a big dormitory. [Local Executive (3) – Capela do Socorro]

This whole situation has given social movements and public power the parameters to base their action. The Law for the Protection of Watershed and its restraints regarding the realization of public infrastructure in the place and the concession of commercial activities such as supermarkets and gas stations only make clearer the shock between the illegal and legal city. This is the reason why the battles for legalization are central in the agenda of the social movements in the region, and it is a question always present in the dialogue with the State:

Capela do Socorro is a different region because of the Law for the Protection of Watershed. [...] There is a contrast between the legal and illegal city. We have always lived inside this conflict: it is a city where many things are illegal. We expected to improve the situation during these mandates (more popular governments). In the mandate of Erundina, for instance, we have had some permissions here... only to fool us. Then Pitta came, Jânio Quadros gave us another permission, only to steal our money and did not legalize anything. And now, the government of Marta Suplicy has given us a permission to try to legalize the illegal city. [...] But it hasn't improved. [Civil Society (5) – Capela do Socorro][18]

It is a very important struggle since is means, for the majority of the population, strong possibilities of access to public equipments in the region:

It is a very contradictory region. A few places are very developed in terms of urbanization, infrastructure, health and education. But just a few. The greatest area is illegally occupied and very irregular, mostly in the suburbs, [...] with precarious

infrastructure in every aspect: health, education, environment and sanitation. [...]. It is one of the most abandoned regions [...] and it was abandoned by the public power and for a long period of time. [Civil Society (1) – Capela do Socorro]

There is a lack of infrastructure, such as sewage, sanitation, because we are very close to the reservoirs. [...] So, we feel much harmed because of the protection area. [Civil Society (3) – Capela do Socorro]

We have been forgotten. [...] The neighborhood has gown a lot and they claim this is a watershed area. [...] They all say they can't build a daycare because it is a watershed area. [Civil Society (4) – Capela do Socorro]

The condition of "illegal city" hampers the improvement of the life conditions, although it doesn't seem to limit in the same way, the expansion of the private interests regarding land occupation. Therefore, the condition of "illegal city" doesn't seem to affect in the same way the interests of the entrepreneurs and the working classes:

We can see the chains of big supermarkets such as Extra spreading and growing in this area. However, when we talk about transportation, universities and schools for the population, there is always an excuse [...] related to watershed. [...] This is because of many politicians suffer great influence of the chains of supermarkets and gas stations... So, they make some quid pro quod in here, they bargain one thing to finance the political campaign of a councilor in the region and they get the permission to do whatever they want, such as building a supermarket. [...] Now, there are many private colleges in the region. Why are they private? Because the entrepreneurs have a deal with the local councilors. [Civil Society (3) – Capela do Socorro]

It is important to remind that the region of Capela is distant from the Center of São Paulo. Some areas inside the region are located more than 30 kilometers of the center, distance that can get even bigger due to the precariousness of the public transportation system. This system can hamper not only the access to the central area, but also the transportation inside a territory isolated by the water mirrors, Billings and Guarapiranga Reservoirs. (BARBAN, 2003). These factors generate an isolation, which

could be translated in a political isolation provoking a negative impact in the contacts between the leaders themselves and with other social movements from outside. It is such as if the leadership in Capela is more withdrawn, having problems to build relationships between their local agendas (which are many times restricted to the local problems) and wider struggles that trespass the territory space. The Central Region, nevertheless, is the stage of great political debates; the conflicts of the center are always exposed by the media. This larger exposure obligates the ones living in the center to get training. In return, there is more access to learning centers, through courses, debates or political dialogue with different social actors.

Finally, we are facing three regions with specific identities: São Mateus, characterized by the popular organization transformed in conquests; the Center, marked by the great struggle to decide who has the rights over this rich territory full of services, infrastructure and public services; and Capela, where the battle to legally "be" is the basis of the effort to reach citizenship. The three regions have their regional identities, their history, but such as a mosaic, compose a specific drawing of the political struggles in the City.

THE ACTORS MOVING IN THE TERRITORY

What are the main characteristics of the efforts to association in the analyzed regions? How does the population organize itself in the territory and what agendas have the greatest potential to mobilize in each region? What is the profile of the ones who participate in these movements? Are there any differences of the pattern of association in the distinct regions? According to the people interviewed, what are the main characteristics of the action of the social movements today? Can we say there is a new form of action? These are the questions we are going to address in this second item. We are not going to offer an exhaustive overview, but only highlight the more emphasized dimensions. We aim to recognize some elements taken from the interviews and use them as a starting point in our investigation.

In a recent work about association in movements in the City of São Paulo, Avritzer, Recamán and Venturi (2004) affirm that the index of participation of the population of São Paulo is of 19%. The authors conclude that these associations are mainly religious, "the association in groups related to religious organizations represents half (51%) of the active participants in São Paulo" (p. 24). From this total, 31% are related to the Catholic Church

and 33% to other Christian churches. According to the authors, 56% of the ones acting in these religious movements claim the reason they do so is to benefit their community (pp. 20-21). The authors also highlight the importance of the association in movements related to housing, health and education. 5% of the ones who participate are members of these associations (p. 23). The religious organizations and the communitarian associations, of health and housing, constitute, therefore, "the core of the participation in São Paulo", and each one of them has its own origins and territories where they belong (p. 50).

In the research, we have asked the participants of the interviews which were the most important movements in their region, and what were the issues that mobilized the locals to the social struggles. In the three regions, the health and housing move-ments were the most mentioned ones, confirming the conclusions of Avritzer, Recamán and Venturi (2004), regarding popular association, followed by movements to defend children and teenagers. The movements of housing, health, children and teenagers are historically important in São Paulo, having amazing capacities of political articulation and realization which became evident in legal conquests such as ECA (Statute of Chil-dren and Adolescents), SUS (Single Health System), City Statute, and in the creation of channels of dialogue with the State, represented in each sector's council. These are legal conquests in which the movements support themselves to consolidate their rights.

The research has shown new data about the importance of culture in the local agenda. This aspect was highlighted as new in the three regions, being a little more emphasized in the East Zone and in Capela do Socorro. The cultural movements have been considered more important in the City Center and in the suburbs, giving special at-tention to hip-hop and other cultural demonstrations that are organized differently from the social movements that existed for a longer period of time. In some cases, they arise from local groups or actors, in others, they are encouraged by the public power, such as in the local forums of culture, which are supported by the submunicipal governments. However, we still know very little about the challenges and potentials of these cultural movements, such as their spaces of mediation, articulation and presentation of demands and speeches of specific groups. We are not aware of the profile of the participants, the reasons for participating, their internal organization and the way in which they dialogue with governments, political parties and institutionalized channels of participation.[19]

According to the interviews, there is an important variation in the profile of the par-ticipants which is related to the type of movement. But, in general, it is possible to talk

about a prevalence of adult women. It is interesting to notice, however, that in the three regions the participants have mentioned the increase of the number of youth participating:

> *We can identify many youth coming, mostly to the housing, street and informal market movements because they can't get a job. [Civil Society (1) – Sé]*

> *There are many young people, so the movement is very diverse. [Civil Society (8) – Sé]*

> *In the cultural movement there are more young men; in the health movement, there are more old ladies that are used to participate. I believe that mostly in the health centers, more young people are coming and they ask for more. [Local Executive (2) – São Mateus]*

> *Women are always in the front, in all movements […] In Grajaú, women are certainly the great majority, but the participation of men and youth of both sexes has grown. [Civil Society (3) – Capela do Socorro]*

Nevertheless, the interviews show that it has not been easy for the more traditional popular movements to deal with youth. Some suggested there would be a resistance of the older leaders to open space for the effective participation of new actors in a dynamics of interaction and when it takes place, is tended to be surrounded of instrumental interactions:

> *Here, you can see people that have been in action for 15, 20 years. […] And they are not interested at all in opening space. […] In the first opportunity, when they invited me to be a tutelary councilor, they only did it because they wanted me to influence the vote of a specific group. […] For so long, they have just been listening to women or retired when they need their votes… they want to fools us […]. I challenge you, […] I doubt there is anyone younger than 20 years old acting in the region of São Mateus. I am sure there isn't. [Civil Society (5) – São Mateus]*

> *People… mostly the more historical, the older ones, are very inflexible in their values and conceptions, and this makes the organization of the movements even more difficult. [Civil Society (2) – Sé]*

The resistance of the popular movements to give importance and legitimacy to other organizations of the civil society, particularly the ones related to specific identities was also noticed:

> *The movements need to open up without losing their perspective and autonomy as an organic movement of transforming society. I believe these movements have to keep their posture, but they should seek new sources of survival. These sources have to do with bringing youth, homosexual, travesties, gays, lesbians... they should gather these groups and bring them to the movements, they should abolish the prejudice. [...] Otherwise, we are going to turn ourselves in ghettos, movements tend to be ghettos because before going to bed they say their blessings, when they wake up, they say their blessings and there is a whole new world that doesn't say blessings before going to bed because sometimes they don't even go to bed and sleep, and we have to consider them as citizens too [...] This is what we need: invite them to join us. We will only win the battle if the stage is crowded. [Civil Society (10) – Sé]*

The comprehension of the extent this resistance to the "other" would be, in fact, a mark of the popular movements in São Paulo, impacting the capacity of renewing their agendas and practices and the possibility of widening their struggles, is a goal that would require another effort of investigation, that goes beyond the limits of this research. But it is important to mention the need for this reflection, since it reallocates, over a different perspective, the question of the real representatives of the civil society.[20] It is about questioning the existence of a line separating "us" from the "other", questioning what supports this line – the participant mentions, in this case, a vision based on religious values – and how this line acts defining if it is legitimate or not the representation of the interests of certain groups in participatory public spaces and/or if they could integrate the more traditional social movements in the city.

Looking specifically to the submunicipal governments, we can see a few characteristics that could be highlighted in the drawing of the local activism.[21]

An important characteristic of the movements in the central region, according to the interviews, is the lack of participation of the ones living in the center as members of a community in which the reference is the territory:

To tell you the truth, popular organization and gathering is something that I haven't seen here, in the center [...]. Even because of the great transit of people living in the region, what may hamper the more popular and communitarian forms of organization. [Civil Society (2) – Sé]

The form of organization in the central region does not reflect the struggle of the ones living in the neighborhood for improvements here. [...] I don't think the ones that live here are organized. [Civil Society (3) – Sé]

There is a very serious problem here in the Center [...] that because it is the home of middle-class, there is no participation in the community. [...] The Center has no community. [...] Even the poor that live in the Center are politically weak. [Civil Society (4) – Sé]

The forms of participation in the Center are not primordially structured based on the local needs and demands, but they are articulated around wider questions such as housing, children and teenagers, homeless, culture, etc., with a strong presence of the forums as a way of organizing themselves:

There are institutional movements and organizations, such as the forums. There are many and many forums around here... they work a lot better than in many regions of the city, even because the headquarters of most forums and organizations are here in this region. [Civil Society (2) – Sé]

Forums that, as affirmed, are very complex organizations because of the diversity of actors they seek to gather[22] It is not by chance that the needs and problems of this articulation were more highlighted in the interviews realized in the central region, when compared to the ones in the other two submunicipal governments. Besides the housing movements, another cited movement was the one of the entrepreneurs, mostly through the articulation of the Associação Viva o Centro, and through the action with the Municipal Government and with the Fórum Ação Centro.[23]

The interviews also suggest there was an increase in the level of participation of some groups, which were pushed to participate because of the deterioration of their life conditions:

Yes, [the participation] has certainly increased. […] Mostly the homeless […] say they participate to get a home. And it didn't happen before…. From 2002, they started to interact. Before, we walked on the streets afraid of the homeless and I guess they were also afraid of us. Not today. The entities are full of homeless […] and it is very normal, very common. [Civil Society (8) – Sé]

People are still very individualistic, but the central region sets an example for the rest of the city. The participation has been increasing; […] the ones working in the informal market come to the housing movements to get information, to know more about their unions. […] This shows the will of organization and participation. It is a slow process, but I feel they are willing to get organized. [Civil Society (10) – Sé]

He has also related this increase in participation with the specific nature of the conflicts in the central region: "there are big conflicts here, […] so, you have to be organized to be a part of it" [Civil Society (10) – Sé]. The submayor, nevertheless, believes the increase in participation, mostly in local actions, has to do with the investments of the submunicipal government in the creation of spaces for participation such as the Forum of Entities, which we are going to discuss below. These impressions that suggest there is an increase in participation go to the same direction of the conclusions taken by Avritzer, Recamán and Venturi, mentioned above, identifying a "potential for popular participation not yet effective" in the City, considering that 38% o the ones who do not participate mentioned they would like to do so (2004).

In the region of São Mateus, as discussed in the previous item, the existence of an associativism more autonomous and participatory in which the roots are in the presence of the Catholic Church and CEBs and in the militancy of inhabitants in the unions in the 70s and 80s, is reported. One representative of the local government emphasizes this aspect:

The active participation of the Church makes a big difference here in São Mateus. […] The union was very strong here in the 70s and 80s. […] In other regions, the movement is supported by someone or some organization. Not here. The movement is a lot more independent […], it asks for more, it argues. […] We could have a meeting in every corner of this region. But I think this is the result of a great lack of power of the State here. [Local Executive (2) – São Mateus]

And he calls the attention to what could be a new characteristic: the "transit" between the social movements in the region:

> *[…] there is a transit between the movements […], people that belonged to the housing movements are now migrating to the movements of health. […] So, the ones who acted in the housing movement are shifting to the movement of health. They want a health center, doctors, medicines, medical analysis… [Local Executive (2) – São Mateus]*

This claim should be noticed because it allows us to look differently to this relation between needs and participation. In different moments, in the three submunicipal governments, the participants of the interviews affirm that in order to satisfy their immediate needs, people abandon the movements as soon as they get what they wanted, weakening the general process of participation. This information was much emphasized in the case of the housing movements as we can see:

> *[…] the housing movements serve to get a home, as soon as he gets one, he is out, he doesn't stay. They are organized while they are waiting for a house, as soon as the house is available, they keep the house and leave the movement. They are not there to change the neighborhood, Just to change their own situation. [Civil Society (12) – São Mateus]*

In fact, the housing movement, as alerted by Renato Cymbalista and Tomás Moreira (2002),[24] has a peculiarity which is the fact that people participate aiming an individual benefit, differently from the struggles to get a health center, day care, school and transportation, and the collectivity is benefited. To deal with this reality, the movement has sought to widen its struggles, trying to show the militants that the struggle for housing is not restricted to the struggle for a house (MARTINS, F. P., SANTOS, G. S. V, n/d). An interesting research agenda would be to search the comprehension of the extent it is possible, in fact, to verify the transit mentioned by the member of the local executive, and if it is there, how could it be understood as a result of the own housing movement and/ or as a result of a learning and appreciation of the participatory experiences as a way o conquer public goods. Moreover, one must establish criteria to analyze the negative color they believe to be the abandonment of a specific struggle and the demobilization

as consequences of the conquest of the goods, to identify the transit of people between popular organizations as a result of a spontaneous or induced renovation of demands. In this idea of transit, there might be a key to bring the discussion of the needed relations between the social movements that actually follow a dynamics of demands for a specific sector, and advance in terms of an articulation policy that widens its capacity for struggling and intervening in the public policies.

Besides the movements of health, housing, children and teenagers the participants interviewed in São Mateus have mentioned the Movements for Literacy of Youth and Adults (MOVAs) as important spaces for the organization of the community:

> *Here, we have more than 100 MOVAs, working by Paulo Freire's methods […]. I am part of a MOVA in the region and only in Jardim Conquista, we have 10 centers. I have been monitoring 20 of them. [Civil Society (11) – São Mateus]*

Therefore, such as in Sé, the forums were also mentioned, although they have different origins and characteristics, as relevant actors in local movements, due to its capacity of influencing public policies in their specific areas.

In Capela do Socorro, the memories of struggles, differently from what we saw in São Mateus, seem to be more present in the individual memories of their leaders than in the collective memory:

> *In 1984, when I got there, many people were killed because of the political participation… because they were able o say "we want infrastructure". They have lost their blood and their lives for that. They have lost their lives so that they could have housing, transportation, etc. And it wasn't in vain. It is kept in our memories. So, in Grajaú, we can see the courage and the determination to demand things to the public government. [Civil Society (3) – Capela do Socorro]*

> *So, in the 70s, I think the Catholic Church has induced popular mobilization. […] here in the region, we have had a process of literacy based on the Theory of Libertation… Paulo Freire […] very connected to the Theology of Libertation, and community have assumed this role. [Civil Society (7) – Capela do Socorro]*

When narrating the present, the interviews show a weak local asssociativism, with a not very satisfactory participation: *"We realize that the mobilization for public policies is still very fragile here, we don't have many results"* [Civil Society (2) – Capela do Socorro]. For a militant of the cultural movement, the lack of a more autonomous associativism is the mark of the region:

> *There are many local associations, of all types. Some of them have an assistance role and others do political bargain. But what I realize is that [...] there is a very complex relation because of politics. So, many people who are members of these associations, end up have relations with politicians, negotiating and bargaining instead of arguing and discussing policies. [...] They see the image of a councilor, a politician, as someone who is going to be helping them somehow.* [Civil Society (1) – Capela do Socorro]

As in the other regions, the movements of housing, health, children and teenagers are the most mentioned ones. Although environment is an important issue of conflict in the region, as we saw, the movements of environment are not mentioned, although APOEMA and Eco-Ativa were named. In Capela, the answers are more diversified, which indicates more fragmentation and isolation of the local actors, who seem to find bad conditions for exchange of information and articulation, what might be one of the results of the political isolation we have already mentioned. In such context, the role of the Catholic Church as a political actor is even more important:

> *It [the Catholic Church] does a great work, with a good agenda and many "pastorals". People get conscious thanks to Church. [...] I think the whole movement started there. [...] The neighborhood is very influenced by the Church meetings.* [Civil Society (4) – Capela do Socorro]

This claim is very important since it calls the attention for an aspect which has been neglected in our analyses: the relation between the social movements and the religious organizations. More recent analyses, in general, refer to the absence of the Church and its impacts in the organization of the movements. However, the research data points to the importance of renewing our efforts of analysis,[25] considering that although there were important political reorientations in the action of the Catholic Church, the place

it occupies is still very important and significant, mostly in the suburbs. Besides, one should consider the growing importance of the Christian Churches in the rearrangement of the local associativism. We still know very little about the impacts of the presence of this political actor in the community, and particularly, about the nature of the relations established with the more traditional social movements and its leaders.

THE MOVEMENTS OF YESTERDAY AND TODAY

The comparison between the social movements today and in the 70s and 80s is a pattern in the interviews in the three submunicipal governments. This analysis was present in the interviews with representatives of the public government and in the speech of the civil society leaders:

> *In the 80s the movements were formed and they had a life of its own. They were not only worried about a specific punctual problem, and once this was solved, it would be over. […] Nowadays, this is more difficult. People can gather to ask for a health center because there isn't one in their neighborhood, but once they get what they asked for, they leave […]. People have no spirit of continuity. […] The participation, as I said, is more punctual and scattered, it is very disorganized. [Local Executive (3) – São Mateus]*

> *The movement is more organized, there is more and more people... because many are part of the councils... the popular council. […] However, the participation is not the same. We can't see the hope for change, people are more accommodated. Before, you would say "Shall we do that?" And everyone would get together and do it. Today, it is different from the 70s and 80s. Everybody is more conformed. [Civil Society (12) – São Mateus]*

> *In this neighborhood, for instance, we have had huge struggles. The meeting room in the church was always crowded... And it was bigger than this one. We have advanced a lot, our neighborhood has a good infrastructure. But if we decide to do a big meeting here, not many people will come because they have electricity, water, they have schools and health centers. Even though there are other more important needs, they are accommodated. It is like that: when they need something, they participate. [Civil Society (5) – Capela do Socorro]*

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As we can notice in the interviews, the image of the movements today is referenced by the mirror of what they used to be – or what one say they used to be – the combative movements in the 70s and 80s. And, in comparison to that time, the actual frame seems negative. The gaps and shortages are highlighted in the narrations, and the lack of "people" is the main one. This feeling of absence usually comes with an evaluation that points to a great disarticulation between the movements today, which could be partly explained by the trouble in identifying common enemies – like it was done in the political dictatorship – in part related to a context of shortages, that puts leaders in a condition of competent in the dispute for resources in the public and private sectors:

> The social movement is spreaded [...] everybody is fighting over small amounts of money [...], it is a hell of a dispute. [Civil Society (7) – Sé]

> The movements are a total mess. First, because they don't have economic power, and without economic power there is no organization, they have to do stuff according to their needs, and this is wrong. [...] If they had economic power, to talk about the organic question, it would be different because they wouldn't beg for money. I feel the movements beg. It is not a feeling, I am pretty sure they beg. They come to Polis, go to FASE, Centro Gaspar Garcia, and soon they will be begging to the municipal secretary of housing. The movements don't demand. This is because of the economic power, their economic power should be equal to zero, or very low. [Civil Society (10) – Sé]

Not only the financial resources are short, but also the possibilities of recognition and reputation, motives that, according to the interviews, help to explain the dispute and fragmentation in the movements in the City of São Paulo:

> The leaders are vain [...] they don't get together to work for the collectivity, they work individually. [Civil Society (5) – Sé]

> They have the same roots [...] but each one is going to a different direction. [Civil Society (9) – Sé]

There are millions of movements [...] maybe it is too much, if people just got together and built their causes it would be a lot easier [....] it is a big fissure [...] because everybody wants to be a leader. [Civil Society (9) – São Mateus]

How do these speeches provide an idealization of what the movements were, inclined to super estimate the achievements and idealizing motives for participation? It seems impossible to think about the meaning and new arrangement of the social movements today without using this past as a reference, but it also seems difficult to advance in the recognition of these new arrangements without adjusting the images provided from this mythical past. How is it possible to balance? How is it possible to proceed with the essential effort to comprehend the new arrangements assumed by the new contemporary movements, looking from the past, but not sticking to the past, always offering negative patterns?

When accounting the nature of the participation in the territory, the interviews offer an interesting contradiction: although there could be more participation and organization, it seems more diluted and people are more accommodated. It means, they are more organized, they participate more, there are more spaces for participation, but they are more discouraged because they don't see that "hope for a change". How could one interpreter these evaluations? How to understand this contradiction, which points to more organization and less organized community? Let's try to establish some clues.

1. At first, on the one hand, it seems like this feeling is related to an objective structural condition: the increase of unemployment and violence in the big centers, leading to the basic need for survival, making it more difficult and uncertain. In the 70s and 80s, people that lived in the suburbs of São Paulo had the chance to get a job (even though it didn't pay much) and the expectation of keeping the job. In the actual scenario, there is a lack of jobs and when there is a job, the monthly income is not enough for survival and the expectation of the future is reduced to luck, in a neoliberal context that deconstructs rights. In addition, the violence limits the chances of transiting for the ones living in the suburbs, impacting the associativism, as we can see in the obstacles to realize meetings in the night shift in many regions of the City. Part of the discouragement might be explained by the lack of perspective of life change, shaking the trust that the popular organization is bringing better conditions for all. This situation contributes for a personal isolation, each one trying to take care of his things, mobilizing their family and personal networks in the neighborhood, Church, or searching for more traditional relations with politicians.

2. On the other hand, this contradiction – many organizations, but a little organized society – might be related to the proliferation, in the last decade, of assistentialitic philanthropic organizations, NGOs, business foundations and even informal charity groups which are involved in projects in the suburbs for different initiatives and motivations, but that doesn´t necessarily mean that the local population is organized for their rights. These actions deserve a study about their impacts on participation because one should verify if they encourage collective action or just lead them to the response to their individual and isolated needs and solutions, with a small capacity of local articulation.

3. Another clue is related to the movements' strategies from the 90s. Part of them has privileged the institutional struggle,[26] which is a less visible struggle, with smaller potential of mobilization, such as acting in the councils. This type of participation in the councils requires a process of growing training of the involved actors, generating, many times, a "participatory elite",[27] whose achievements are less evident and certain, since they suppose constant vigilance and monitoring. Both the actors that experience and analyze that, frequently interpret that the efforts undertaken in the negotiation with the governments – almost always very resistant to share the power – end up consuming all the energy of the movements, and because of that they can't invest in the work with the basis. If, on the one hand, we can talk about a certain demobilizing tendency resulting from the needed efforts to institutional participation (TATAGIBA, 2002), we also must recognize, on the other hand, the impact of opening the institutional channels of participation over the local association pattern. That is to say, the power of calling of the participatory spaces, which attracts individuals who have never had any experience of political organization, should be considered. Individuals that are not related to movements or organizations and respond to the invitation to participate in this space, giving the idea that there are more people participating, but the reflection of this participation over the communities and movements is not the same.

4. This contradiction is apparently related to leadership. The leaders are strategic pieces in the organization and mobilization of their communities, giving some meaning and unit to the punctual struggles in the territory. In the 90s, however, it seems like there was a shortfall in the process of training new leaders, as recognized by the representative of the public government:

In the 70s and 80s, the movements and the Church invested a lot in training to understand the health policies, the housing policies and the problems... The Church invested in the education of the community forming a considerable number of leaders, who can still deal with the population, organize a manifestation, a demand or a complaint. [Local Executive (3) – São Mateus]

The financial problems have also appeared as an important hitch in the process of training new leaders, according to a representative of the civil society:

There are not enough people in the field, we need more people. It is not because there is not anyone interested in get political and ideological education. The problem is that we end up having no conditions to support training, and [...] and execute what they have learned. This is a proof of the fragility of the movements. [Civil Society (10) – Sé]

In addition, there is a migration of important civil society leaders to the government, to the Workers Party and/or cabinet of councilors. Regarding the negative impacts of this transit over the organization of the local struggles, one of the interviewed leaders affirmed:

In my point of view, there was a great loss when the popular government took place. Many leaders of the movements ended up leaving to work for the government and then... tried to mediate, but were certainly defending the public government. A lot of interesting people left, it was a great lost because power corrupts [...]. There was a good example here in the Forum for the Rights of Children and Adolescents, people ended up in the government, and they hardly came over because their interest was no longer the same. [Civil Society (5) – Capela do Socorro]

In fact, the transit of leaders to the governments and political parties is a new question that provokes a strong impact in the logic and associative structure in the local level,[28] mainly in a scenario where the democratic potentialities of this transit seem to be limited, because they are subordinated to temporality and demands of the elections. One of the consequences of that is reflected in the challenges of autonomy in the movements concerning the political system, in a scenario where the actors

seem to live the drama as part of the movements, the political party and the government, as we will see in the item 4.

5. Finally, the last clue takes us to the discussion of the meanings of participation. The question is: what are the speech matrixes[29] that guide the discourse and the actions of the social movements today and allow them to define, defend and evaluate their strategies for struggling? Or yet, which are the discourse references used by leaders when defining the place, role and meaning of participation?

These questions were placed in the research process when we have identified that the interviewed leaders have practically not mobilized the social movements' original matrixes, expressed through the language of rights, citizenship and democracy.[30] That is to say, when telling their stories, evaluating their victories and defeats, the leaders start from a different group of references, in which the pragmatic dimension of a struggle focused on concrete results which come true in the form of health centers, bus lines, urban infrastructure, popular housing, etc., is highlighted. The impression it makes, reading the interviews, is that participation has lost the symbols which have allowed it to be related to a wider project of social transformation in a different moment. The leaders seem to create some expectations about the participation, confining it to the field of production of public policies, and to the management process. The main question is not the type of reivindications that are made, even because, as we know, the reivindications of the social movements of the 70s and 80s were also related to small struggles in the territory, but the meaning that actors give to these struggles and the expectation that animates them. In a scenario of strong devaluation of the political action, the participation doesn't seem to find support in utopia. After all, in times of an unique path, what are the projects of social transformation capable of mobilizing minds and hearts, printing meaning beyond the management of needs in the participatory action?

In the same path, Feltran (2005), in his work about social movements in the suburbs of São Paulo, departs from the recognition of the great moving force in the beginning of the 90s, equal to the one that happened before, but with a lot smaller effective political impact. Seeking to understand the causes of this fact, he suggests the problem is in the lack of a political field encouraging new popular struggles. To explain his hypothesis, he uses the metaphoric image of a projector. In the cinema, the absence of a screen makes all the images (or actions) look foggy, with no sense, as if they were projected in the empty. This is the case of the social movements in the 90s: it is like if today there wasn't any screen (political field), where the social movements could project their struggles:

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It seems like even against all prejudice and disqualification, the ones living in the slums have taken the projector of their experiences to the public park and made sure to keep it functioning during the last two decades. But the screen in which the images would have been projected, without noticing (…) has been removed. Although the projector was on, the only things left without the screen were the images, plans and sequences, getting lost in the empty space. (FELTRAN, 2005, p. 332)

Feltran associates the removal of the screen to the emergence of the neoliberalism:

The neoliberalism (…) has removed the ground of the movement. And the process was so serious, that turned the lack of alternatives to the transformation into common sense. And this has produced many consents of part of the movements, although filled with deception and frustration. (FELTRAN, 2005, p. 331)

The actual moment appears to be marked by this lack of wider political horizons capable of giving meaning to the action of the social movements. This could be translated in a certain *"despolitization"of participation – in the traces of political devalorization as a conflict arena* – evidenced not only in the relation of the movements among each others and with their social basis, but also in the forms of occupying the institutional spaces and interacting with the political systems, as we are going to see.

PARTICIPATORY EXPERIENCES DURING THE GOVERNMENT OF MARTA SUPLICY
GENERAL EVALUATION ABOUT THE CHANNELS OF PARTICIPATION

As we are going to see now, there are similar evaluations about the institutional channels of participation opened during the mandate of Marta Suplicy, but there are also different ways of conceiving the participatory process in the different regions. In a big and diverse city such as São Paulo, it couldn't be different. Our intention here is to comprehend the perception of the people interviewed, mostly in what concerns these channels of participation created in the context of the submunicipal governments.

Therefore, the first question that calls our attention is the non-implementation of one of them. The Organic Law of the City of São Paulo that implemented the submunicipal

governments has also previewed the implementation of the Representative Councils as we have mentioned in the beginning of this text. From 2002, when the Law for the Implementation of the Submunicipal Governments was approved, to the end of 2004, when the Law for the Creation of the Representative Councils was finally approved, there has been many debates and resistance from different groups. In the three regions of the city, there are participants interviewed who have been actively involved in the struggle for the approval of the Representative Council. However, the majority of the Chamber of Councilors has not made any effort for the consolidation of this space. The interviewed councilors mention the Representatives Council highlighting the risks of the creation of a new instance for the projection of future candidates, and for the representation of people, and its impacts over the electoral competition, already strong in the local space:

> There is a main factor. There was a strong opposition […] coming from the Chamber, the majority of them. Many councilors said the [Representatives] Council would take the power away from the councilor. This happens exactly because the councilor, today, does the job of dialoguing. […] Many of them do exactly this job of intermediating the dialogue between the public government and the population, and in a certain way, the Representatives Council was going to substitute this role, or reduce it. Besides, councilors saw this space as an eventual space of competition. If you are representative of a council, in the next moment you might want to be a councilor, and you are going to compete with the existing councilors. [Legislative 4]

> Many councilors do not approve the idea of the submunicipal government and Representatives Council because they are afraid of losing their power. Actually, this is not the point, the power is still concentrated in the Chamber. The Chamber still votes the budget and the Master Plan should be approved by the Chamber. Any important change should be approved by the Chamber. The Council doesn't pay a wage, and it can also represent a channel for popular reivindication and this is why I think it is going to be very important. [Legislative 3]

It is interesting to notice, in this second interview, how the Representatives Council is not seen as a threat for the councilors, because it would be a channel for reivindications, not a space for deliberation or monitoring, that is to say, the council doesn't bring

risks since it is compatible with a weak conception of participation. This vision about participation resulted in the creation of a law giving a few powers to the Representatives Council, and even with only a few powers, until the moment when this study was elaborated, elections to choose councilors (that should have occurred in the beginning of 2005) haven't yet taken place.

With the non-approval of the Representatives Council, the Municipal Government has orientated each submayor to define a model for participation in the local level, as the responsible for the Secretariat for Submunicipal Governments affirms:

> […] we haven't created a model or frame to say to them: "organize your discussion forum". Not at all. […] We have encouraged the submayors to create their own forums for local discussion. Obviously, each submayor has adopted the models they thought were the most convenient ones. […] So, we have the different examples of many submunicipal governments that conducted this process more or less politicized. [Municipal Executive 1]

In the interviews, we sought the evaluation of the leaders about the operation of these spaces. When asked to talk about the existing spaces for participation in the Submunicipal Government of Sé, the person interviewed mentions the Participatory Budget (OP), the Forum for Entities, The Forum Ação Centro, the local management councils, the Regional Master Plan and the commissions for safety in the community.[31] Some of them said they were not aware of the existence of formal spaces for participation in the central region, declaring they send their demands directly to the submayor.

In the three submnicipal governments, the people interviewed in Sé mentioned more spaces for participation created by the submunicipal government, highlighting the Forum for Entities and the Forum Ação Centro. The Forum for Entities was created by the Submunicipal Government of Sé aiming the articulation of the entities acting in the districts. In each of the eight districts, the entities would elect three or four entities to represent them in the Forum. It wasn't a formal forum and the meeting would happen every two weeks. Regarding the goals and results of the Forum, the submayor affirms:

> We have adopted here a council of representatives, based on entities […]. Besides the mechanisms for participation created in the region, this Forum for Entities […] has also

helped entities to achieve more space and have quicker access to information, interacting with its members in a more intense and quicker way. [Local Executive (3) – Sé]

However, the leaders evaluate the Forum for Entities was not capable of becoming a relevant channel of dialogue between the movements and the public government:

It was almost like a Conseg,[32] do you know what is discussed in Conseg? [...] The guy that had a bar should be expelled because he had put a canopy where he shouldn't, you know? These kinds of things. [...] And then, they would say: how are we going to change these bulbs, these old lamps? How are we going to paint them? [Civil Society (8) – Sé]

People participated in one or two meetings. [...] They didn't want to get involved and then have abandoned everything in the middle of the process. [Civil Society (6) – Sé]

In the evaluation of the leaders, the Forum Ação Centro has also deserved many criticisms:

We have participated, we have been given information in the beginning, before it was approved, but after its approval, I couldn't monitor anymore, we were not invited to the meetings, I don't even know what happened, even because we had a very clear critic too. [...] The question of including the homeless was very serious and should be discussed in terms of financial numbers because sometimes this question is only present in the speech. [Civil Society (1) – Sé]

The Forum Ação Centro is a department which was created with the Secov, I think, this people has a different look to the City of São Paulo. They believe the Center should be beautiful, with red carpet. [...] this is where we disagreed. [Civil Society (8) – Sé]

Differently from the Submunicipal Government of Sé, in São Mateus there was a larger diversity in the answers when asked to point the spaces for participation in the submunicipal government, even because the people interviewed considered meetings of the Master Plan and establishment of agreements with the Municipal Government as participation. The experiences of participation that were mentioned were: the Regional

Master Plan, local management councils, monthly assembly meeting for the discussion of questions related to the maintenance services, agreements between the movements and the Municipal Government and personal advise on Wednesdays.

In the Submunicipal Government of Capela do Socorro, there was also a great diversity in the answers, and OP, local management councils, Regional Master Plan, Councils of CEU[33] (Unified Center for Education), monthly meetings at the submunicipal government and the forum of culture were the most mentioned ones.

When we analyze these answers, what is understood as participation calls our attention. In the submunicipal governments of São Mateus and Capela do Socorro formal spaces (institutionalized participatory spaces, such as councils, Participatory Budget and Master Plan) and "participation" as personal meetings of leaders with the submayor or coordinators, is considered as participation. In Sé, some of the people interviewed, although emphasizing less than in others submunicipal governments, have affirmed they mobilize personal networks to proceed their demands.

In several moments, these two distinct forms of "participation" are not properly differentiated by the person interviewed. It is like there wouldn't be any difference to have a formal public channel or to talk directly (and privately) with the submayor or any coordinator in the submunicipal government. It is even possible to say, based on the interviews, that the informal spaces are more estimated by the movements. There is a positive evaluation – by the social movements and some members of the public government – of the personal relations as a form of transmitting demands that, in the case of submunicipal governments is even easier because it is physically near. What does this role attributed to personal relations as a way to get public goods to actors who have built themselves as political individuals and defend the rights of citizenship, mean? In the same way, what are the risks of this strategy that defends the opening of institutionalized channels of participation, at the same time that mobilizes the traditional channels for intermediating interests? In the speeches of the movements, the limits between participation and clientelism seem to lose sharpness in the same way that the lines uniting participation and democracy on one side and privileged relations with the public government and corruption on the other. We leave here the registry of a discussion that we are going to try to discuss deeply in item 4.

When asked about the channels of participation in the submunicipal governments, many participants answered they know some spaces, but they affirm they don't have

time or conditions for participating in all of them. Therefore, they say they don't really know what happened or has been decided in those spaces. People answer: "oh, I was not the one who went to this meeting, but my partner did… regarding this space, you have to talk to him (her), he (she) is the one who knows what happened". It is not the fact that people share duties which called our attention, it is impossible to participate in everything. What called our attention was the fact that it seems like there is no information exchange between the leaders nor collective strategies elaborated for the occupation of these channels, not favoring a collective vision about these processes and possibly not favoring a more incisive action that would reinforce common questions. It is like there were specialists, the ones who know more about a given topic and they are practically "irreplaceable". We are aware of the importance of deep knowledge to participate with quality and effectiveness in these spaces, however, we still think how it could be different, how it would be possible to have specialized people that also build collectively this knowledge with the community every day.

These remarks take us to the debate about the multiplication of the participatory spaces. This is shown in the interviews as a need to rethink the many spaces, articulating them, avoiding overlapping and the sensation of participatory exhaustion:

> It is getting messy. There are many councils, people is being called to participate, there are too many things […] there are many activities related to health and they called us, but we couldn't participate. […] I think it was facilitated and now there are too many activities for the same public. […] There are a lot of councils, for instance. In health, there is the Conference of Women, the Health Council, […] there were many callings for participation. […] We couldn't manage it, it is good to be called, but if you have no time, no way to come, what can one do? […] Because there is just a few who are willing to sit down and think, to monitor, it is not easy to sit down, listen and see the clock ticking, losing your free time, your resting time to go there and participate. It is not easy. [Civil Society (8) – São Mateus]

The representative of the public government goes to the same path:

> We realize the social organizations are having some trouble to participate in so many forums… there was a growing in these forms of organization, a certain

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institutionalization of these tools, but we can see that civil society is not capable of participating of everything. So, they say it many times. […] We should think in the reorganization of these spaces, in a way to facilitate the participation of the civil society. [Local Executive (2) – Capela do Socorro]

This data allows us to think in three dimensions that we should possibly concentrate on. First, if this evaluation about where one should participate has been collectively made, if not, we should do it. Second, if it is not necessary to think of ways of sharing and articulating information among the participants of each space. And finally, if there are, in fact, enough leaders who are prepared to participate in these spaces, and if not, if new leaders should be trained.

PARTICIPATORY BUDGET: FROM ENTHUSIASM TO DISENCHANTMENT

In this item, we are going to discuss how the people interviewed have evaluated the Participatory Budget in São Paulo (OP), approaching the initial enthusiasm of the leaders and the disenchantment with the work that has not been realized. We are also going to discuss the role of the leaders in the mobilization process, how they exercised the representation and even the frauds that took place in some parts of the City.

The Participatory Budget,[34] and the Master Plan, was one of the channels of participation most mentioned by the people interviewed. In many regions of the City, there were a lot of criticisms to this experience.

In Sé, only two of the participants interviewed said they had never participated of any meeting. When evaluating the OP, the deception with the results of participation is highlighted. The evaluation that the non-realization of the approved works has leaded to a discredit on the mechanisms of this channel of participation, leading to a decrease in the number of participants every year, was general. The Participatory Budget, an important mark of the governments of the Workers Party, has come to an end in the government of Marta Suplicy, with several criticisms of the leaders of movements:

We couldn't identify any work in the City that was a result of the OP. [Civil Society (1) – Sé]

The Participatory Budget should be called "fool me if you want" because so far I haven't seen anything. [Civil Society (4) – Sé]

This is a big lie. It doesn't exist. In 2004 we did not participate in the OP. […] So that we can see how much we argue and debate for the budget and the councilors are the ones who end up making the decisions […] it is not even the mayor. […] Everything we have discussed and considered as priorities, such as daycares, health centers and hospitals, were never executed. […] This is why it is difficult to mobilize the population to discuss politics. [Civil Society (8) – Sé]

I don't believe in the Participatory Budget […] because of political issues, I don't agree with its methods, how it works. Here, there is no Participatory Budget anywhere. […] The budget is already divided: a certain amount to health, another to education, some money for the external debt and some for the internal debt. Then, the small amount left, 6 or 7%, should be given to the civil society and movements to debate. So, this is not Participatory Budget, it is misery budget. [Civil Society (10) – Sé]

The initial enthusiasm with the experience of the Participatory Budget was followed by discredit and as a consequence participation started to vanish:

The results are very small […] and are not satisfactory. […] There were better results in the beginning. […] When the project of Participatory Budget has first appeared, people believed they would see their problems being solved. Then when […] the first year was over and most of the problems had not been solved, people stopped believing. […] So, what happens? I am not going to waste my time to discuss the project, go there, and pick up a delegate, if I am aware that the problems we list are not going to be solved. […] So, people don't believe on it. [Civil Society (6) – Sé]

In the first moment, it [Participatory Budget] was a boom, everyone was interested, and now, no one else wants to participate because you approve the budget and the works and they are not done because of many reasons, and you just have the power to decide over the allocation of a very small part of the resources, and you have to argue for it.

[…] So, the popular participation is not a real one. […] It is a popular participation, but it is not as democratic as it appears to be. […]. [Civil Society (7) – Sé]

I am going to take the example of housing in the Center. Some people came five or six times, and then we see the mistakes in the speeches of the militant and public government: that all the problems are going to be solved. So, follow me because we are going to get the houses. In four years, how many houses did we get in the Central Region? The first ones are only being delivered now, and still it is very restricted […]. But if I say, come with me, we are going to get a house, and you come one, two times, and realize there is no house, and there isn't even a tile […] nor a small package of soil to take home, I am being fooled in front of the others. I am going there to argue and fight and I don't even understand what the fight is for. I don't go anymore. [Civil Society (9) – Sé]

In the Submunicipal Government of Capela do Socorro, we can find the same evaluation we have found in Sé, but more emphasized: the non-realization of the approved work resulted in discredit and decrease in participation, emptying the OP:

In the beginning, the population came and believed. Some of the meetings had more than three thousand people because they believed in the project. […] I have been to a meeting that there were so many people participating […] that inscriptions lasted until five o' clock... because they believed... I come here, I will be able to vote in the representatives, participate in the budget and say which the most important things for my neighborhood are. And it was disappointing. It was disappointing because there was no feedback and time goes by. […] It is a channel of participation that started to vanish, lost its credibility. […] People won't participate unless they are respected and heard, did you get it? They need an answer, it could be yes or no, but a convincing answer. When it is not clear, people tend to leave, not participating. [Civil Society (3) – Capela do Socorro]

No, there was no participation […]. Nothing happened, unfortunately, because everybody got their hopes down. I have even invited people to participate of the last meeting, but no one wanted to come. There weren't enough people and we couldn't even elect a delegate or approve anything because the people didn't want to participate.

[…] Right in the beginning, everybody was excited, but right after, all the measures approved got old and were not executed… So, I think that in the end of the process, […] mainly in our neighborhood, there was no participation at all. I think there were only me and three other people. [Civil Society (4) – Capela do Socorro]

Because of my disappointment, I have also gotten away from the Participatory Budget. I realized that all the things discussed, everything we considered important, was not done. The work wasn't done. [Civil Society (5) – Capela do Socorro]

In the first year, we had many hopes. Mainly related to the policies of health. […] Although we have put all our efforts to make it work, it was very hard to keep the same hope afterwards. [Local Executive (1) – Capela do Socorro]

The problem of representation inside the Participatory Budget, which caused the cancellation of the assembly meeting was also mentioned:

In some places, only three people were present [in the assembly meeting] and they pick representatives from these three. So, three votes became 300 votes. How can it be? […] The representatives should represent the community, it should be someone trusted by the community and someone committed to the population. This is the great fear. […] It is true, there was even an intervention and they had to cancel the whole process and start it over again to have representatives in the Participatory Budget. [Civil Society (3) – Capela do Socorro]

The submayor called the attention to the positive results of the Participatory Budget:

We have executed many things approved by the Participatory Budget. Many things. There are daycares, schools, renovation and many services which were approved by the OP. There was an unusual thing: the sport group got organized by the first time, went to the meeting and approved the construction of a roof for a court in a CDM [Municipal Sport Center] in the District Dutra. And we did it. The employees of the submunicipal government went to the place, assumed the commitment of implementation in case of approval, and we did it. The court has a roof now, as a result of the Participatory

Budget. And it was interesting because this is a population that is not usually mobilized to participate. So, there were many forums of participation, and you don't go to all of them. During this last year, we have had elections so there was a natural demobilization. [Local Executive (3) – Capela do Socorro]

In the evaluation made in São Mateus about the Participatory Budget, although the criticisms were also prevailing, as seen in Sé and Capela do Socorro, there was one thing which was different: the item "the non-realization of the works has leaded to a discredit and decrease in participation" has had just a few references. Only one of the interviews has elaborated this critical argument, which was frequent in Sé and Capela:

Look, I have always been to the Council of Health, since the 80s […] and I have always really believed that population should be pointing the causes and possible solutions. […] But we have always thought the population was wasting a lot of time with that… there is a meeting here, another one there. […] I said: but listen, people give their free time, pay the transportation to go wherever it is necessary… time is important to everyone. And we get there, discuss the problems and solutions with opened-hearts and there is no result. In my point of view, this was the most frustrating thing in the last years. […] This year, I have even abandoned things unfinished, in the middle of the process. I said: no, it is enough, I can't take it anymore. Every time we would go to the meeting we would come home stressed. [Civil Society (1) – São Mateus]

The feeling of frustration by the fact that decisions were concentrated in the mayor's cabinet, the critics to the fragility of the popular representation ("there are always the same people participating") and to the political use of the space surround the speech about the Participatory Budget in the region. The occurrence of a fraud in a meeting, although mentioned punctually, contributes to the negative evaluation of the process:

In the first occurrence of Participatory Budget I was present. I have even participated in the commission responsible for the organization, but then, I saw what happened in that first OP and I was shocked. I said: […] I have a lot of things to do, I need to get out of here. Because everyone debated, debated and debated and in the moment of picking delegates, some councilors would choose who they would be […], and they did that

openly, everybody could see, and I was very angry, I said: I will never come back here. […] I am not going to get involved in this fight. I think it is a very dirty fight, I am not going to stand in the same level they are. So I left. [Civil Society (12) – São Mateus]

Just to have an idea of how big is the participation here, last year there was an assembly meeting that was cancelled because of corruption. The drop-box of votes came from the submunicipal government with 33 extra votes. […] So that you can see how democratic is the government of the Submunicipal Government of São Mateus. […] But we fought against them. It was the only OP meeting which was cancelled. Unfortunately it was a shame for São Mateus. [Civil Society (10) – São Mateus]

This manipulation has no end. […] When someone is inside his house, he doesn't know what the Participatory Budget is. And no one shows him. Because it is not worth, he would participate and question. And then you break the existing chain, because there are always the same people participating. [Civil Society (9) – São Mateus]

But there were also some people who made sure to highlight the positive aspects of the whole process of discussion in the Participatory Budget. In a very interesting analysis, one of the interviewed highlights the positive aspects of the OP, calling the attention to the different type of learning it offers and the possibility of making politics and social pressure in a different form that, according to her, is more compatible with the cultural values of the locals:

When someone reivindicated an improvement next to your house and you saw that happening, it would give them credits, it was very good. It was a popular movement a little different from the ones we were used to in the 80s and 90s. […] I think it was a process of learning to the low income population, it was a real training. […] Is it going to happen this year? They are already asking me that. […] Our population came from the countryside, when we mobilized, we went to the streets, stopped the cars, so not everyone liked us, we gave the impression of an aggressive movement. […] And the whole process of budget was calmer, we would talk in small groups, and then would enlarge the group, getting together… So, for some people who had problems with the movement of struggles, could take it easier and participate, it was less aggressive to

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them. [...] They have also learned, and we have learned too, there are many things we could do for our region. [Civil Society (2) – São Mateus]

A "learning" offered by the Participatory Budget, and it might seem dual, is to know how to deal with the lack of resources and comprehend the "reasons of the State".

In the OP meetings, he [the submayor] would expose the problems he had. [...] Look, this month we haven't received enough money to do this or that. So, what should be our priority? Should we try to do this first? Or let's share? Do a little bit here, a little there and when we get more money we can finish here or there. This was taken from the submunicipal budget, and it was a monthly accounting he [the submayor] would do. [Civil Society (3) – São Mateus]

When the submayor came, there were not many resources available to respond to our needs, of course, but he would listen and try to go to the meetings. [...] And the population knew "He is not doing for me, but is doing for others". [...] The important thing is that people know what was being done in that place [...]. So I think these channels of meeting and conversation have existed and were very good. [Civil Society (6) – São Mateus]

This learning can lead one, on the one hand, to an accommodation and conformity that demobilize the movements. Because the simple finding does not necessarily take to any form of mobilization. The Participatory Budget can be turned into a space for provision of accounting as it sounds as a powerful instance of legitimacy.

On the other hand, it is a learning that many people do not want to recognize because it means to think more in the community as a whole and in the ones that have more needs; it involves giving up personal relations with politicians or councilors to get quicker response to *your* needs. The municipal resources are limited, as we can see above in the two interviews, and the Municipal Government has to make choices all the time and the population could publicly decide how to use them. This would be the goal of the Participatory Budget, to make public and share the decision of allocation of the scarce resources. If each one is only thinking about *his* street and *his* neighborhood, the clientelist relations tend to be maintained and overlap the public channels of participation.

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The approval of the Municipal Law 13.430 in September 13th, 2002 has instituted the new Strategic Mater Plan of the City of São Paulo. In the City Statute [2000], it is mentioned that Master Plans should be executed by municipalities with more than 20 thousand inhabitants. It aims the assurance of the social function of property, the planning of the development of the city and the orientation of the distribution of the land occupation, the preservation and recovery of the environment, the creation of new public spaces, the improvement in the urban landscape and the adaptation of the conditions of access to some places in the city. It also mentioned the elaboration of Regional Master Plans over the institutional responsibility of each submunicipal government, which could elaborate its plan with or without external advisory.

The space of the Regional Master Plan has received many positive evaluations in São Mateus. One of the participants interviewed, for instance, who was very critical to the Participatory Budget, defining it as "illusory participation", refers to the experience of participation in the Master Plan as "the only moment of deliberation" [Civil Society (9) – São Mateus]. Another participant affirms, with pride, that the Master Plan of São Mateus "was one of the most organized ones in São Paulo" and explains the reasons for that:

> Why it was well organized? Because the community has participated. I know because I have monitored the ones who came to work in the Master Plan. I was the guide of the technicians who elaborated this plan, I took them everywhere. [Civil Society (11) – São Mateus].

However, in many interviews realized in São Mateus and in the other submunicipal governments, there were critics about the process of dissemination of information about the Regional Master Plan. Actually, the problem of information was much emphasized as a limitation to the access of the population to the channels of participation, in general. On the one hand, the lack of information about these spaces seems related to the complexity resulting from the size of the population and its distribution in the territory, turning the process of dissemination of information about the many existing spaces into a difficult task. On the other hand, nevertheless, according to the interviews, the local government is not willing to share the information with all, limiting as a way of control-

ling the potential for conflicts in the participatory spaces, sharing the information only with the ones who agree with their general principles. This perception that the information about the channels of participation is unequally disseminated and that the most important filter is the partisan one, was highlighted in the interviews in the three regions:

> *[…] I think this is a different problem: there were groups of popular participation, so, the friends had lots of information and the enemies had just a few. [Civil Society (9) – Sé]*

> *The process was very closed. Unfortunately, it happened again. You only have access to what is happening if you are acting as a group. In this case, there is always someone who is connected to someone of the submunicipal government and you get the information. Otherwise, you won't know what is going on. […] Generally, there are many people that would be interested in the participation, in the exposition, reivindication […] but it is not going to happen. [Civil Society (5) – São Mateus]*

> *We are still in that system… it is too closed. So, look, what does the political party that is in charge do? He seeks to […] involve members of the party. So, generally, people that are militants or are not members do not get information. So, it is more difficult to participate. [Civil Society (7) – São Mateus]*

> *Everything that happened in the submunicipal government was restricted. The ones who were not friends of the king, who didn't agree with the principles of the government, had no information. Or looked for information somewhere else. So, some people went to the Chamber, looking for councilors, to find out the date of the meetings. Unfortunately, only a few people ended up participating in the Master Plan of that region. Only a few. […] Because they didn't inform us. [Civil Society (3) – Capela do Socorro]*

Such as in São Mateus, the Regional Master Plan of Capela do Socorro has also received positive evaluations despite the critics regarding the dissemination of information. The people interviewed – both from the civil society and local government – have stressed the importance of the process of discussion:

It might not be the Master Plan that everybody dreamed of, but no one can say it was not debated. [Civil Society (5) – Capela do Socorro]

It was an incredibly participatory process. [Local Executive (2) – Capela do Socorro]

There was participation. No one can say there wasn't, and it was good. […] We gathered lots of people involved in health, many associations, people I didn't know and we debated among specialists and non-specialists for several days, many Saturdays, the whole day. And I got to know the place. [Local Executive (1) – Capela do Socorro]

The way in which we built the whole process made me very pleased. [Local Executive (3) – Capela do Socorro]

In the Submunicipal Government of Sé, the Regional Master Plan doesn't appear to be a process that has effectively mobilized the leaders, contrary to what we have noticed in the other submunicipal governments. The few references are critical evaluations that highlight the small organization of the process of debating, mainly in the local level, "I have participated […] but I haven't understood how the participation took place. Everything was very confusing, we were called in the last minute" [Civil Society (8) – Sé].

Comparing the evaluation of the processes of Participatory Budget and Regional Master Plan, we have noticed that evaluation is, in general, a lot more critical to the Participatory Budget than to the Master Plan. This probably happened because the process of the Regional Master Plan was better conducted, but also because of the decisive nature of the participatory spaces and its impacts over the dynamics of debating inside these same spaces. In the case of the Master Plan, we are talking about the elaboration of a law and not its execution. It seems like the people interviewed have not realized that the elaboration of a law is very different from its implementation. None of them has affirmed to be worried if the Master Plan is going to be respected or not.

In the Participatory Budget, we are dealing with a way of participation that involves the decision about which works and services are going to be executed (or not) in the next year. This is why the results of the participation are clearer. The experience itself encourages the participants to think in the works that are going to be executed in the short-term, instead of the long-term city planning. It is a space where the decisions fol-

low a well defined calendar that starts in one year and finishes on the next. Although a Master Plan also presents an end product taken from the debates, which is the final draft of the Plan, the result is a different one, what might favor the dialogue, the mobilization of different interests and conflicts of a different nature. The process of the Master Plan deals with the dreamed and wished city and not with the immediate works and services to the population.

Finally, there is a question if the population that participated on the Participatory Budget has really understood that not all the demands proposed were going to be executed. The choice of delegates and councilors and the whole process of discussion that ends in the presentation of the final budget involve options of works and services that are effectively going to be executed. Through other evaluations, we know that the communication process in the experience of Participatory Budget failed and people didn't clearly know in what they were participating, what was the methodology and that not all the demands were going to be executed (VITALE, 2004).

We also would like to add that, contrary to this evaluation, some participants – even though being critical to the process and results of participation – have given a great importance to the opportunity to "talk and to be heard". Therefore, when asked about the possibility of the movements influence in the public policies, we read:

> *The actual government doesn't listen to us […] although the government is focused on the majority of the population, they don't listen, they announce: it is going to be like that. Some times you can interfere. For instance, we could be able to interfere in the question of bus lines and corridors. We want to talk, but no one listens to us. […]. I think it works like that: they have heard in the past, elaborated the policies and now they are going to execute it. […] But, the space of dialogue is still a lot wider than in the previous mandates, the last two mandates. […] It is not comparable because before you couldn't even approach. Now you talk and sometimes they don't listen. But at least you say, give your opinion, criticize and there is space opened for dialoguing, but it is not the way we think it should be. [Civil Society (3) – Sé]*

> *Even though we are aware it is not really "democratic"… but the right to be there and to participate is really positive. Even if our demonstration is kept inside the drawer in the office, we have the freedom to go there and say what we think… […] Just the fact*

of going there and saying what I think, what I think it is good for my neighborhood, even knowing that 90% of what I said is not going to be realized, is very positive. [Civil Society (9) – São Mateus]

These interviews show the evidence that the chance of accessing the State, of presenting demands, without the need of middle men such as the councilors, for instance, is already a lot if we take into account the Brazilian authoritarian tradition, added with 20 years of political dictatorship and to eight years of mandates of Maluf and Pitta in São Paulo. This comprehension was present in the interviews in the three submunicipal governments and although it was not a general evaluation, we believe it is important to be considered. It is the recognition that there are more spaces for expression, and this is not trivial, if we also consider that there is still a long way to reach a point in which the population is going to have the power to actually influence the process of production of public policies. Dilemmas that another participant summarized in one phrase:

Any open door is welcome, today, but it is still insufficient. [Civil Society (10) – São Mateus]

This item has pointed what the people interviewed understand as participation and how they evaluate it in their regions. We have discussed how many participatory channels arose, but what called our attention was the development of informal conversations with the submunicipal government as ways of participation (we are going to explore that in the next item). We have noticed that the implementation of the submunicipal government alone is not sufficient for the democratization of the management processes. Although the small amount of time doesn't allow us to adequately evaluate its results, our research showed that in the same time that the submunicipal governments appear to have contributed to the access to the State by the citizens, this possibility might have generated, as a collateral effect, the strengthen of the clientelist networks.

The Participatory Budget and the Regional Master Plan were the more analyzed spaces because they were the ones most mentioned during the interviews. The great variety in the forms of the implementation and development of these experiences in the three regions should be highlighted. Obviously, it was not possible to identify, in this research, the factors that were the most important variables in each region, but in gene-

rally, we could highlight the form in which the decentralization was conducted in the territory, the political group that assumed the power in the submunicipal governments and the larger or smaller capacity of organization of the local civil society as important explanatory factors. Despite the diversity, proper to the complexity of the capital of São Paulo, we have also identified common problems to the many experiences, such as the lack of information about the existing participatory spaces, the fragmentation of the participatory spaces, the disarticulation of the social movements and the lack of a more organic and articulated strategy for occupation of the institutional spaces. And, in addition to that, a perception, based on the concrete experiences, that the participatory spaces, although essential, are partial and insufficient spaces of struggles, mostly in a scenario in which they appear to have become instances dismissed of power. As seen in many interviews, the comprehension that participatory spaces are spaces for the confirmation of decisions already taken somewhere else was common.

PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRACY: OLD AND NEW CHALLENGES

In the interviews, we have realized that when it came to the evaluation of the nature and quality of the channels of participation, it was common that the answers wouldn't be restricted to the evaluation of participation in the local level, but widened to the pattern of relations between government, legislative power and society.[35] The evaluations, although departing from concrete empirical references such as the Participatory Budget, Master Plan or local experiences, and had as its bases the personal experiences at these spaces, ended up extrapolating the more restricted aspects. Therefore, when evaluating the concrete experiences, the people interviewed have revealed dimensions that point to the ground of political expectations in these spaces, allowing us to problematize the questions of meaning and place of the institutional participation, for State and Civil Society's actors, in the complicated process of struggling for the affirmation and defense of their rights.

In a more general plan, this debate gives evidence to the important discussion about the desirable and possible combination between representative and participatory democracy, in different projects of state reform. In a micro level, what is at stake is the comprehension of the expected results of institutional participation and its limitations when combining, in the agents perspective, with more traditional strategies for forwarding demands, through the representative system and the mobilization of personal networks.

There was an expectation generated or fed by specialized literature, that the decision of investing in forms of participatory democracy would mean choosing the investment in more universal, public and democratic forms to access public goods; an "option" that would point, consequently, to the denial of less democratic forms, such as personal networks, privileges, favors, etc, which are strategies that are already rootened in our political culture. Although historical, political and cultural constraints were mentioned to affirm this new *ethos*, it was common – and this is the point we would like to focus – the identification of dichotomic pairs that seem to guide majority or exclusively the action of the political subjects, considering that one of the main ones would be the opposition between favor and right, privilege and citizenship, as presupposition to the relation between State and society.

However, departing from the discussion presented in this text, we question to what extent we are not forgetting to investigate, with the same effort, the forms combining, in the concrete strategies of political subjects, these different (and contradictories) forms of relation between State and society, movements and political system, in the process of distribution of political resources, when we focus on the potential of renewal of these subjects and its practices.

On the other hand, we can't say there was only a mistaken expectation or oblivion in observing the many forms of relation in which society reivindicated its demands. In the second item of our text, we have showed how some scenario changes can impact the social movements, such as the increase in unemployment, violence and the proximity with the political system. We are saying that effectively the movements are no longer the same because it is no longer possible to organize in the same way.

In the case of the mandate of Marta Suplicy, the balance of participatory experiences, as seen above, apparently indicates a government that opened spaces for participation, but did not invest on these spaces, and mainly, did not consider them items of an agenda for democratic reform of the State and construction of governability. During her mandate, the experiences of participatory democracy had a peaceful relation with an extremely conservative practice of management concerning, for instance, the relation between the legislative and the executive powers, in which core was based in a relation of exchange, related to the short-term electoral interests. The participation during her mandate, at least the one practiced in the local level in which we could access through the research, has assumed an instrumental and residual character being, therefore, inca-

pable of tensioning the more general logic of work of the government, both in the work of the bureaucratic structures, in terms of social control over them, and in the relation the government establishes with the different State powers. On the one hand, the government mark is leftist when dealing with the allocation of public resources, concerning the redistributive effects of implemented policies, particularly social policies. However, on the other hand, politically, Marta's mandate has rehabilitated conservative structures when seeking the maintenance of power.[36]

Regarding the social movements, the peaceful relation between the participatory and questioning action in the institutional channels of participation and mobilization of personal networks as a form of accessing the State, has called our attention. According to a specific story of origin, dated on the arise of these actors in a scenario of dictatorship, the paradox between privilege and right, favor and conquest, private and universal, citizen and client, among others, addressed to some specific characters and their different way of acting in the public arena. In the dichotomic pairs, the dispute between the old and new pattern of relations between State and society in which the deception point would be in the ascendance of "new citizens of rights", would be expressed. Our research reveals that it would be more adequate to talk about a combination of different forms of sending demands to the State, and the option for participation should be one of these strategies, that could be valued (depending on many factors, such as the opening of the State) and in the same time could be associated with others, such as the attempt to contact a councilor or influent politician, instead of a paradox. With this registry, we might be able to better understand the fact that many people interviewed gave the same value to the participation in councils, Participatory Budget meetings and private meeting with representatives of the public government. Therefore, it seems absolutely important to reflect about the place participation takes in the political projects of the movements.

But what creates a peaceful relation – in the cases of movements and in the mandate of the Workers Party – between participation and conservative and non-democratic methods of relation between the State and society? Why can participation be considered as something in the same level as privileged relations established with State representatives as a form of presenting demands? Why doesn't participation impact the management logics?

An assumption might be in a clue mentioned in item two: the despolitization of participation. Analyzing the public representatives' and civil society speak, it seems like

we are dealing with the same meaning key, that addresses to an adequate participation. The meanings of participation to the government and movements, look like, in a certain way, as two sides of the same coin, where we can see the vanishing of the political discourse, in which the use of participation can be seen as one of the consequences. In the following two items, we are going to deepen into this analysis.

THE PLACE OF PARTICIPATION IN THE GOVERNMENT'S POLITICAL PROJECT

When looking at the mandate of Marta Suplicy, we realize the variety of channels of participation opened during her government. Many processes, such as the Participatory Budget, the Regional Master Plans, the implementation of the submunicipal governments, show the will of widening the channels of participation.[37] However, the evaluations made about these experiences by the movements were mainly critical, highlighting the lack of concrete results of participation and an inclination to manipulation and use of participatory spaces, used as instances for the government's legitimacy:

> *We have participation, but even with all the opened spaces, we recognize they used it as a tool. [...] They would call assembly meetings [...] to get the population's approval, but actually things came in a top-down perspective. [Civil Society (5) – Capela do Socorro]*

Another participant, when mentioning participation in the councils, affirms that "in the councils we never have the majority of votes [...] you end up being the tool of legitimacy of their votes. This happens in all the councils because the presidents are always government's allies.

And she expands her criticisms to the Conferences of Health and Social Work:

> *The Conference of Health was a massacre [...], an annihilation, we have lost all the battles. [...] The Conference of Social Assistance was also an absurd, the ones from the government wanting us to approve the proposal anyways. I haven't even fought for it, because in the Conference of Health I did it, we fought, we cursed, and in the following day I didn't even show up. In the Conference of Social Work I left. I had a chest pain, I was tired, you know? [...] So, unfortunately, there is no democracy in such councils. [Civil Society (7) – Sé]*

This evaluation about the participatory experiences in the Workers Party's mandate seems to provide a discredit not only in participation as a tool to conquer public goods and services, but also in the public government – as an instance of forwarding legitimate demands – and in the own possibility of political action. It is interesting to notice how the instances of participation, used as instances for legitimacy, even with no power, might produce the opposite result – the lack of belief in the politicians, in participation, and sometimes even in democracy and we can see in the interviews below:

> *No, people don't participate. There is a general discredit in the public government, […] we don't really believe they will vote in a proposal and once it was approved, it is going to be executed. […] Why can't a homeless be in the same room with an entrepreneur and debate? I think we expected this would happen in a mandate of the Workers Party and it didn't. Power is still a very strong fetish. So, I believe we should demystify power […] so that the population can potentially feel capable of participating of the discussions […] There is a general discredit on the public power […] and I believe there is an abuse of power, lack of words […] It seems like political marketing than the effective search for participation in the construction of the city. I am not sure if people give credit to the participation with the public government. I don't think so. This is not the way we see things from here. [Civil Society (1) – Sé]*

> *We are going through a very difficult moment because people don't believe in any government anymore… […] because a more structural change was expected. […] We have history, democracy didn't simply appear from anywhere and we still have to deal with the same problems […]. The other day, we have decided to count it: all of us have become poorer, all of us. So, why is democracy for? If we just have it to say we do, it is not enough… We want financial democracy. This is a discussion that should be more present, not only in the Union of Women, but also in the social movements. [Civil Society (7) – Sé]*

In the same logic, a person interviewed admits the Brazilian Constitution is no longer a tool for struggling:

I have battled to include the fifth article that says "every citizen has the right of housing" inside the Constitution, I thought it would solve our problems, but it didn't […]. This Constitution doesn't serve for us anymore. [Civil Society (8) – Sé]

Of course, in all these speeches there was also a disappointment with the Workers Party:

We believed a savior would come. […] There were only two saviors: either the Christ or Lula. […] We have experimented many forms of government in Brazil […] every political trend, every political party, all of them have already tried a piece of the cake, from the conservative to the ones who dreamed of a transformation. They have all commanded. Now, […] I am curious to see what is happening on the next elections, hoping the extreme rightists don't win. It sucks! Poor and black are gonna suffer... I can't tell what might happen. [Civil Society (5) – São Mateus]

Regarding the politicians, mainly here in the City Center, we hate them because they are all the same, and I don't belong to PSTU,[38] I want to make it clear. But unfortunately, that's what happens. The social struggles here in the region are political struggles of people of Maluf's[39] class. I mean, the political culture of the state and country hasn't changed, even the politicians of the Workers Party act such as the old politicians. So, our relation with politicians is always very careful. [Civil Society (1) – Sé]

This new information is very important and certainly will have an influence in the practical action of the movements from now on. After all, the Workers Party worked as an important communication tool, and more than that, it appeared like a way of getting to the political system, approaching it without getting corrupted, since the own party seemed to be isolated, avoiding infection with political and non-ethical games that have traditionally marked Brazilian politics. What are the reflections of the movements in a scenario of lost illusions? When PT appears to be just "one more party", how is their relation with the political system and what are the impacts of that in the strategies for action of the movements? These are important questions that arise from the actual scenario of political crisis, and that are going to need new investigation efforts.

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The Constitution and the participation along with the governments of PT in the federal and municipal levels and its weak results – mostly in the social area – seem to compose the plan of lost illusions. This is an important balance of leftists post-90s. The same person interviewed that mentioned that "this Constitution is no long good for us" is also the one who says that "this government is no longer good for us "and "this participatory budget is no longer good for us". The leftist movement in Brazil is actually a successful movement. They have an approved Constitution, created councils, a political party which has reached power and uncountable participatory experiences instituted in many levels. It is just hard to realize how these experiences were not capable of changing a pattern in which democracy is residual and inequalities are permanent and irreducible. We can no longer say: when the Earth Statute is approved, when we create the councils, or when the Workers Party wins the elections everything is going to change. It is the end of innocence.

This evaluation of the movements was based on the practices of Marta Suplicy's mandate that, on the one hand, implemented participatory policies, showing her commitment with the democratization of public management, and on the other hand, kept the old political practices of giving political posts in exchange of something such as in the submunicipal governments' posts, something mentioned many times during the interviews. A militant of the health movement said:

> *Politics has changed a lot, it is no longer the same, we are very disappointed because we fought against the distribution of posts in the submunicipal government and now it is happening... it is something we don't like and we don't agree with. [Civil Society (12) – São Mateus]*

About that, we can read in other interviews:

> *The party responsible for the city, PT, is not listening to the population […] they give posts to people who they have political interests […] in my point of view, this is terrible because it reminds me of the old mandates of Maluf and Pitta… the submunicipal government given to that councilor. […] The population is not heard, is divided and sold among councilors. [Civil Society (3) – Sé]*

Do you know how the submunicipal government is composed? Its is like that: a councilor "x" had more votes, so he has more representation... […] even if it isn't in the same neighborhood where he got the votes. But he can say: I want to be the in the head of the "x"submunicipal government […] and then, they just leave two or three posts to some people that might have good intentions, but he won't be able to do anything there. Do you know why? Because he is not going to have any power to make decisions. The fight coming from the top doesn't allow us to work. [Civil Society (5) – São Mateus]

It is a party's discussion; who is coming, who is going to be pointed, who is assuming each coordination. Oh, and they have to save posts for councilor's friends. This is how it happened, a great exchange of posts, it is the well-known old system. [Civil Society (9) – São Mateus]

In general, the Chamber of Councilors and parties of the coalition are shown as being responsible for the way of making politics based on the exchange of posts, presented as necessary to keep governability. For some people, in this process, "people with no scruples" have won space and movements were not able to oppose, remaining silent. [Civil Society (5) – Capela do Socorro]. There was also the evaluation that in this point, nothing changed from the precedent mandates:

They did the same things that have always been done. […] Some submunicipal governments still have people who are Maluf's allies, from all political parties […] They have used us to elect who they wanted to […]. Councilors are always giving the posts […] some advisors would work for two months each, to exchange posts with others… I have the sensation they have gone completely nuts. [Civil Society (7) – Sé]

Two questions have remained from these findings: to what extent the exchange of posts has compromised the channels of participation opened by the municipal government, contributing to the emptying of these channels? But, even if it didn't contribute to that, didn't it jeopardize the idea that participation is necessarily part of a wider project? Actually, what the movements have seen and related in their analysis with some perplexity, is a participation project that is focused on the democratization of the management,

but in practice is dealing with the opposite: the exchange of public interests because of the way of thinking of the party, focused on the electoral disputes.

Another important point of the same question is the evaluation made by the people interviewed about the social accomplishments of the government. As seen in item two, Marta Suplicy's mandate had, according to them, very positive results in the social area, but they are results that seem to be separated from the channels of participation, coming more from her government program than from the organizations' pressure. When a result came from the organizations' pressure, we can realize this pressure was made, mostly, outside of the channels of participation and not through those channels. According to the people interviewed, Marta's mandate has simply employed a form of participation that basically meant the increase of the degree of "listening "and guaranteeing the homologation of her projects. Somehow, this scenario has generated a frustration with politics, PT and to some extent, to democracy itself, even considering the positive social results.

The government of Marta Suplicy has created a parallel institutionalism that did not effectively impact the political system when it didn't search for a form of relation between participatory democracy (provoked by the existing spaces or created during her mandate) and representative democracy. Differently from other governments, such as the experience of Participatory Budget that took place in Rio Grande do Sul, for instance, in which the OP helped tensioning the clientelist practices,[40] one logic lasted with the other, generating what appears to be the weakening of participatory practices as a form of making politics (and building governability) in a different way.

It seems like these channels were dissociated from projects of change, from society, the deepening of democracy and from something that would give them meaning other than themselves. It is undeniable that this has affected even more the level of trust in the political system, already very fragile. This is important to be highlighted to balance the argument of the defenders of the *good governance* (the critics, management, liberal) and of others who see the expressions of associativism from the top, affirming that participation always reinforces associativisms, social capital, etc. The interviews suggest that it is important to qualify participation, in order to make possible, in fact, the comprehension of its effects over the associative pattern, the political system and mostly over the quality of democracy. It is the case of asking if the opening of the channels of participation impacts the political system, society, the actors involved and the ones not involved. We still

have no concrete evidences to answer to this question, but we have taken from the interviews the information that fake participation has messed some of these dimensions.

We also know that the ex-mayor Marta Suplicy was elected because of a government plan, which was legitimated by this process. The dialogue between government and society should depart from this recognition – that imposes challenges to the participatory process – as reminds the ex-Municipal Secretary of Submunicipal Governments:

> There is a government plan, at least in the last elections this was clear, which was debated with the whole population and it was approved. So it should be executed. Its main actions were approved by the votes, and it should be executed. I think this is a limitation of social participation, it shouldn't reverse the demands which were approved. Now, these general outlines of the government plan, in order to be accomplished, include a group of actions that could be debated. The form, intensity, the allocation of resources... I think everything should be debated. Even the monitoring, the participation in the planning process, so that you can actually make all the things that were defined in the government plan, I think this is participation. [...] Social participation should denife the intensity of these programs. [Municipal Executive 1]

This comment addresses the relation between participatory and representative democracy, and brings two questions to the debate. The first one concerns the relations of this government plan and participation. Just a few governments have a defined government plan when they reach power. PT is one of the only political parties that have been doing this. However, any mandate, including the PT's ones, is influenced during its terms, changing their government plans, so, to what extent participation alters the government plan? Or other influences alter it more?

And the second question refers to the nature of the conflicts which could be brought to the participatory processes. What decisions could or should be submitted to widen processes of participation? Question that refers to the different expectations related to participation, in what refers to the nature and its themes, its scope and character more or less vinculating to its decisions and that actually lead us to the consideration of the complexity of the production of public policies' process. As shown by Marques (2000), the process of production of public policies involves a wide and diversified group of

formal and informal agents, in different acting positions, moved by distinct dynamics and temporalities, and capable of mobilizing varied resources. The institutionalization of channels of participation does not reduce, but increases, the complexity inherent to this process, not only because it allows the inclusion of new actors and importance of new interests, but also for the trial of printing a new logic to the relations among the actors in this network, through the affirmation of principles that result in their sources of legitimacy, participation, transparence, advertisement and social control. It means, in the diverse and complex field, the institutionalized channels of participation – such as the OPs, forums, etc. – are one among many agents, and the strength of their action depends of its capability of strategic location inside this network, result from the clear determination of its identity and resources related to other actors (TATAGIBA, 2004).

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND POLITICAL SYSTEM:
REAPPROACHING THE QUESTION OF AUTONOMY

The group of interviews exposes the intense articulation that social movements establish, inside and outside of the institutional channels of participation with many actors in the political system. The relation with councilors, leaders of political parties, public agents, submayors and politicians in general has occupied an essential role in the stories told by the movements. Along with this recognition, as expected, the topic of autonomy of movements is also in the agenda. As we know, in the 70s and 80s, the matter of autonomy or the speech "against the State" was in the core of the urban social movements and it was an essential principle differing them from the traditional clientelist relations (GECD, 1998, p. 22). And today, facing a new social and political scenario, with new patterns of relations between the State and society, what does it mean to talk about the autonomy of the social movements regarding the political system?

Doesn't the contemporary strategies of action adopted by the movements aiming the influence of the process of decision, implementation and execution of public policies, impose redefinitions or tension in the traditional meanings associated to autonomy? In other words, is it possible to talk about the autonomy of movements regarding the government, political parties and politicians in a scenario of struggle in which the chance of influencing – in the relation of interacting and conflict with other relevant political actors – the distribution, allocation and destination of scarce resources is at stake? Is it pos-

sible – necessary or wanted – to struggle without establishing relations of commitment with the political elite from the political parties, parliament and government?

Autonomy is a value and, therefore, informs the limits that should be observed in the relation between movements and political system, values that, when not considered, could result in instrumentalization, cooptation, etc. Thus, autonomy doesn't mean a lack of relation, as it is generally approached, but it informs us about the quality of this relation and how the actors find their place in this bond. To talk about the movements' autonomy, therefore, means to ask about the nature of the relations that movements are capable of establishing with other actors in the political system; it means asking to what extent they are able to choose their speakers based on their agendas, defend their interests, define their goals and to what extent they guide or are guided by other political forces. Autonomy might exist even in a scenario in which the movements have permanent and constant bonds with other actors such as parties, unions, government, councilors and deputies; as a matter of fact, these bonds and contacts have many times appeared to be essential. Actually, there is not any problem in the alliance of movement and government, parties and councilors to struggle; movements have always done that. The problem is in the feeling that these relations are much more useful to the State, parties and government than to the movements themselves.

As we know, the relations between government and society are marked by a huge asymmetry of – organizational, informational, financial, educational – resources, among others, limiting the chances of exercising autonomy. The social actors play the political games as subordinates in a society where the chances of association are more and more restricted and violence and unemployment are aggravating the situation. In this scenario, the development of the non-democratic practices of our political culture such as clientelism, cooptation and exchange of favors are very favored. We are facing here the sequence of a democratic construction surrounded by advances and setbacks, in a country strongly marked by the hierarchization of social relations. Therefore, we can talk about a non-institutionalized cultural pattern, but extremely effective, which tends to standardize the political practice in the basis of clientelist and paternalistic relations.[41] It as reality shared with Latin American countries, in which the principles of liberalism, impartiality, impersonality and universality as parameters of political sociability have historically and contradictory combined "with other principles designed to guarantee political and social exclusion and even control the definition of what is considered political in unfair and

hierarchized societies" (ALVAREZ, DAGNINO and ESCOBAR, 2000, p. 27). The disassociation between democracy and equality in our continent brings clear challenges to the debate about autonomy and emancipatory potentialities of the participatory processes.

Besides these structural constraints, we would like to bring to the debate some elements which are part of the specific political scenario of the City of São Paulo at the actual moment. Thus, we would like to highlight: i) the impacts of decentralization with the creation of the submunicipal governments; and ii) the dynamics of the electoral disputes, featuring the action of the Workers Party in the municipal government.

Although the process of decentralization and creation of submunicipal governments is still an incipient process (and many participants mention this fact), it is important to highlight that it is extremely appreciated by the ones interviewed. Some of them even say that this process allows the distribution of powers, the effective presence of the public government, the power of local decision and the chance of real dialogue with the movements. We can actually say that the support to the process of decentralization in the submunicipal governments was unanimous. Although there were several critics to the way in which the process was conducted, as we have seen, none of the people interviewed has affirmed that decentralization would be a mistake:

> *It moved forward because the powers given to the submunicipal government were also distributed. [Civil Society (10) – Sé]*

> *It made things easier because somehow the poor is closer to the public government. [Local Executive (1) – Sé]*

> *It was very good. When the regional administration has been turned into a submunicipal government, they started to listen to the community. The community is participating more, in every sense […] they are trying hard, and they ask the leaders what our needs are. [Civil Society (3) – São Mateus]*

To the ones not living near the central area, decentralization has also meant a bigger chance of accessing the public government, thing that couldn't happen before unless they went to the City Center.

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The government is closer to you, power is closer to you. One can see the projects and can have more chances to talk to the local government. You don't have to go to Pedro de Toledo (name of a street) or to the City Center. [Civil Society (11) – São Mateus]

We have more access and get to know people [...], really get to know them, more than the ones who are in the City Center. [Civil Society (4) – Capela do Socorro]

But if, on the one hand, the creation of the submunicipal governments has really represented a step forward in the democratization of the local power, in so far as it brought the citizen closer to the State; it has also, on the other hand, favored the bond of personal nature between government and community in some regions in the City. This problem was very clear in the interviews realized in the Submunicipal Government of São Mateus.

As seen in the previous discussions, São Mateus was a region distinguished from the others for the autonomous character of its association patterns, the quality of its leaders and the role the political struggle plays in the neighborhood's history. In São Mateus, the experience of the submunicipal government has been positively evaluated by the leaders of the movements contacted because it has increased the public participation. However, when trying to deeply comprehend the argument, we can find strong references to personal relations established with the submayor to discuss their demands. At this point, it is important to mention that they were collective demands, not personal, and they regarded street lights, authorization for the realization of events, street paving, road fixing, etc. The meeting didn't have a personal nature to ask for jobs, vacancies in the daycare, such as in traditional clientelist relations. They were public demands asked in private meetings, outside of the participatory channels, in which these same movements participated such as the Participatory Budget meetings, forums that took place in the submunicipal government, etc. In the case of São Mateus, the personal relations were facilitated by the fact that the ex-submayor was a ex-priest who was very active in that region and well-known in the movements. We can see below some interviews of the civil society which have called our attention:

We knew the submayor was one of us and he couldn't do everything he stood for [...], he couldn't do much because of the lack of financial resources [...], but he dedicated

his full time, he opened his agenda some days a week to talk to the public and he was gentle to us. [Civil Society (01) – São Mateus]

It is easier to see the submayor here than see the mayor there […] it is easier to get in touch with the health coordinator here than contacting the Secretary of Health there […]. It is as if the City Hall was here in São Mateus. On Wednesdays, the submayor would talk to the public […], every thirty minutes he would meet with a group of people. So, his agenda was taken the whole day […]. Sometimes, someone would talk to him alone, too. But most of them were groups: 10, 12, 5, 6, 4, depending on the problem, you would fix an appointment and show up there with your group. [Civil Society (6) – São Mateus]

Every time we have looked for him [the submayor], he has responded […]. Generally, we asked for infrastructure for events […]. So, when we fixed an appointment with him, he knew we were going to ask for something… And he would still meet with us… of course, when he could, because was not always able to meet. But, if possible, he would meet with us and help us. [Civil Society (7) – São Mateus]

I felt we were listened. I think we even had the opportunity to go there and say a lot of bad things to the submayor. Oh, do this, do that, won't you? I don't think it should be this way, but that way […]. He would talk to everybody, he would meet with everybody. Everyone that looked for him had something to ask for. In our case, we would say "I don't have money, I don't have anything!", or "I don't want your money, just want that you come with me and help me". And he would do. So, this opening, given by the submayor, was fantastic. The only ones who didn't participate were the ones who really used their entities and community to reach different goals. But the ones facing problems related to public policies could get a channel of communication […]. We would get there, his doors were opened […]. We had great conditions for participating. [Civil Society (9) – São Mateus]

The submayor, who was also interviewed, also points this closer relation with the public:

People see, they know people here and know what has been decided, they participate. If you do not respect the published working plan, they are going to call you or criticize you on the next assembly meeting. They will get mad. And it is not the only thing: all the meetings that we have done during these last four years, participatory budget, council, etc, have created a relation of commitment between the local government and many leaders and they felt appreciated and respected. They felt they could reach the government, they could come and talk, look for the submayor, an advisor, a coordinator and be able to express their feelings, criticize, question or approve. And this is something they could not do when all the services were concentrated in the Secretariat. Nowadays, the leaders know me, and I know many of the leaders. So, all of them can talk to me. They say "submayor, in that specific place someone has done that… You said you were going to do this way and they did that way…" and so on. The social control is a lot easier, and a lot more informal. I don't like formalities. Of course, we have to make some things formal. I think that when you respect you get respect back. It is a lot more dynamics. So, not everyhting was formal. But I think that participation has grown a lot. [Local Executive (3) – São Mateus]

What does it mean? What is the importance that social movements give to that personal relation with representatives from the State and how does this State recognition influence or alter the will to participate? To what extent this could be a redefinition of the clientelist dynamics, in which the participatory spaces are integrating – instead of confronting – the logic of private relations? How should one understand these interviews going beyond the logic of two "Brazils", our incomplete modernization and our historical incapacity of separating the public from the private? How to take into account the question of personal relations in our analysis about meaning and the importance of participation, which promises uniform procedures?

In the case of São Mateus, these questions are even more interesting considering the history of mobilization and participation. Facing this past – which is renewed in the construction of the present, as we have seen – the actors' speech should have mobilized a lot more the rights, citizenship, when what we actually see are the references to "requests" and the chance of privileged dialogue with the State. It is privileged because we know there are filters – of different natures – that provide the conditions of belonging and recognition to some people, and not to others, as suggested by two participants:

The Submunicipal Government of São Mateus only supports who gives votes for their candidate. This has been happening during the latest four years of mandate [in the submunicipal government]. [...] The ones that had different opinions or political positions coldn't get anything. [Civil Society (10) – São Mateus]

I have never had any problem with him because I think politeness comes in the first place. [...] But I know some people, some neighborhood's leaders who had many arguments with him. Sometimes, he treated us good, sometimes not. Sometimes he didn't even look in our faces, he ignored us [...], we had a small bridge here, there was a stream, so many times we asked him, through petitions and meetings, sewer [...] it was an opened sewage. He would always say: no, there is no sewer, we have to wait. And sometimes he had sewer, but he would send them somewhere else. And he would leave that place with no sewer... So, he would privilege some people... There is always someone that is nicer, that pleases you more... He would choose who to help, got it? [Civil Society (3) – São Mateus]

As seen above, the chances of accessing the submunicipal government seem to vary according to the political group to which the person was connected. In personal relations, as we know, the motto is "to friends we should give everything, and to our enemies, the law!" Therefore, we can suppose that the location of individuals in the network of political support could impact their willingness of participating on the institutional channels; after all, if a friend who listens to my demands is in charge of the submunicipal government, why should one participate of difficult and exhausting processes with uncertain results such as the Participatory Budget? Why not go directly to the source?

In fact, one can figure that if participation is a residual strategy for the government, it is also for the movements. Considering the available political resources, bigger or smaller permeability of the State to the social demands, the inclusion (or not) in networks of support, the power of the participatory spaces, etc., the institutional participation may or may not be central as a tool for asking demands to the State. Sometimes, this strategy might be present, but subordinated to other things that might involve, for instance, the direct contact with political leaders. After all, if there are actors in the political system holding strategic posts, and they are "sensitive" to the demands made by the movements, if the conditions of accessing these actors are easy, why not going to them

and ask for a little help? Mostly in the cases in which the participatory channels appear to be spaces without power and the other channels, opened through clientelist relations, are still strong and economically feasible, why not mobilizing networks of personal support to fight for resources also in these places?

The question is: which values and principles guide these decisions? Which are the cultural, political and social conditions that constrain these "choices", that can't be resumed, as we know, as simple strategic choices? We still have no conditions to answer these questions. The one thing the research showed us and that challenges our comprehension is that, for the studied social movements, participation is one of the mechanisms of relation with the political system, one of the strategies of sending demands to the State, and it is many times combined with others in which the core basis are in the bonds of affective and / or personal recognition, or in the more instrumental exchanges, such as the ones established with the local councilors. The fact that the movements make use of personal relations doesn't mean they are immoral or colluding with this illegality, as affirmed Soares (2005), when approaching the issue of meanings of legality in Brazil. As mentioned by this author, there are acts that have specific meanings and specific moral codes (that we are not forced to accept and respect just because they are supported by great part of the general population). What needs to be better explored is how this form of solving problems doesn't only take place outside of the state apparatus (in the community), but also as a way of accessing the state apparatus, being side by side with participatory spaces that have as one of its main functions the widening of democracy.

It is interesting to notice how these relations with the local executive are not seen by the movements as something negative; on the contrary, they were valued and even compared to the participation in the Participatory Budget. The movements – at least until the point noticed in the interviews – haven't identified in this relation any constraint to their autonomy, differently from what was noticed when the question was the kind of relation established with councilors, a relation that has apparently been impacted by the submunicipal government. The distribution of jobs among councilors in the submunicipal government seems to have reinforced the idea that councilors use the movements without giving them anything back. In the case of the relation with the submayor, the chances of doing small works and services with resources from the municipal government makes this exchange more fruitful for the movements; while in the relation with councilors, it seems like they (the movements) do not recognize themselves as subjects in

the relations, but as instruments used to the realization of someone else's interests. Let's see how this subject is approached in the submunicipal governments.

When asked if the creation of the submunicipal government of Sé would have changed the relations between councilors and social movements, the majority of the people interviewed has affirmed that the power of councilors in the City Center is more attenuated, since their electoral basis are more concentrated in the suburbs and therefore they wouldn't have noticed the change in the submunicipal government. Thus, a participant of the Central Region, militating for 17 years, has affirmed:

> *In my opinion, the Center is also different from the other regions in this aspect [...].*
> *In other places, the neighborhood's councilor, the neighborhood's politician, has a lot*
> *more power and influence in the public policies than here in the Center. [...]. The story*
> *of the Godfather, the colonel, Big Daddy, who is normally a guy that distributes food*
> *around is common and it is still happening in many parts of the city and here in the*
> *Center is more attenuated [...]. It is more attenuated because there are a lot of people*
> *everywhere. [Civil Society (2) – Sé]*

Anyway, we can clearly see in the interviews the chances of manipulation, use of the movements and cooptation of their leaders, mostly the ones who are paid to do the work of militancy:

> *There is a political interest behind every movement and of course, someone is*
> *funding, financing it [...]. There is a lot of corruption there [...], I can see it in the*
> *movements I participate. People have many things to do and the ones who actually*
> *participate are the ones who do it professionally, it is the professionalization of*
> *movements [...]. Some movements sell their ideas to the ones interested on funding*
> *them. [Civil Society (5) – Sé]*

In São Mateus there is a general understanding that the political and partisan dispute is strongly present in the everyday life of the communities, impacting the relation of the movements with the local councilors and in the effectiveness of the participatory spaces. In many interviews, we have the impression that the clientelism is more present than never:

The final word was given to political groups and parliamentarians. They have shared among them the coordinations to balance the political power and they gave the final word. They are reference and they are the ones that control that submunicipal government. [Civil Society (4) – São Mateus]

The submunicipal government belongs to two councilors... they only do what those two want them to do, it is not about what people want, what we need. When someone asks for an improvement in his neighborhood, […], what happens? The two councilors go there, meet with the people […], if the people give them political support, they do it, if not they don't. [Civil Society (12) – São Mateus]

In the words of the person interviewed, it is as if "the submunicipal government was sold in an auction by the municipal government" [Civil Society (4) – São Mateus]. The municipal government has contributed to a more clientelist relation between the movements and parliamentarians. If the power is at the submunicipal governments, the movements need to be in touch with them.

There is a vision that the submunicipal government is managed by the councilors and they can also control the participatory spaces. Nevertheless, differently from Sé, some of the participants understand that the Submunicipal Government of São Mateus brought many changes to the relation between the movements and the councilors because the movements no longer need someone to "open the doors" at the City Hall with the existence of the submunicipal governments, since they have easier access to the government because they know the submayor and coordinators. The submunicipal government would have taken from the councilors an important part of their function in the region, as suggested in this interview:

Before, parliamentarians would gather the people to go there [to the City Hall] and take us, but since it is closer now, we can walk, we can run and get there […]. So we no longer need parliamentarians to take us there. Because before the only ones to be received were the ones taken by the parliamentarians. But when it is near […], we get to know the ones working there and we don't need the parliamentarians. […] You can approach the submayor and say: I know you, I know you personally. [Civil Society (6) – São Mateus]

Some have reminded that the submunicipal government has changed the way personal relations were used because it is now possible to monitor and avoid the political partisan use of public resources by the local councilors:

> *Because the submunicipal government will be there [...] and they are going to have a council to monitor where the money will be. [...] There is a list of services [...] that is fixed on their wall, so we can always monitor what 's being done, e check if the machines are actually on that specific street. [...] If they didn't deviate them to another place, to get vote from the people. [...] Even that is a contribution of the submunicipal government, closing the space for the councilor, for the deputy who has pointed the political post so that someone can steal and be corrupted and manipulate, when saying: go to that specific neighborhood because I have been there and the population has asked for the machines. So go there and tell them I asked you to do the service with the machines. With the popular participation and decentralization there is no way of having a councilor and deputies intervening in the demands of services. [Civil Society (11) – São Mateus]*

In the region of Capela, the description of exchange of votes and influence of politicians is very present, pointing their influence even in the definition of which entities are going to have agreements with the Municipal Government:

> *Many politicians dominate the general population of the region, buying their votes, using the leaders, paying three hundreds, even five hundreds reais to get vote and avoiding a process of participation. So, when they look for you, they say: what can you offer? I can give you this... or a house... And you offer a wall to paint his name in exchange of an agreement and so on... It is like that. [...] And the population doesn't want this anymore, this is no tour goal. And they still have these ideas. [Civil Society (3) – Capela do Socorro]*

It is important to remember that we haven't heard what the councilors have to say about their relation with the movements. We don't know how they feel and how they would react to the criticisms made. We don't even know if the movements would have any interest, in fact, in establishing other kind of relations with the councilors. The discredit in the representative institutions has apparently limited the progress of

the debate about democratization of the legislative power, which actually involves the democratization of the relation between councilors and social leaders in the local space. It doesn't seem feasible to move on in the participatory dynamics without the adequate understanding of these relations, and that would mean the investigation of the extent in which the involved actors would actually be interested in the democratization of these relations – how they evaluate lost and gains in this process – and in which basis they could build these relations, in a local scenario marked by the reinforcement of electoral disputes, where it seems impossible to give up the immediate exchanges to build or consolidate electoral majorities.

To close the debate, we are going to refer to an interview that is a good example of the long path that the debate about autonomy takes, considering the contradictions enclosed. At the same time the person interviewed affirms that popular movement can't mix with political movement, he also mentions that the councilor that approaches the population asking for votes should give something back to the community, and the movements should remind him and charge him. At the same time he affirms the movements can't get involved with political parties, he thinks it is normal to mobilize personal networks to "get improvements for the communities". Moreover, when talking about the importance of the submunicipal government, he says the essential would be that it would allow the community – in case they could vote and elect a submayor – to have personal relations with him, and he goes on:

> Because I would know who the submayor is and if I couldn't talk to him at the submunicipal government, I would know where he lived and could go to his house to talk. Or, even better, could ask my wife to talk to his wife, or my children to his children. I mean, we would have a relation that doesn't happen today. [Civil Society (4) – Sé]

This valorization of personal relations as a mean of getting what you need is, at the same time, side by side, and opposed to the refusal of partisan bonds and commitment with governments:

> I have always had clear in my mind the fact that popular movements shouldn't be mixed with political movements. This is something I believe, because I don't want to be connected to anyone. [...] Why? Simply because if you disagree with the government's

positions and fight, and get united to the government's competent, in 10, 15 or even 20 years and they win the elections, how are you supposed to fight against a partner? Someone that stood next to you for years? So, [...] you lose your focus, and don't know what to do. We can agree with the government, but we shouldn't because we are a popular movement... You can never be allied with the government, you must defend the people. [...] I can mention a few examples because we have a government with popular participation [...] and the movements don't know how to act and what to do. Some of them crossed the line, such as MST (Movement of the Workers with no Land), that has occupied 170 farms in a month only to prove they didn't have any bonds with the government. Others don't do anything because they haven't realized you can't have any bonds or connections with the government [...]. Therefore, you should know that government is government and it is there, no matter the name of the person in the mandate, it is the government. [Civil Society (4) – Sé]

But, in practice, it was not easy for the social movements or militants who assumed a post in the state bureaucracy or partisan structure not to cross the borders. On the contrary, the presence of a government of the Workers Party in the municipal government, in a scenario marked by strong electoral disputes, has brought new challenges to the establishment of an autonomous relation of the movements with the State and the party. This is the subject we are going to approach now.

The City of São Paulo represents 6% of voters in the country and 30% of voters in the State of São Paulo. Not only because of the importance of these numbers, turning the City into one of the greatest electorate in Brazil, but also because of its political and economic significance, holding one of the greatest public budgets in the country (gross), the electoral disputes in São Paulo are usually seen as mirrors that reflect and impact the dynamics of the political game developed in the federal government. This is why the two latest municipal elections were, in great part, influenced by the federal government. It is a context in which the partisan disputes are strongly influenced by ideology. Highlighting, initially, the conflict between partisans of Maluf and Workers Party, and today, the conflict between PT and PSDB.

This peculiarity of the City of São Paulo appears to create a permanent electoral atmosphere in the local territories, with politicians always trying to create, widen or conquer political majorities. The change of strategies in the PSDB, which wasn't consid-

ered a political party for the mass, but is trying to widen its social basis as a strategy to consolidate its political leadership in the capital, brings even more conflicts. The result is the subordination of the strategy of action of social and political actors to the own needs and scenarios of the political dispute. This seems to be an important condition in the relation between the social movements and the political system, with some important implications in the question of autonomy.

In the interviews, one of the perspectives of this scenario was shown in the identification of the impacts of the alternation of power, essential in democracy, over the movements' strategies of action. The interviews call the attention to the fact that many times the social movements, when are not challenging themselves and questioning their roles, identity and strategies in the relation with the other, end up stuck in the electoral dynamics, temporality and rhythms.

> *It is an old business, but is still happens here and in two years it is going to happen again. [...] The elections are coming again. Politics is like a centipede: it has many legs, and it involves you, because the person who is in charge of the government now, is already thinking of her situation in two years, you know? [...] So, as members of the community, we should be more careful, more watchful to avoid that... [Civil Society (1) – Capela do Socorro]*

In this scenario, there is a risk of always starting it over again. Among the interviews that have mentioned the change of government and its impact in the movements' agenda – referring specifically to the election of José Serra – we have highlighted the dialogue below:

> *H1 – We will have to do it all over again.*
> *M1– There is no way out!*
> *M2 – Start it over? Can we handle that?*
> *M1 – Can we take it? Oh, God, why?*
> *H1 – Do you think we can't take it?*
> *M2 – Yes, but are we going to handle that? We are very strong... we can do it.. we have a strong spirit... we rest for a while, then start back...*
> *H1 – If the movement has to start from the beginning, it is going to be a total breakdown.*

M2 – I am going to tell you one thing […], the servant of God can't be accommodated. So, when things get hot, we have to be ready to act, we have adapted, I am telling you, we can't accommodate. Now, things must get hot. We can't leave things this way… no, we can't.

M1 – Yes, we have to do something. Face them and show that we are alive, we must defend our cause and tomorrow is going to be a better day. If we get neutral, there is no way out.

H2 – We are going to do a demonstration in front of the Secretariat of Housing because the new secretary is the president of the Union of Real Estate Brokers in the State of São Paulo. Do you think a guy like him is going to be worried about land reform in Rio Claro, Vila Bela? […] So, we are already organizing the demonstration and the housing movement. Everybody is going. We are calculating a minimum of 100 buses.

H1 – Now they will be able to see…. [Civil Society (10) – São Mateus]

The perception that the movement was accommodated may be referring to the fact that the movement was not sufficiently involved in the elections and this is why Marta Suplicy has lost the elections, or to the fact that they stayed quiet during the mandate of Marta Suplicy. In the same direction, many movements are analyzing themselves, trying to understand why they have been captured by the speech of governability and why, even not agreeing with some aspects of the government of Marta Suplicy, specially the exchange of political posts, they could not oppose the government's actions neither giver visibility to the conflicts.

When we talked to the submayor or went to the Workers Party, we heard we should respect governability. And as a movement, fighting for the party, we have been colluding […] I think we have not done anything in respect to the Party. And today, it hurts. It hurts to realize we haven't been respected at all. [Participant of the workshop]

Reading this, we might be able to understand the declaration given by some people interviewed that when a government committed to popular struggles is in power, "people get more inactive". On the one hand, it happens because they assume a historical responsibility concerning the government, limiting a more critical speech; and on the other hand, because normally old militants are in charge of important secretariats, mostly the

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social ones, facilitating the dialogue since there is a larger permeability of the state agents to the demands of the excluded ones. As seen in the fragment above, these conditions no longer existed in the mandate of José Serra, that put in the Secretariat of Housing someone connected to the real estate business, clearly identifying the enemies and helping the recomposition of borders between the social movement and the political system, and, at the same time, "pushing "some actors that knew someone in the secretariat or in the state, to the participatory channels.

This transit of militants to the state and partisan structures, one of the important variables to comprehend the new form of the social movements in the 90s (as suggested in item 2), brings great challenges not only for the movements, but also for the state actors who came from the militancy in the civil society.

For State actors, it was not easy to establish new relations from the state position with old friends. Gabriel Feltran (2004), in his research about the displacement of actors of the civil society to the political society, has identified these dilemmas in the speech of a militant of social movements who has assumed, in 1989, the post of coordinator of policies for literacy in the Municipal Government of São Paulo, during the mandate of Luíza Erundina. Mentioning the difficult meeting with old friends, now in different places, the coordinator evaluates:

> We have had a difficult meeting with the movement, looking from this other social post we are now occupying [the State] … and what was difficult? (…) We were very pressured by some sectors in the movement, some sectors that were weakened because of the lack of resources, and believed that, because we are here in the Municipal Government, there was a chance of immediate access to resources. (FELTRAN, 2004, p. 26)

As analyzed by Feltran, looking to the civil society from "the State's point of view", the coordinator reminded his old friends that "acting without public parameters, the private logic of clientelism, criticized by everyone, would be reproduced" (FELTRAN, 2004, p. 26).

But how to reconstruct these parameters in a scenario where the borders between the public and the private can't be easily found? In the process of rescue of values of the social policies, which are the parameters in which we can affirm the limits between

the public and the private, and the meanings attributed to any of these aspects? In a scenario of a relation strongly based on financial resources, through the establishment of agreements, how to divide the fields of autonomy of the movements regarding the State? How to build, after all, a new notion of public responsibility, where the public is not limited to the notions of the state, but when widened, doesn't end up reinforcing the reductionist and privatizing traps of the neoliberal speech?

The experience of being in the government, both in the municipal and federal fields, brings new elements to the debate that appears to be important not only for the movements, but also for the governments, as reminded by another person interviewed:

> This is the great challenge: how can we make the movements grow with autonomy? To do that, the movements should think about their new historical role. But the public government, mainly the one in charge of the city now, which has been consolidated by the social movements […] is not helping this political growth as far as it segregates and manipulates the social movements to get answer in terms of votes, only. [Civil Society (4) – São Mateus]

The question the movements should answer is how to create relations with the governments, mostly when it is a mandate of the Workers Party, without risking being used by actors that are only worried about the logic of the electoral calendar. One of the faces of this instrumentalization, is the restriction of participatory channels to friends and allies, from the selective distribution of information, as mentioned in many interviews in the item about the Master Plan in this same text and in the interview below about the occupation of the local participatory spaces, with the Management Councils of CEUs:

> Because of this political-partisan organization, that is extremely strong in the region, the general population is not even informed about the chances of participation. Everything is centered in the one who had first access to information. This is because they have a stronger need of presenting their work, even because of the ideology. […] The management councils created in the CÉUS São Rafael and São Mateus are clear examples of what I say: if you go there and make a list, you will see they are all members of the party, not members of the community. […] The questions related to politics and parties are very strong and they really interfere in the region. [Civil Society (9) – São Mateus]

One can realize, in the interview above, how the relation between governments and movements privileges people with bonds with the party, that even dispute among each others. It is important to mention that these disputes are not always between people from different political parties, but also between people inside the Workers Party, related to different political groups or trends.

> Inside the Workers Party there are many groups with different lines of thinking, and this makes things difficult. When you start debating a political project and they name it: it belongs to "X" or "Y"[…], it is difficult. Sometimes people related to health and education have different ways of thinking. […] In the local spaces we can really see the difference. If the group is the same one which is in charge of the submunicipal government, it is easier for me, but this group hampers the other. [Participant of the workshop, movement of health]

These disagreements are taken from inside the parties to the movement. In some cases, they are not really deep distinctions, but since one should reinforce the politician with whom you are related, the dispute for space decreases the chances that someone not connected to a politician or party be able to represent the community in the relation with the public government.

Finally, we know the militants of many movements have exercised, during the mandate of Marta Suplicy, a triple identity: besides belonging to the movement, they were also members of the Workers Party and, since PT was in charge of the government, they also felt they were part of the government and had to defend the government inside their movement. This is not a trivial situation, having consequences for the movement and for the individual himself. The individual had a personal crisis, trying to do more than he could, besides he was blamed everywhere. The movement had problems assuming a position because some of them are real close to the government, want to make the government work, and others don't feel committed to government and want to fight such as in any other government.

If autonomy is a value, and we believe it is, how to overcome the actual constraints to exercise it? How to move forward in the definition of parameters not subordinated in the relation with the State? How can the social movements contribute to a democratic reform of the State and institutions through a participation in which they act as agents and

not as tools of legitimacy of policies and processes? Which bonds between movements and political system could favor the movements' struggles? To what extent a pragmatic and instrumental participation – that appears to point the lack of project for change that guides the action of the movements – hampers an agenda of inter-relation focused on autonomy? These are some of the uncountable questions that appeared from this preliminary and insufficient recapture.

AGENDA FOR RESEARCH AND ACTION

As mentioned in the introduction, we see this text as a result of an exploratory research that has sought to discuss issues and problems related to the political action of the social movements in the City of São Paulo, identifying its challenges and potentialities. We tried to look inside and outside the movements, privileging – different, but deeply inter-related – questions – that address, on the one hand the changes in the forms and patterns of action of the social movements, and, on the other hand, the patterns which structure the relation between social movements and political system. We have taken as a departing point, the territory, knowing, as taught by Calvino, that although we can't mix the city with the speech describing it, there actually is an important bond between them (CALVINO, 1990, p. 59). Departing from the territory, we connected the points that bond *need and participation, interest and political action,* reviewing the trail of the new experiences that have marked the participatory practices in the mandate of the ex-mayor Marta Suplicy. Finally, it seems like we have come up with more questions than answers, and we conclude this text with these questions, aiming the systematization of points for a future agenda of research and action.

THE NEW PATTERNS OF THE SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

• How to move forward in the effort of better understanding the new patterns assumed by the contemporary movements, analyzing from the past, without getting attached and only offering negative images?
• What are the speech matrixes that guide the speech in the struggle and action of the social movements today, and allow them to define, defend and evaluate their struggle's strategies?

• How to interpret the analysis that affirms that there are more spaces for participation, but people are more accommodated because they no longer see that "hope for change"? How to understand this paradox, which points to more organizations and less organized community? To what extent it could be understood basing on the clues we have put together in the text, what other clues should be suggested, and what is the explanatory potential of each one of them?

In this item, we have also highlighted issues for the future agenda:

• The role of the cultural movements in the rearrangement of the urban associativism in the City of São Paulo. To what extent is it possible to talk about the arise of new political practices and speeches, associated to these movements, and what is the effective power of gathering people when a great mass of youth appear to be in the borders of the instituted political speeches?

• The new relations between social movements and religious organizations. What are the relations between social movements and religious organizations today, in a scenario marked by the changes in the direction of the Catholic Church in the last decade, on the one hand, and the spreading of the protestant religions on the other? And still, what is the religion of leaders of social movements today and to what extent this religion would still be an important variable – such as it was in the 70s and 80s – to comprehend the movements' patterns of action nowadays?

PARTICIPATION AND THE DYNAMIC OF PERSONAL RELATIONS

• What does the role attributed to personal relations as a way of accessing public goods by actors who have built themselves as political individuals fighting for rights and citizenship mean? What are the risks of this strategy that defends the opening of the institutionalized channels of participation at the same time that mobilizes the traditional channels of intermediation of interests?

• How to understand the registries going beyond the declaration of the logic of two Brazils, our incomplete modernization and our historical incapacity of adequately separate public and private? How to take into account the question of personal relations in our analysis about the meaning and importance of participation, which promises uniform procedures?

• In the case in which the participatory channels appear as spaces with no power and other channels, such as the ones opened with clientelist relations, are still strong and economically feasible, why not mobilizing personal networks to fight for resources also in these spaces? What are the values and principles that guide these decisions? What are the cultural, political and social conditions which constrain these "choices"?

• To what extent that would be a new pattern of clientelist dynamic in which the participatory spaces are integrating – instead of confronting – the logic of private relations?

THE MEANINGS OF PARTICIPATION

• What are the speech references that leaders use when they need to define the place, role and meaning of participation?

• How to adequately interpret the fact that when narrating their struggles, evaluating victories and defeats, the movements' leaders have started with a group of references in which the speech of citizenship or rights is not highlighted, but the pragmatic dimension of a struggle aimed to the acquisition of "concrete results', that in general became real in the form of health centers, buses, urban infrastructure, popular housing, etc.?

• To what extent this would be an evidence – not obviously a cause, but an evidence – of a despolitization of participation? Has participation really lost a symbolic "weight" that in old times has allowed it to be associated to wider projects of social transformation?

• In a society in which the neoliberal dogmatic structure is always trying to convince us that there is no way out and there are no alternatives left, which would be the projects of social change capable of mobilizing minds and hearts, giving to the participatory action a meaning beyond the management of needs? To what extent is it possible and desirable to reconciliate the idea of participation considering the dimension of utopia?

PARTICIPATION, SOCIAL CONTROL AND DEMOCRATIZATION OF PUBLIC POLICIES

• What has effectively been decided in the participatory spaces? Which are the obstacles for the effective occurrence of deliberation and social control through these spaces?

• What is the nature of the conflicts which could and should be brought inside the participatory processes? What decisions could or should be submitted to wider process of participation?

• In the process of rescue of values of the social policies, which are the parameters in which we can affirm the limits between the public and the private, and the meanings attributed to any of these aspects? In a scenario of a relation strongly based on financial resources, through the establishment of agreements, how to divide the fields of autonomy of the movements regarding the State? How to build, after all, a new notion of public responsibility, where the public is not limited to the notion of state, but when widened, doesn't end up reinforcing the reductionist and privatizing traps of the neoliberal speech?

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, PARTICIPATION AND POLITICAL SYSTEM

• Nowadays, what does it mean to talk about autonomy of the social movements regarding the political system? Doesn't the contemporary strategies of action adopted by the movements aiming the influence of the process of decision, implementation and execution of public policies, impose redefinitions or tension in the traditional meanings associated to autonomy? In other words, is it possible to talk about the autonomy of movements regarding the government, political parties and politicians in a scenario of struggle in which the chance of influencing – in the relation of interacting and conflict with other relevant political actors – the distribution, allocation and destination of scarce resources is at stake? Is it possible – necessary or desirable – to struggle without establishing relations of commitment with the political elite from the political parties, parliament and government?

• How to move forward in the definition of parameters not subordinated in the relation with the State? To what extent a pragmatic and instrumental participation hampers the establishment of a relation of autonomy between the movements and the political system?

• To what extent the social movements and members of the political system would actually be interested in the democratization of these relations – how they evaluate lost and gains in this process – and in which basis they could build these relations, in a local scenario marked by the reinforcement of electoral disputes?

• Could the participatory strategy be conciliated with the short-term political and electoral interests? To what extent the dispute of the political elites over the State control is compatible with the adoption of strategies of sovereign political inclusion of the popular sector in the process of public policies' management?

• What are the reflections of the actual scenario of "lost illusions" to the action of social movements? When the Workers Party appears to be "just another party", how is the relation with the political system and what is the impact of this fact in the movements' strategies of action?

• To what extent the belief in the participatory democracy can be part of a progressist and democratic agenda for State reform and assurance of governability? To what extent, going against the conservative thesis, can we affirm that the compatibility between the increase in participation and political stability? What can the experience of the Brazilian politics teach us about this?

NOTES

1. Magíster en Ciencias Polítcas y Doctoranda en Ciencias Sociales de la Universidad Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP).

2. Doctora en Ciencias Sociales y Profesora del Departamento de Ciencia Política de la Universidad Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP), São Paulo.

3. Marta Suplicy was mayor of São Paulo, representing the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) from 2001 to 2004.

4. The Observatório dos Direitos do Cidadão is an initiative of Instituto Pólis, in a partnership with the Institute of Special Studies (Instituto de Estudos Especiais IEE) of PUC-SP. The support to the intervention of organized civil society in the formulation and control of public policies aimed to the enlargement of citizenship in the City of São Paulo is its main goal.

5. We would like to thank the contribution of all the participants of the workshop: Celina Maria Oliveira (UMPS), Eduardo Marques (CEM/Cebrap and DCP/USP), Francisca A. Quinteros (UMPS), Gabriel Feltran (UNICAMP), Itamarati de Lima (Pólis), Jorge Kayano (Polis), Lourdes M. Queiroz (UMPS), Luiz Eduardo Wanderley (Social Sciences/PUC-SP), Luiz José de Souza (UMPS), Luiz Roberto Lauand (Pólis), Maria Adenilda Mastelano (UMPS), Maria Inez Callado (Fórum Municipal de Assistência Social), Maria da Graça Xavier (CMP), Maria Lúcia Carvalho da Silva (NEMOS/PUC-SP), Mateus Bertolini (Pólis), Pedro Pontual (Polis), Raquel Raichelis (IEE/PUC-SP), Tatiana Maranhão (Pólis), Terezinha Martins (UMPS) and Vilma Barban (Pólis). We also would like to specially thank Anna Luiza Salles Souto (coordinator of Instituto Pólis) and Rosangela Paz (coordinator of /IEE-PUC/SP) for the careful reading of the many versions of this text and all the suggested contributions.

6. The Ministério Público is the Brazilian body of autonomous magistrates formed of public prosecutors working both at the federal and state level (Footnote made by the translator).

7. José Serra was elected mayor of São Paulo by PSDB in 2005. He has left the post to run the elections of national presidency. His deputy mayor, Gilberto Kassab, has assumed the municipal government and holds its post until 2009.

8. The Submunicipal Government of Sé covers a region of 373.164 inhabitants; The Submunicipal Government of Capela do Socorro covers 546.861 inhabitants, and the one of São Mateus covers 381.605 inhabitants. [www.portal.Prefeitura.sp.gov.br, in July 3rd, 2005].

9. In order to protect the privacy of the ones interviewed, we have defined the following registry: field of action (Civil Society, Local Executive, Municipal Executive or Legislative Power), followed by a number which correspond to the identification of the interview (each person interviewed receives

a number – which starts back from 1 for each new region), and the region where the person belongs (Sé, São Mateus and Capela do Socorro).

10. Elected by the Workers Party (PT), Luiza Erundina was mayor of São Paulo from 1989 to 1993. Her mandate was known for being essentially popular, with policies focused on the people living in the suburbs of the city. The educator Paulo Freire was her Secretary of Education.

11. The Unified Educational Centers (CEUs) were created during the mandate of Marta Suplicy.

12. Renda Mínima is a program of the Municipal Government of São Paulo that confers money to the low-income families with children younger than 15 years old. In order to get the grant, children should go to school.

13. Connected to the Church, The Base Ecclesial Communities (CEBs) were formed by members of lower social classes, acting, in general, in the rural area or in the suburbs. They spread in the country in the 70s and 80s, during the struggle against the political dictatorship. They were important agents who contributed for democratization and the creation of social movements in the country.

14. Mutirão is a form of aided mutual help in which organized communities (or housing associations / movements) played an important role in the management of the housing process. Thus it is based on direct and collective participation of the urban poor in the building / management of low-income housing construction. (Footnote made by the translator).

15. Built to host the Bank of the State of São Paulo, in 1939, Banespa building represents the richness of the State of São Paulo and it is one of the biggest symbols of the City of São Paulo.

16. Sílvio Santos is the animator of one of the most popular TV shows in Brazil. He is also an entrepreneur and is involved in a battle for a great area located in the region of Bela Vista, in the city center, for years. His opponent, José Celso Martinez Corrêa, is the director of the Theater Oficina, that is located in a wide area in the heart of the neighborhood. Sílvio Santos wants to build a big shopping center where the theater is located.

17. The Association Viva o Centro was created in 1991, aiming the upgrading of the Center of São Paulo, recovering it to economic activities to the middle and upper classes; the association is formed by professionals, presidents and directors of banks, companies and institutions located in the city center. Bank Boston is the biggest sponsor of this initiative and the headquarter of the association is located inside the Bank. The Forum Centro Vivo was created in 2000, aiming the articulation of the ones who battle for the right of staying in the center and transforming it in a better and more democratic place, opposing to the movement of urban renovation and exclusion that has been taking place in the city. It gathers popular movements, universities, pastorals NGOs and many entities.

18. The person interviewed is mentioning the ex-mayors of São Paulo: Jânio Quadros, 1986-1988, PTB; Luíza Erundina, 1989-1992, PT; Celso Pitta, 1997-2000, PPB; and Marta Suplicy, 2001-2004, PT.

19. Hypothetically, it seems like at least part of these cultural movements is inclined to be more autonomous, defending and practicing independent action, refusing any political institutionalism which

has marked the movements in the 70s. This is the reason why they might bring something new, attracting urban youth, who are in the edges of the political system because they invest in a new form of political action and communication, denying politics itself. An interesting research agenda would be the comparison of the demands, practices and symbolic universe of the specific struggles of the cultural movements, comparing them with the more traditional movements of health, housing, children and teenagers. This could be a path to reach the comprehension of the role of the cultural movements nowadays in the rearrangement of the urban association in the City of São Paulo, and if it is really possible to talk about the arise of new political practices and speeches, and what is the effective power for assembling a large group of youth that seem to be left in the edges of the institutionalized political discourses.

20. For a critical discussion of the question of the "legitimate representatives of the civil society", one should consult the study of Cátia Aida da Silva (1994) about the tutelary councils in São Paulo.

21. About the importance of the territorial dimension in the characterization of the patterns of association in São Paulo, Avritzer, Recamán and Venturi affirm: "[the index of participation] is not equally expressed in all the regions of the city. On the contrary, data indicates that there is a territorial concentration of the level of participation [...]. The territorial question has an important component which is its variation in terms of types of associations. If, on the one hand, the associated population in the City of São Paulo is distributed unequally over the territory, on the other hand, this unequal distribution seems to be even more intense when we consider the different types of association. So, the popular association effort has a huge concentration in some regions of the City of São Paulo"; it is a "differentiated distribution of participation that impacts the organization of public policies and political culture in the City of São Paulo" (AVRITZER, RECAMÁN and VENTURI, 2004, p. 38).

22. Here, the participant is mentioning the forums organized by the civil society. These forums, in general, are articulations between movements, entities, associations and NGOs, without the presence of the public power. There are articulations between different social actors aiming the preparation for the dialogue with the State. It is important to mention, though, that sometimes the government created spaces of participation called forums. Fórum Ação Centro, a space created by a Municipal Law is a good example (see explanations in footnote 20).

23. Fórum Ação Centro is a space that seeks to strengthen the role of civil society in the formulation and implementation of strategies and actions which promote the integration between the public power and the civil society. It has been created through the Ordinance 44.089 in November 10th, 2003, to articulate and be the space of debate of the complementary actions to the ones implemented by the municipal government, and also be the main tool of information of the actions of the Programa Ação Centro. This program seeks the rehabilitation of the central area of São Paulo, it is coordinated by EMURB (Municipal Company of Urbanization), and it was implemented with municipal resources and resources from IDB http://portal.Prefeitura.sp.gov.br/empresas_autarquias/emurb/forum_acao_centro/objetivo_acoes/0001 accessed in 07/03/2005).

24. The authors say, "differently from the sectors of health and education, which are basically based on the offer of services, the policy of housing involves the offer of a physical and touchable product, and its value is always very significant: housing. [...] This peculiarity, in a context where the State can't

respond to this demand, generates series of obstacles in how to deal with the problem. The lack of housing makes one see it as a privilege instead of a right, and to get a house from the State in considered a gift" (CYMBALISTA, R.; MOREIRA, T. 2002, p. 11).

25. The analysis made by Ana Maria Doimo (2004) represents an effort in this direction when she resumes the connections of the Catholic Church with the social movements from the 70s to the 90s, and the impacts of these relations in the rearrangement of the associativism in São Paulo and in the local political scenario as a whole.

26. Analyzing the meaning of these changes Ana Maria Doimo claims: "during the period of political closure, in the end of the military regime and dictatorship in the late 70s, mobilization was considered as a meaning of pressure over the decision system, in a moment when the more expressive impulses of this demanding cycle were composed. However, in the following years, when the political opening and democracy took place, these impulses got lost, turning into corporative integrating impulses reinvidicating from the State, searching for positive sanctions to their demands" (DOIMO, 1995, p. 119).

27. Several studies about participatory experiences have been calling the attention to the tendency of conformation of a "participatory elite". To analyze this topic in the study of experiences of the management councils, we have referred, among others, to Santos Júnior (2001), Tatagiba (2002), Fuks, Perissonoto and Souza (2004). For the discussion of the same topic, in the case of Participatory Budget, see Teixeira e Albuquerque (2004).

28. We would like to thank Raquel Raichelis for calling our attention to this aspect in the workshop for debate of the first version of this text, promoted by Instituto Pólis.

29. Sader, when talking about the speech matrix, affirms: "In the social struggles, the involved people elaborate their representations about the facts and about themselves. To reelaborate the meaning, they use constituted speech matrixes from where they extract modalities of meaning. (...) The speech matrixes should be understood (...) as forms of approaching reality, implicating many attributions of meaning. They also implicate in the use of divisions of interpretation and naming (for actors, themes, situations) and reference given values and goals. But they are not simple ideas: their production and reproduction depend on material practices and places from where the speech is made" (SADER, 1988, p. 143).

30. See Dagnino (1994), Sader (1988), Telles (1994).

31. It is not a spontaneous mention, considering that in the majority of cases, the interviewer asked the opinion of the persom interviewed about a certain instance of participation.

32. Communitarian Councils for Safety

33. About CEU being considered a space of community organization, one of the persons´ interviewed affirms "In CEU we have meetings every third Saturday of the month, so that community can be organized and can participate in the debates in the region, in the councils, in many things [...]. They send the invitation to the associations and they inform the community so that we can go" [Civil Society (4) – Capela do Socorro].

34. Participatory Budget (OP) is a process of universal and voluntary participation, in which the population can debate and decide about the destination of part of the public resources and policies. It has functioned from 2001 to 2004. In São Paulo, the methodology of OP involved meetings for raising demands and elections of representatives in the thematic assembly meetings and in the 31 submunicipal governments. Previously, in the government of Luiza Erundina from 1989 to 1992, there was also an experience – more incipient – of Participatory Budget (VITALE, 2004).

35. The evaluations about government, legislative power and society didn't mean, however, an evaluation about all participatory spaces in the City. Many municipal types of council such as the Municipal Council of Housing were created during the mandate of Marta Suplicy. There are practically no evaluations about these spaces, even because nothing was asked. They were asked exclusively about the participatory spaces in the local level. As seen, some people interviewed have mentioned the conferences, but practically no one has mentioned the municipal councils, or referenced the articulations between the participatory spaces in the local and municipal levels, what might suggest a segregation, to be better investigated, between municipal and local participatory channels.

36. We would like to thank Eduardo Marques for calling our attention o this aspect of the mandate of Marta Suplicy, in the workshop for debating the first draft of this text, promoted by Instituto Pólis.

37. We don't have enough data to deepen this debate, but it is important to mention we are not affirming that the mandate of Marta Suplicy was uniform (no government is). Different secretariats, submunicipal governments and allies might have had (and actually had) different points of view and actions regarding participation. In this item, when we talk about the political project of Marta Suplicy's government, we are considering the most predominant points of the government which have prevailed in the perception of the people interviewed.

38. Socialist Party of Unified workers (PSTU) is known in the country for its radical political ideas.

39. Paulo Maluf was mayor of São Paulo twice. His mandates prioritized great works, instead of investing in social policies for the population.

40. The analysis of Cáudia Feres Faria about the experience of employing the OP in a state level in Rio Grande do Sul, during the mandate of Olívio Dutra, 1999-2002, also highlights this dimension, calling the attention to a governability strategy that points to the political dispute around government programs and policies: "the OP's forums, in Rio Grande do Sul, therefore, interceded in the traditional relations between the state executive, municipal executive and legislative powers. The bargain to get financial resources started happening in the many implemented public forums. This is why mayors started to go to the OP meetings in Rio Grande do Sul. However, this presence was not always voluntary. As mentioned by the mayor of Guaíba (PPB), 'we don't have another resource, we have to participate' (FARIA, 2005, p. 237).

41. To read more about these themes, we recommend, among others, Santos (1993), O'Donnel (1996), Avritzer (1995), Dagnino (19), Souza (2003).

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Representative and participatory democracy: A complementarity or a subordinate combination?

Considerations about participatory institutions and public administration in the city of São Paulo (2000-2004)

LUCIANA TATAGIBA AND ANA CLAUDIA CHAVES TEIXEIRA

The broadening of participation during the 90's has been one of the most evident dimensions of democracy building process in Latin America. This broadening has been associated to another trend: the strengthening of the control and deliberation instances at local level, within the boundaries of the administrative decentralization processes which have brought more power and responsibilities to the municipalities (O'DONNELL, 2004). As has been shown by a number of studies, the intensification of the dialogue between governments and communities, in a variety of new institutional channels of participation, has generated a growing diversification and complexity in the arena of public policies formulation in the region, renewing the practice and the discourse about democracy.

One can find an evidence, in the reformulations of the legal framework that during the past decades have been incorporating different participatory models, of the profound transformations that have occurred in the structure and form of policy managing in the region, as well as of the central role that social participation and control have played in this process, as noted by Felipe Jara:

> *During the last decades, constitutional and legal reforms have been carried out in the majority of the countries of the continent, and have assured a bigger participation of the citizens in public affairs (…). The first finding of the analysis on legal frames of the ICI [Institutionalized Citizenship Involvement] is the large number and variety of principles and mechanisms that can be found in the constitutions and laws of the region. If we add to that the analysis of the existing mechanisms in the secondary*

sector legislation, besides the regional laws and regulations about the issue, we reach the conclusion that the participation of the citizens is not a minor or distant matter regarding the juridical structures of the continent. (JARA, 2006:358)

Under the umbrella of the new legal systems we can witness what Boaventura Souza Santos has called a "widening of the democratic experiment" (2002). Examples of these experimenting actions are experiments with implied participation, valid not only in Brazil but also in Argentina, Uruguay, El Salvador, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Mexico; the councils and agendas regarding public policies, manly in the child and teenager areas, health (highlighting the health councils in Chile, Paraguay and Brazil), housing (such as the housing policies of Uruguay, Argentina, Paraguay and Brazil, for example) and urban planning (with differentiated formats and decision making levels being experimented in Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Paraguay); the treasury inspector's office and/or "accountability" in Costa Rica, Colombia, Chile, Bolivia, Mexico, Paraguay and Ecuador; and the "rounds of consultation for the fight against poverty" in Bolivia and Peru, among other experiments.[42]

We are aware that this apparent consensus over the valuation of ideas of participation in the Latin American scene hides significant differences which are expressed, in each country: i) in the specific combination between the weight of external conditionalities – an important ingredient in the repertoire of the reforms – and the specifics of the domestic area[43] ii) in the different agendas that the debate over the crisis and the reform of the state generated within the weaving of the national political game conflicts,[44] and iii) the different foundations that confer legitimacy to participatory practices and to the conflicts between them.[45] We are also aware that the deep and persistent inequalities impose very clear restrictions to the debate on autonomy and the emancipatory potential of the new participatory processes in Latin America, as recalled by the CLAD Scientific Council, when it states:

The construction of a new kind of State is also the big issue for Latin America. But beyond the existence of a comprehensive reform context, major Latin American peculiarities are presented (…). These structural changes, among others, can only be made viable in Latin America in the event that the draft State reformulation take into account three major problems specific to the region, namely: the consolidation

of democracy, the need to resume economic development and the reduction of social inequality. (CLAD, 1998:28)

That democratic experimentalism has been associated – albeit differently in each country – to the debate provoked by the crisis and issues of State reform. Several researchers in a number of Latin American countries have been calling attention to the specifically political dimensions of this process of reform, arguing about the role that participation and social control have been assuming in it.

This work precisely seeks to contribute to the progress on this debate.

Our general goal is to advance the knowledge about the practical processes of State reconfiguration at local level, based on the understanding of the role participation plays in such processes. So our expectation is to offer a small contribution to the important discussion about the possible and desirable complementarity between representative and participatory democracy, as a component of a forward-looking agenda for State reform and at the same time a guarantee of governance.

Understanding participation as a specific type of political action that "expresses, in multiple ways, the direct involvement of social agents in public activities" (CUNILL GRAU, 1997:74), with this work we aim to *identify and discuss the types of relationship between these new participatory modalities and the traditional decision-making mechanisms whose legitimacy is founded on the principles of representative democracy.*

In this paper we start from the premise that creating participatory mechanisms will not substitute representative democracy institutions, but will supplement them. The challenge seems to be how to promote a new institutional architecture where the representative system can be tested and strengthened by the inclusion of mechanisms for citizen participation.

Taking the Brazilian experience as a reference we see that in the vast majority of cases the participatory procedures did not complete their institutional journey. Although several other participatory instances, such as the councils of public policies, have been defined as key elements of the policies decentralization process – mainly social policies – they have not found their place in the State structure. As a result, in many cases, participatory institutions, far from contributing to the institutional reinvention, ended by constituting a parallel institution with little or no democratizing effect on state institutions and, generally, on the policies formulation process. Moreover, the Brazilian experience shows another dimension of this problem. In a context in which the political agenda

is often monopolized by political-partisan disputes, participatory instances – mostly at local level – are deeply "contaminated" by the political game which is inherent to the process by which electoral majorities are formed.

In this context, instead of referring to the complementarity between participatory and representative institutions, it seems more appropriate to refer to a combination or to a subordinated accommodation;[46] in other words, we believe that the Brazilian democracy, while acknowledging and opening a myriad of new opportunities for interaction between the government and society, will not include them as elements of a new institutional architecture capable of providing new and alternative ways to the democratic reform of the State and also of offering a guarantee of governability.

It seems that the wealth of the worldwide renowned participatory experiences in Brazil "run on the outside", remain at the periphery of the system, affecting one sectorial policy or another, and become dependent on the political will of governments and/or on the pressure power of organized society. It seems that these experiences do not induce or are a result of a more profound link between representation and participation in the framework of the currently available models which guide the practical processes of reconfiguration of the State.

This is the general concern area which fosters the reflection effort we intend to develop in this work. The purpose is not to provide answers – which would certainly be an enterprise doomed to failure – but to provide elements for discussion based on the opportunities and challenges posed by the articulation of the representative and participatory democracy models.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

In order to address the range of issues and problems that those horizon of concerns uncovers, in our analysis we will reference some research results of "Social movements and political system: the challenges of participation", which aimed at assessing the participation experiences in the city of São Paulo, during the management of former Mayor Marta Suplicy (2000-2004), of the Workers Party (hereinafter "PT").[47]

This research was designed with the purpose of revealing the impact of the administrative decentralization process, which began with the introduction of the so called sub-prefectures;[48] in the way it achieves citizen participation in the city of São Paulo.

It tries to analyze the limits and possibilities of citizen participation coupled with the sub-prefectures, and the scope of social control of the policies at local level. As for the methodology employed, we have selected three sub-prefectures as scenery of the research: Capela do Socorro (south of town), São Mateus (east), and Sé (central region);[49] these three sub-prefectures have been selected because they are recognized as parts of the city which possess large social mobilization and a history of active participation. The selection is also due to the fact that they are areas which have different characteristics in terms of population, environment, economy and politics, providing a good picture of citizen participation in the new management model. Militants of different movements have been interviewed, councilors of various political parties and public officials from each of the three sub-prefectures (sub-mayor, health coordinator and social action coordinator) and from the central government (of the Coordinatorship for Popular Participation, linked to the Mayor's Cabinet, and the Municipal Secretariat of Sub-prefectures) in a total of 50 interviews.

Although the research evaluated all the participatory models created by the "petista" management, we will examine only those results related to the evaluation of the Participatory Budget, considering that the idea of complementarity or combination of participation and representation is the core of the proposal, consistent with what Avritzer suggests when he defines OP as "a way to rebalance the articulation between representative and participatory democracy" (AVRITZER and NAVARRO, 2003:14). The Participatory Budget is governed by principles which, combined with other means of civic participation, help to reconcile those things which are always separated in the civil service: democracy and efficiency. Some of these principles are: pluralism, deliberation as a means to address problems and decisions, advertising and competition as usual rules for action, and social autonomy (CUNILL GRAU, 2004). Of course, these principles are not always conducted on the OP experiences. We intend to discuss the São Paulo OP as a possible democratization of the relations between the State and society, which possibility is not automatically achieved.

Our work is divided into four parts. In the first part we present the general framework of our discussion, evaluating the process currently under reconfiguration of governance in Brazil and the role that participation plays in this process. Then, we introduce the scenario of our investigation, the city of São Paulo, from a more focused look on the electoral disputes in the city *vis a vis* the transformation process of governance through

the creation of new participatory mechanisms. In the third part of the work we present the empirical study and the analysis of the participatory budgeting experience during Mayor Marta Suplicy's administration. In the fourth and final part, based on an analysis of the OP, we develop our conclusions from the discussion about the combination of participation and representation in the field of politics in the city of São Paulo.

PARTICIPATION AND STATE REFORM:
REFLECTIONS BASED ON THE BRAZILIAN EXPERIENCE

The broad spectrum of the so-called crisis in the Brazilian State had two important expressions: The blatant failure of the State to continue appearing as a driving force of national capitalist development, on the one hand, and, on the other, the change in the pattern of relationships between the state and society which, at the time, evidenced the limits of the cooptation/ representation model, a result from the recent unification of civil society. The dual face of this crisis, generated during the 70's, would show up with such force during the second half of the 80's that the positions and disputes assumed by the various actors, related to the representations and the conditions for overcoming the crisis, would delimit different ethical and political fields which, in the decades following, would lead the debate, not only regarding the restructuring of public administration in Brazil, but the pace and intensity of the ongoing redemocratization (CRUZ, 1994).

Since the end of the 70's, the worsening of the social problems and the crisis in the public sector – along with a growing demand from the social sectors for control of the State and its policies – led to questioning whether the centralizing, authoritarian and exclusionary pattern that had characterized the relationship between state agencies and recipients of public policy (emphasizing the need for *democratization of the process*) as well as to questioning the ability of the State to respond to social demands (emphasizing the issue of the *effectiveness of the results*). It was hoped that through a citizenship participation in the institutional space there would be a reversion in the public policies planning and execution patterns in Brazil. The change in this pattern would be possible because participation would lead to a strain on State agencies, making them more transparent, more accountable and more susceptible to control by the society. Society would have a more effective role of supervision and control by being "closer to the State" and could assert a more democratic logic in the setting of priorities for public resources allocations.

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These mechanisms of participation would require the State to negotiate its proposals with other social groups, hampering the usual "confusion" between the public interest and the interests of the groups that are circulating around the State and which tend to exert a direct influence on the State. It was also expected that the involvement would have a direct effect on the involved players themselves, acting as an educating factor in promoting citizenship.

In the midst of this process imbued with huge expectations, the agenda of public policy suffered a major breakthrough, whose key feature was the expansion and the increasing complexity of the decision-making arena as a result of the incorporation of new actors and themes (TATAGIBA, 2002). As declared by Melo:

> (…) since 1984, the conceptual field moves toward the analysis of the modus operandi of the same [public policy] and of its bureaucratic, privatizing, centralized, exclusionary, inefficient and ineffective nature. In the diagnostic conducted by the critic analysts and organized sectors, two instruments of politico-institutional engineering are highlighted in order to overcome the mistake: The participation of the sectors which had been excluded from the decision-making arena (and its corollary, transparency in the decision-making processes) and decentralization (with which the problems associated with bureaucratic gigantism could be overcome). In this movement, the procedural size of democracy came, for the first time, to be incorporated into the agenda of public discussion (…). Introduced in the public agenda as a democratic principle, participation has also become a necessary prerequisite for the improvement of the modus operandi of policies, in order to make them more efficient. (MELO, 1998:18-19)

During the evolution of the debate on public policies in Brazil, this remarkable turning would find a legal format in the 1988 Constitution, under which the foundations of a new federative arrangement, decentralization and social participation would be established as guiding principles of actions in the health, social care and planning areas. Beginning with the 1988 Constitution and after approval of the specific federal laws, various participatory instances were established at different levels of government, in areas such as health, welfare, children and adolescents, housing, environment, etc. An important participatory modality arising from this process was the creation of the councils for public policy. Being mandatory for several sectorial policies, they became central parts of

the process of decentralization and democratization of public policies. Some figures are, in this respect, revealing. According to Carvalho (1995), more than two thousand Health Councils were created all over the country between 1991 and 1993, an average of two new Councils on each day. In a more recent investigation, Carvalho re-emphasizes the phenomenon of the proliferation of Councils: "on July 1996, an estimate (…) suggests that nearly 65% of the universe of Brazilian municipalities have Councils (…) which means the existence of some tens of thousands of council members, equivalent to the count of city councilors" (CARVALHO, 1997:153-154). Data in a 1999 document from the National Health Council point to the existence of about 45,000 health counselors in the government's three spheres. An investigation conducted in São Paulo suggests that there are more than 1,167 municipal councils in the state, in the social area alone, with an average of ten counselors on each council (CEPAM, 1999). In the state of Rio Grande do Norte, an investigation indicates the existence of 302 Municipal Councils considering the social area alone (Archdiocese of Natal, Pastoral da Criança and UFRN, 1998). If we sum the entire NGOs contingent to nongovernmental counselors and the organizations and movements involved in the qualifying and training of these technical and political advisers, we will see that there is a large concentration of energy and investment in these so called institutional spaces of the councils.

The Constitution is the institutional framework which has also favored the development of experiences such as participatory budgeting, as it encouraged opening participation channels in the municipalities and strengthened decentralization while, at the same time, providing financial and legal capacities to municipalities, allowing them to manage local affairs (FARIA, 1997). These capabilities have been important for the development of the PB experience, which became one of the most innovative forms of social control over the budget ever built in Brazil. Between 1997 and 2000 Brazil had more than one hundred experiences of citizen participation in the formulation of municipal budgets, as showed a research[50] by the National Forum for Popular Participation (FNPP).[51] This investigation found nearly 140 experiences of "Participatory Budget", acquired information from 103 of those experiences and found that 60 of them practiced participatory experience during the full four years of administration. The results of the investigation also showed that it was possible to implement the OP in small, medium and large towns, with both urban and rural characteristics, and in all regions of Brazil. Half of the experiences took place under the administration of mayors who belonged to the Partido dos

Trabalhadores (PT), the other half was distributed among mayors from different parties, most of them allied to the PT. This reflects, on the one hand, the initial link of the experience with the Workers' Party program, but on the other hand, that the proliferation of the proposal influenced the agendas of the other parties. 170 Participatory Budget experiments were conducted between 2001 and 2004. In the state of São Paulo alone there are now 30 municipalities employing the OP.

Along with these more formalized experiences there exists a large number of "innovative management programs" which have, as one of their major innovations, the intention of promoting community involvement in the implementation and monitoring of programs or projects. An interesting radiograph of this new consensus is offered by the Getúlio Vargas Foundation in the framework of the *Citizenship and Public Administration* Program, which, since 1996, rewards and disseminates innovative management experiences in several Brazilian cities.[52] Farah, in a reading of 629 programs and projects enrolled in the first cycle of awards, highlights participation of civil society as the axis of the most important innovation: *42% of the programs result from joint actions of the government with civil society entities: organized community, NGOs and private sector business. Although under the leadership of a government entity, many of the projects are structured as networks of agencies and institutions, mobilized and revolving around an issue of public interest.* (FARAH, 1999)

Currently, we have a considerable number of studies designed to investigate the extent to which the dynamics of actual operation of the new participatory arrangements have allowed (or not) that these innovative experiences to be translated into innovative political practices in the field of public administration. Or even to what extent the new institutional designs have, in fact, favored an independent and effective participation of key social stakeholders in the formulation of policies, and what are the elements that favor or impede that process. While the short span of existence of these new institutional experiments makes it hazardous to draw any conclusive and generalized evaluations, in terms of their medium and long term impacts, studies have shown that it has been very difficult to confront, in practice, the centrality and the central role of the State in defining political and social priorities.

In general, the evaluations commonly present in the literature refer to these spaces as finding difficulties to meet the goals for which they were created. The vast majority of the studies points to the low innovative capacity in public policy from the participation

of civil society in those spaces. The reasons given are broadly related to: i) the working dynamics of these spaces, such as State centrality in the development of the guidelines to follow, lack of training of social actors, representativeness problems, difficulty in dealing with the plurality of interests ii) maintenance of clientelar patterns in the relationship between State and society iii) lack of political will of governments, and so on.

We believe that, next to these factors, an important dimension to be considered concerns, as noted in the presentation of this work, the place that these participatory experiences occupy in the institutional architecture of the State.

The problem, we believe, lies in the difficulty of devising a model of democracy which can overcome the contradiction between representation and participation, articulating these two aspects as constituent dimensions of a reform agenda which is able to account for the complexity of the problems in contemporary society. We know that the challenge of constructing alternative reform models to the authoritarian-bureaucratic model, on the one hand, and neo-liberal on the other hand is a great challenge not only for Brazil but for all the Latin American left. In the Brazilian case, these challenges have become evident mainly after the PT election victory in 2002, with the federal government conquest.

There was a stake by certain sectors of the left (both inside and outside the academy) which believed that the political project which was forged, in the first instance, in the context of the struggle against the dictatorship (in the 70's and 80's), and, in subsequent years, in efforts to broaden and deepen democracy, would bring in its womb – as a result of the experiment in progress – a new model of State and of public affairs administration, the core of which is the democratization of State/society relations, which would have social participation and control as its main strategy. The Workers' Party[53] – important actor in the field that called itself "popular democratic"– was giving birth to what appeared to be that new management model in countless prefectures conquered during the 80's and 90's. The Study Group on Democratic Construction refers to this process in the following words:

> It was in this scenario, for example, that the experience of Lages, Santa Catarina was developed (between 1976 and 1982), under the MDB (Brazilian Democratic Movement) administration. Housing construction through the mutirão system, namely self-managed housing developers, and the "community gardens" which were implemented

by that administration allowed greater openness to social participation and became a counter example to the centralized and authoritarian exercise of authority that always characterized the Brazilian State, and that was accentuated particularly during the military regime that was installed in 1964. During the 80's, under a climate of political openness, other participation initiatives occurred in Brazil, as for example that of Lages, in São Paulo, during the Franco Montoro administration, and in Paraná, during the José Richa administration. (Democratic Construction Study Group, 2000:18-19)

With the 1988 elections this process gained extraordinary momentum through the conquest of important prefectures by the Workers' Party, such as Diadema, Porto Alegre, São Paulo, Curitiba, Santo André, among others:

It was a concrete forethought, at that time, the possibility of breaking through the previous patterns and incorporating new forms of relationship between State and society (…). It is in this context of double movement that a space was opened, starting with the municipal elections in 1985, which is more conducive to articulate various sectors of society. There have settled in Brazil, at local level, more consolidated participatory management experiences whose models held as major theoretical bias an administrative decentralization associated with popular participation. (LEAL, 1994:26-27)

At the heart of the "*petista* way to govern" was social participation as a key strategy for the promotion of social justice. It was inside PT that discussions on the implementation of the people's councils and other forms of democratic governance of the State gained ground, with particular emphasis on the model of participatory budgeting, the main *petista* showcase. These initiatives – carried out by the PT – have their origin in the claims of popular organizations, who sought improvements in their living conditions or were involved in a broader process of social transformation".

However, the fact is that the people's democratic political project was not yet in a position to engender – from that one rich and intense democratic experiment – a consistent alternative proposal for the reconfiguration of the State and its form of relationship with society and the market. In this regard, we think it is fair to state that the people's democratic field had – and has – a clear model of a society, but not a State model. There-

fore, the experiences of management – mainly in the post-adjustment context – have not moved in the direction of innovating the managing methods, maintaining participation in the periphery of the system. Both in the case of São Paulo, as we shall see, as at Federal level, the PT government has in a way repeated the formula that tends to decouple participation from the strategies of maintenance of the governance. What we have seen – both in Marta Suplicy and Lula's governments – were a governance strategy that does not rely on participation channels, but which is coordinated with them, subordinating them. That is the issue that we intend to deepen into through the analysis of the Participatory Budget experience in São Paulo.

Before, however, we will make some general clarifications on the Participatory Budget in Brazil.

THE PARTICIPATORY BUDGET IN BRAZIL

Although this is the internationally best known participatory experience, the Participative Budget (OP) – as we pointed out in the paragraphs above – is not the only one which exists in Brazil. The OP is part of a package of initiatives that since the second half of the 70's – under the military regime and in opposition to it – have enabled generating proposals aimed at making the public administration an apparatus more permeable to popular participation. Different methodologies have been used in implementing the OP, both within each municipality and in some states, however, we may define this experience, in generic terms, as a space open by the executive to ensure that every citizen may contribute in deciding on the fate of the government budget.

The origin of OP and other participatory experiences in Brazil is associated with at least three main factors: i) to the story of a sector of civil society organizations in Brazil which became concerned about the management of public policies and the allocation and control of the government budget, ii) to the existence of a new legal and institutional framework given by the 1988 Constitution, and iii) to the left-wing parties (especially the Workers' Party), which reached local power with proposals for exercising government based on popular participation.

Since 1986 some cities like Vila Velha, in the state of Espírito Santo, began experiences of discussing the municipal budget with the people, using ways quite different from one another. Since 1989 new experiences began to take place in the cities of Porto

Alegre, Uberlândia and many others. However, the Participatory Budget would consolidate in Brazil under the seal of the Porto Alegre experience in Rio Grande do Sul, which has been the longest lasting and most rewarded, renowned both nationally and internationally. With the passing of time, the OP was introduced in many municipalities in Brazil. During the 1997-2000 administration more than 100 municipalities have been identified as having started this experiment, under governments formed by a number of political coalitions, and which reproduced the methodology of debate over the government budget, with very different results.

Despite the differences between the various experiences, we can say that the PBs are methodologically directed by a "cycle" which seems to characterize most of the Participatory Budget procedures known in Brazil. This cycle, which is repeated annually,[54] starts in the first half of each year and culminates with the delivery of the Annual Budgetary Bill (ABB) to the Municipal Legislature in September (or October, in some municipalities). It starts with the disclosure and invitation to meetings in districts or regions, and continues with plenary meetings in which an initial selection of the demands of the population is performed. Also, it is during these meetings that are elected the counselors who will be responsible for negotiating with the government the demands that will be part of the investment plan, which will be incorporated in the bill and submitted, in turn, to the Municipal Legislating Chamber, for approval. This cycle also includes monitoring the implementation of the approved works, and is restarted by the process of discussing next year's budget.

PARTICIPATION AND SOCIAL CONTROL IN THE CITY OF SÃO PAULO: THE OP EXPERIENCE

São Paulo is the largest Brazilian city and the second largest city in Latin America with about 11 million inhabitants. In the metropolitan area of São Paulo that figure reaches 18 million. In 2004, the government budget for the city totaled 14,294,000,000 reais. 11% of its population lives in slums, or *favelas*. There are 36,000 homes in areas subjected to risks. As evidenced by these figures, São Paulo is an extremely unequal[55] city, subjected to various contradictions. One of the interviewees summarized as follows: "Characteristic of São Paulo is the density of wealth and of poverty." On one side, "there is the Banespa",[56] symbol of prosperity and development, and on the other, poverty,

"evident wherever you go in the city centre" [Civil Society (1). Sé].[57] São Paulo is, in this sense, a portrait of Brazil, one of the most unequal countries in the world.[58]

Apart from its financial significance, the state and the city of São Paulo play a significant role in national politics. The city of São Paulo accounts for 6% of the electorate in the country and 30% of the electorate in the state of São Paulo. Not only because of the grandeur of these figures, which makes it one of the biggest polling stations in Brazil, but for its political and economic weight, with one of the highest public budgets in the country (in gross terms), the electoral disputes in São Paulo are often seen as mirrors which reflect, while impacting, the dynamics of the political game that takes place in the federal sphere. Since the electoral competition in São Paulo transcends the town, we can say that these are federalized elections, where support for either candidate at municipal level usually makes politicians, the press and opinion formers to end up nationalizing the results. It is no coincidence that in the last two municipal elections in São Paulo (with PT winning in 2000 and PSDB in 2004) the federal government acted firmly, both from the financial as well as from the political and administrative point of view, to favor its candidates.

It is, as you can see, an area where party disputes are heavily charged with ideology, with a high distinction, in the beginning, for the conflict between *malufismo*[59] and *petismo*, which now seems to have shifted to a confrontation between PT and PSDB.[60] This peculiarity of the state capital seems to keep the local territories under a constant climate of elections, keeping politicians engrossed in a daily quest for the creation, expansion or reconquering of electoral majorities. The change in strategies by PSDB, which until recently was not constituted as a party of the masses but that now seeks to expand its social base as a strategy to consolidate its political leadership in the capital, features an additional ingredient in this mix. The result of this situation is the subordination of the action strategy of social and political actors to the needs and rhythms characteristic of an election campaign. This seems to be an important condition in the relations between social organizations and the political system, with very sensitive implications when it comes to the issue of autonomy and effectiveness of participatory spaces.

The history of participation and social control in governance in the city of São Paulo is a story that, by its irregular and discontinuous movement, evidences the deep ruptures in the field of political action and the occurrence of administrations targeting quite different ethical and political principles.

Based on recent history, in 1985, Jânio Quadros (Brazilian Labor Party, PTB by its initials in Portuguese), leading the conservative coalition, wins the election for mayor of the capital, arguing as flags, and following the previous administrations precedent efforts to moralize the administration and the customs with a personal and authoritarian style of government (CHAIA, 1991:271). However, on this occasion it met a civil society much more careful and acting:

> It was an important moment for the reorganization of civil society and redemocratization of the country after 21 years of authoritarian rule. Ecological movements, neighborhood associations and grassroots organizations demanded a more active involvement in the life of the city. The civil society expanded its political spaces. (…) In his last administration, Jânio Quadros had to withdraw many of his decisions, not by his own choice as he declared, but because of the pressure he received from broad sectors of society. We lived a new era, where the movements, organizations and associations were present and were attentive to the actions of the Executive. (CHAIA, 1991:296-299)

At the end of the 80's, in the heat of the mobilizations around the National Constituent Assembly, the Workers' Party for the first time took on the prefecture of São Paulo, with the Luiza Erundina administration. With PT heading the municipal executive, the prospects for democratization of governance in the local space took shape in a large movement for the creation of new government-society communication channels.

As indicated by the studies, the creation of these new participatory instances has been subjected to an intense discussion in relation to the nature of the functions of these new collegial bodies' occurrences. The debate was strongly guided by the structuring principles of the *movimentalista* field (GONH, 2003; DOIMO, 1995). It was not just a matter of defining the format of those spaces, but also the direction, purpose and the sense of the relationship between government and society at the time of building the institutional foundations of the Democratic State. To what extent the society could come close to the State without been actually "contaminated" by its logic, and how far could the government open to dialogue and to negotiating with social groups without threatening the "governance" as a result of the escalating demands? The answers to these questions did not generate consensus among the members of the party, neither in the government nor among the representatives of the popular movements.[61]

Such questions, however, provided orientation for the development of the Municipal Organic Law of the City of São Paulo in which discussion proposals were formulated pursuant to councilmen and social organizations, about different types of spaces in relation to government / society in their most different forms and directed to the most varied areas of public politics. Despite all problems which arose in the course of this process, the new Organic Law of the City of São Paulo, approved on April 5 of 1990, opened, as Calderón concluded, a new era in the construction, of participatory democracy in the city:

> *The difference of the old Organic Law of the City of São Paulo, of 1969, and all the prior ones, in which there were no space for the participation of the civil society in the government of public affairs, at any level and in any Court of First Instance, the current Organic Law of the City of São Paulo stands out for having established the judicial basis of a new paradigm in the interrelation of the public power and the civil society, thus enabling the administrative decentralization and the creation of new mechanisms and principles of popular participation in the City's government. (CALDERÓN, 2000:26)*

The convergence of these new legal guidelines and the local government political project during the first *petista* government, led by Luiza Erundina, brought about a strong movement for broadening the arena of political formulation – and made it more complete – as a consequence of the creation of various institutional channels of participation at the end of the 80's and beginning of the 90's. Among these channels, the Government Council of Public Politics[62] and the first experience of Participatory Budget initiated in 1990 stand out. This first experience with the Participatory Budget in the city caused some conflicts, both with relation of the government with the Party as well as the relation of the government with the City Council. This is what Brian Wampler explains:

> *Within the scope of the administration party coalition led by PT (Workers' Party), Erundina faced a difficult political battle about which type of participatory institution should be created. The discussions were polarized between choosing "deliberative" or "consulting" bodies, and whether such bodies should be organized based on territory or based on political sectors (…). The demand for PB came from the PT sector linked*

> *to the social movements, but it was not necessarily shared by other factions of the PT. To the extent that Erundina`s measure was forced to focus in a more restricted range of reforms of those that PT had originally foreseen, the mayor decided to give up the authority to the citizens' bodies. (WAMPLER, 2005:56)*

According to Couto (1995), it was extremely challenging to the São Paulo City PT to exercise the executive power in a city like São Paulo, for the first time. It was about a conflicting adjustment process of the "original model of the Worker's Party": from a "radical" and "revolutionary" party to the "party responsible for the administration". This change generated a crisis of relationship among the members of the PT which were in charge of São Paulo's administration and those who were not, a crisis which lasted for the four years of the administration. According to the author, the failure in advancing was due to the exclusion of a significant political sector, whether from the party or from the legislative power.

In the same direction, Wampler points out the difficult relation the government maintained with the City Council during the four years of government: "the political capital employed by Erundina to articulate a stable majority of votes jeopardized her capacity to delegate decision-making authority, once the mayor was forced to support the political projects of potential allies in the Câmara Municipal (City Council). This support, administrative as well as oriented to obtain resources, determined the restriction of available resources for the OP" (WAMPLER, 2005:57). In this context, concrete results (the implementation of approved projects) and the increase of power delegation to the citizens were much worse than expected (WAMPLER, 2005).

In 1933, with the election of Paulo Maluf and after that with his successor Celso Pitta, a new correlation of forces is established, bringing forth a harsh change of direction of the social movements, both in the government plan itself and in the social movements strategies of action, just as one can see in this analysis of the representative of the Central dos Movimentos Populares (Popular Movements Central):

> *When the government changes, everything changes, regardless of the opposition to such changes. Recently in 1993, we lived through this situation with the change in the municipal government of São Paulo. In spite of society mobilization, the policies created by a democratic government were destroyed. And the aim of mobilization*

was more to keep the services created by the former administration than to improve those, for they had been achieved by long lasting popular movement struggle. (quoted in BONFIM, 2000:66)

During Maluf's and Pitta's administrations, several experiences of dialogue between municipal government and society were aborted. Among them, the OP. As from 1998, the innumerable accusations of corruption, which compromised the relationship between mayor Pitta and the City Council, generated a strong crisis in the government, with very negative repercussions for Celso Pitta's political godfather, former mayor Paulo Maluf. These accusations reinforced the need for changes in the way the city was being governed.

In the year 2000, with the election of Marta Suplicy,[63] the PT retook the leadership of the municipal executive, and owing to this, the process of creating decision-making collegiate bodies was put back on the agenda of the municipal government, by comprising new areas such as housing, public safety, the homeless, etc.[64] In her administration, Marta again institutes popular participation for determining the budget.

The return of the PT to power in municipal government, after eight years of a conservative government, imparted another logic and dynamics to the dialogue between the society and executive power and at the same time made it clear that the challenges posed for the creation of a participatory public government are still far from being overcome, as we shall see in more detail in the following analysis of the Participatory Budget in Marta Suplicy's administration.

OP: FROM ENTHUSIASM TO DISENCHANTMENT

The PB was in Marta Suplicy's program of government, which was supported by the coalition of left-wing parties called *Muda São Paulo*. During the campaign, several seminars to discuss popular participation, specially the OP, were held.

In 2001, Law No 13.169 of 06/11/01 created the Coordination Office for Participatory Budget and two other coordination offices: the one for Popular Participation and the one of the Youth (VITALE, 2004). The experience of the OP lasted for the four years of Marta Suplicy's administration (2001-2004), and was discontinued in the beginning of José Serra's administration.

In the three regions investigated, namely the southern zone, western zone and the central zone – the interviewees were very critical towards the experience. When evaluating the OP, interviewees pointed out the disappointment with the results of popular participation. In the interviews, the general opinion was that the failure to implement the projects of works that had been approved led to a discredit of such participation channel and its feasibility, so the number of participants was fewer and fewer over the years. The PB, an important motto of Workers' Party's administrations, ended in Marta Suplicy's administration under harsh criticism of the leaders of the movement, as one can notice in the declarations of the leaders of the central region:

> There is nothing to identify, no works, not a thing that one could say: what we see here is the fruit of the OP. [Civil Society (1) – Sé]

> OP means deception, because until now I haven't seen anything. [Civil Society (4) – Sé]

> (…) This is a fairy tale. This does not exist. In 2004 we did not participate in the OP. (…) One sees how people had fought for the [participatory] budget and in actual fact; councilmen were the ones that decided (…) it's not even the mayor. (…). Everything people discussed, what people have discussed, what people have seen as high priority such as a day care center, a health care center, a hospital, remained on paper (…) This is why today it is difficult to mobilize the population to discuss any political issues. [Civil Society (8) – Sé]

> I do not believe in the (…) for political reasons, because I disagree with the method, and how it is being carried out. I do believe that we do not in any place have a (…) The budget comes ready, so much for health, so much for education, so much to pay foreign debt, so much to pay the internal debt, and then, the little that is left over 6.7% they put it on the table for the movements to argue, put the civil society to fight for. Thus this is not a Participatory Budget; it is the Budget of Poverty. [Civil Society (10) – Sé]

In the wake of the initial enthusiasm aroused by the experience of the OP, came the discredit and, in consequence, the emptying of the channels of participation:

The result was too poor (…) it ended up to be non satisfactory. (…) In the beginning there were better results. (…) When the PB Project came forth, the people believed a lot that their most direct problems would be solved soon. As soon as the first year ended and most of the matters had not been solved, then in the second year the people did not believe in it anymore. (…) So, what happens? How am I going to loose my time, how am I going to continue to discuss a project by going there to elect a delegate, if the problems we have enumerated are not solved. (…) So people stop believing. [Civil Society (6) – Sé]

In the first moment the OP had a boom and now came the time that nothing does work because you approve the things and they are not done for multiple reasons, the part that you decide is a [small] part of the budget (…) the struggle goes on, the people against the people. So the popular participation is sham participation. (…) So, it is a popular participation, but it is not much democratic. (…). [Civil Society (7) – Sé]

I am going to give an example of the housing here in the City center. There were people who came five or six times, and there comes the mistake of the militant, the mistake the speech of power: that they are going to resolve the problem. (…) If I say so, come with me that we will get a house…Thus you go once, twice and you notice there is no house, not even a tile (…). Not even a load of earth to take home. Why should I go there and act like a clown in front of others, discuss, and not even understand what the discussion this is? I am not going to go anymore. [Civil Society (9) – Sé]

In the Sub-prefecture of Capela Socorro, we clearly observed the same evaluation we found at Sé: failure to implement project of works approved leading to discredit and the decrease in participation, resulting in the emptying of the OP.

In the beginning the population was confident, and in some plenary sessions there were three thousand people, because they believe in it. (…) I have been to a plenary session in which only the registration went on until 05:00 pm (…) because so many people participated … because they believed in it… good grief, I will be able to vote here for the representatives, give an opinion about the budget, about what my district needs more. And it was disappointing. It was disappointing because there never was an answer for anything. (…) It is a channel which was emptying, lost credibility. (…) The people

would only participate if they were really respected, heard, do you understand? There should be an answer, either a yes or a no, but a convincing answer. When this is not clear, there is the doubt; people tend to do this, cease participating, and leave. [Civil Society (3) – Capela do Socorro]

There was no participation, no (…). Nothing, unfortunately, because the people were all disenchanted; I even invited the people who had participated at the last meeting that was held. Nobody cared to know what had happened at the last PB meeting, and at the end, there was no use to choose a delegate, and approve anything because the people did not participate. (…) At the beginning, people were very willing to take part, but than, everything which was approved was lost… it did not get off the paper. Thus, I believe in the end it the last meeting that was held (…) particularly in our district, there was no participation at all. I counted no more than three people. [Civil Society (4) – Capela do Socorro]

Disappointed, I gave up taking part in the PB, because I could see that everything the people discussed was important, but it was not put into practice, was not executed. [Civil Society (5) – Capela do Socorro]

In the first year it was a great hope, mainly in health. (…) Even though in the first year we made a great effort, I find that afterwards there was a certain difficulty in maintaining this hope. [Local Executive (1) – Capela do Socorro]

It was also mentioned the representation problem inside the OP which cancelled the plenary session.

There were various places were there were only three people present [at the plenary session of the PB] and those three chose their representatives. So, three turned into 300 votes. How is this? (…) it is necessary to have a profile that represents the community, a person the community can trust, a person that has a commitment with the population. This is the worst fear of the population. (…) A proof of this is that there was an intervention, they had to cancel the entire process in order to start the election of their OP representatives all over again. [Civil Society (3) – Capela do Socorro]

In the evaluations of the OP in São Mateus, even though the critical tone also prevailed, like we saw at Sé and at Capela do Socorro, one thing was different: the item "the failure to carry out works leading to discredit and demobilization"was mentioned fewer times. Only one of the interviewees used this critical argument that was common at Sé and at Capela:

> *See, I have always been in the health council, since the 80's (…) and I have always truly believed that the people need to show its problems and possible solutions. (…) But one always thought that the people had to loose a lot of time with it, too much time, a meeting here, and another meeting there. (…) I said, but listen, the people devoted time, the people … pay for transport to go wherever it is necessary to go, time is sacred for everybody, we got to see the problems and the solutions and we have presented ourselves with open arms, with plainness, and the results did not come. In the past years this was for me the most frustrating thing. (…) Last year I had to abandon ship in the middle of the journey: I said; no, enough is enough! I cannot take it any longer. And every time I went to these meetings I came home much stressed. [Civil Society (01) – São Mateus]*

The feeling of frustration due to the fact that decision-making was concentrated in the mayor's office, the criticisms of the fragility of the popular representation ("always attended by the same people") and the utilization of the same space permeated the speech of the OP in the region. The fraud occurred in the plenary session, even though mentioned only punctually, and has been another contributing factor for the negative evaluation of the process.

> *The first time a Participatory Budget meeting was held, I participated even in the organizing committee and everything, but when I saw what was happening in the first Participatory Budget, I was taken aback. I said: (…) I have much else to do, I'd better leave. Because it was like this, I would discuss, discuss, discuss, discuss, I would go there and arrive at the same time as the delegates, and some councilmen would manage to get those delegates there (…), they did not bother to conceal it, you know? Only if you didn't want to see you wouldn't see what was happening, and I got very angry; I said, I am never going to come back here; the next year I did not come. (…) I won't take*

up this fight…I believe it is a dirty fight. I will not stoop to their level, and so I left. [Civil Society (12) – São Mateus]

For you to have an idea of how important the participation is here: last year we had a plenary session of the OP that was objected to because of fraud, the ballot box was tampered with at the sub-prefecture, and the count vote was inaccurate with 33 votes in excess. (…) There you can see how democratic the administration of the São Mateus sub-prefecture is. (…) We overthrew it. It was the only plenary session of the PB which was overthrown, that was objected to. Shame on São Mateus, unfortunately. [Civil Society (10) – São Mateus]

The manipulation has no end, (…). You are at your home; you don't have the slightest idea of what the Participatory Budget is about. Nothing is taught. Because it is not interesting for them. Because you will start do participate and discuss. And there you break the chain which had already been formed, in which the same people always participate in. [Civil Society (9) – São Mateus]

The question of information has been mentioned many times, since it is one of the problems that restrain the access of the population to the channels of participation in general. The little knowledge of these spaces seems to be, on one hand, related to the complexity due to the size of the population and its distribution in the territory, which makes it difficult the make known the innumerable existing spaces. But, on the other hand, according to the interviews, there was a local government arrangement to limit the access to this information, aimed at controlling the conflictive potential in the spaces of participation, limiting the participation to those who share the general principles of the government. The perception that the information regarding participation channels is distributed in an unequal manner and that the most important filter has originated in the party was pointed out many times in the interviews in the three regions of the city:

(…) I believe that is another problem, there were some popular participation "feuds", so there were the very good friends who were very well informed and there were those who were not so well informed. [Civil Society (9) – Sé]

Everything seemed to be concealed. Again, unfortunately. You would only be in the know if you act inside of four walls. If you belong to a group, in general you have a person you are connected to, who knows what is going on, and than you will know what is going on. (…). If you do not, you will not know what is going on. In general there are a lot of people who would be interested in, would be interested in participating, in explaining, in reminding what was promised (…) and who will never be a part of it. [Civil Society (5) – São Mateus]

The system still operates like this… though currently it seems more concealed. In that case, I'll ask you: What does the party in power usually do? It manages (…) to involve the people that are party members. Thus, in general, people that are not party members, that are not party militants or are not a part of the party, get information by other means. So, it is more difficult for you to participate. [Civil Society (7) – São Mateus]

To conclude, we would like to mention, for comparison purposes in this evaluation, the importance that some of those who were interviewed and who criticized the participation process and its results give to the opportunity of "speaking and being listened to". Along this line, those who were asked about whether the movements could influence public policies, answered the following in the interviews:

The government does not listen (…) although it is government with policies for the majority of the population, it doesn't listen all the same. When you could step in and make changes, such as in a bus itinerary, and the people would like to step in, nobody listens to. (…). I think that it works like this: the government has already listened… knows what has happened, has already devised policies and now wants to implement such policies. But the space for dialogue is much larger than in the two former administrations (…) it cannot even compare, because before you wouldn't even go there. Now you can go there and speak and sometimes they would listen to you. But you can speak, state your opinion, criticize, and they listen to you for a moment… that is to say, there is a space for dialogue, even though it is not what it should be. [Civil Society (3) – Sé]

Despite the fact that we know that this is a democracy between quotation marks … but the right to be there and to be able to express yourself is extremely positive. Even

when our expression is filed away. But this possibility to be there and speak… (…) To be there and to say what I believe, to say what I would like for my region, even knowing that a great part of it, 90% of that will just be on paper, is very positive. [Civil Society (9) – São Mateus]

What the interviews show is that the possibility to have access to the Government, to present demands without the need of middlemen, as the councilmen, for example, is not so unimportant when we consider the Brazilian authoritarian tradition, plus the more than twenty years of military dictatorship, and that São Paulo was eight years under the governments of Maluf and Pitta. This understanding was present in the interviews in the three sub-prefectures, and even though it is far from being a general evaluation, it seems important to be considered. It is about a acknowledgement that there is a larger space for expression, and this is not totally insignificant, and the perception that the population still has a long way to go before it can actually influence the making of public policies. Dilemmas that a interviewee summarized in the phrase: "any door opened today is welcome, even though it is insufficient." [Civil Society (10) – São Mateus]

PARTICIPATION AND REPRESENTATION: RECIPROCALITY OR SUBORDINATE COMBINATION?

By observing Marta Suplicy's administration, we can see the various participation channels created by her government. Several processes, such as Participatory Budget, Steering Plans and the creation of sub-prefectures show how Marta's government was willing to widen the participation channels.[65]

In spite of that, the evaluation of such experiences was manifestly critical by pointing out poor concrete results and a trend to manipulate and use the spaces of participation for promoting Marta's policies:

We do participate, but with all this openness, we have to admit that we have also been used. (…) Sometimes, plenary sessions were held (…) in order to ensure people's support, but actually the proposals were imposed top down. [Civil Society (5) – Capela do Socorro]

It seemed to us more of a game of political marketing than a true effort to get people involved in participating in decision-making processes of the city. I don't know if the trust in popular participation and in the public power has increased. I don't think it has. This is how we see it. [Civil Society (1) – Sé]

Such evaluation by the movements was influenced by Marta Suplicy's administrative practices, which at the same time that established participatory policies in order to show its commitment to the democratization of public administration, also adopted the old political practice of plot of land, or distribution of public positions in the sub-prefectures in exchange for political favors, a recurrent theme in the interviews. Commenting this process, Wampler asserts:

With the aim of maintaining the support in São Paulo City Council, Marta Suplicy allowed councilmen who were allied to the municipal government, state representatives and even federal representatives for the State of São Paulo to appoint people to hold up to seven positions in each one of the 31 sub-prefectures. This political strategy helped to assure that the municipal executive government would have its bills and budgets approved and to prevent legislative questioning such as those that dampened her predecessors' administrations, the former mayor Celso Pitta and former mayor Luiza Erundina. (WAMPLER, 2004:384)

As for the impacts caused by such strategy for ensuring the OP (Popular Participation) governance, the author says:

The politician or the political group that takes the "control" of the sub-prefectures starts to exert a major sway in the way the PB is managed in each region. If the politician supports the PB, there will be organizational and operational support for the process and it will be the focal point for the implementation of the projects of works and services prioritized by means of the PB. But if the politician does not support the PB or supports it only partially, PB delegates will face great difficulties in effectively influencing the results of policies. (WAMPLER, 2004:385)

To this respect, a militant of the health movement gave vent to her feelings by saying:

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Politics has changed a lot, it is not what it used to be, we are disappointed with politics because we have always been against the distribution of submunicipality public positions in exchange for political favors, and now... this unscrupulous policy with which we cannot agree. [Civil Society (12) – São Mateus]

In the same vein, we can read the following in other interviews:

The party that is administering the city, the PT (Workers' Party), is not listening to people. (...) It grants public positions to those who can be of its interest in order to play a political game. (...) I cannot stand that. (...) people are not listened to; people are distributed among the councilmen. [Civil Society (3) – Sé]

A sub-prefecture is made up of the following: a certain councilman Mr. X has received more votes and then he has representation... (...) He is not even from the district where he has received more votes, you know? But than he [says]: I want to be the head of this sub-prefecture (...) For the others, there will be two or three positions left, for people that may sometimes mean well, but who will be as if they were anesthetized there, and do you know why? Because those will not have much power to act. Than, the conflict coming from above will prevent the work down here. [Civil Society (5) – São Mateus]

A partisan discussion: who is going to come, who is going to be appointed, who is going to take this coordination office. Oh! That those councilman's interests have to be defended. This belongs to that councilman, take another one. And that is a loteamento [distribution of public positions in exchange for political favors], also an old acquaintance of ours. [Civil Society (9) – São Mateus]

In general, the City Council and the parties in coalition appear as responsible for way of making politics based on the loteamento of public positions, and justify this arguing that it is necessary for the sake of governance. For some, in these processes there are some "unscrupulous people" involved, who gained terrain and the movements were not able to oppose them, we let things occur, we were conniving with them [Civil Society (5) Capela do Socorro]. At this point, it was also concluded that a kind of political continuity in connection with former officeholders took place:

This is how it has always been done. (…) There are sub-prefectures that have Maluf's people, and there are people of all parties. (…) They use the delegation that I give them in order to elect whoever seems fit to them. (…) This is a distribution of public positions (loteamento) that occurs out of the councilmen's control. [Civil Society (7) – Sé]

These findings deserve two observations. On the one hand, the distribution of public positions [loteamento] seems to have compromised the participation channels opened by the municipal government, and being a contributing factor to empty such channels. On the other hand, it seems to have harmed the idea that participation is necessarily part of a wider project. What the movements have actually witnessed, as shown in their analysis with certain perplexity, is a project of participation – which seems to be in value terms directed to the democratization of administration – but that in practice is just the opposite, the balkanization of public interests due to the predominance of a partisan logic basically oriented to electoral struggle.

The interviews clearly showed the realization that the political-partisan struggle has a strong presence on the day-to-day of communities, thus affecting the relationships of the movements with the councilmen of the region. After talking with several people, we got the impression that patronage is more active than ever before:

The last word belongs to politicians or political groups. They shared among themselves the coordination offices with the aim of balancing the political weight of each one and the last word belonged to the politicians who had, who have, who are a reference, and I would say, even have power on that sub-prefecture. [Civil Society (4) – São Mateus]

The sub-prefecture is in the hands of two councilmen… only what they want is carried out; this is not the people's struggle, it is not what the people want. When the people ask for an improvement in their district, (…) what occurs? The two councilmen (…) go there, have a meeting with the people… if the people favor them, the improvement is carried out, if the people do not favor them, it is not. [Civil Society (12) – São Mateus]

In the words of an interviewee, it is as if the auctions of the sub-prefectures by the municipal executive [Civil Society (4) – São Mateus] have fostered a more patronizing relationship between the movements and the politicians. If the latter hold the power in the

sub-prefectures, the movements cannot afford to avoid relationships with them. There is a view that the municipality is in the hands of the councilmen and that they also manage to use to their advantage the spaces of participation.

It should be mentioned that the councilmen were also interviewed and did not say anything about this issue. We do not know how they feel about it and how they would respond to the criticism on them. We do not even know whether the movements would be actually interested in establishing relationships with the councilmen on a different basis. The distrust in representative institutions seems to have restrained the progress of the debate on lawmaking democratization, which undoubtedly requires the democratization of the relationship between councilmen and social leaders at a local level. It seems to us that it is impossible to move forward in the dynamics of participation without the proper understanding of these relationships. This means, in its turn, to understand to what extent the players involved were actually interested in the democratization of such relationships – how they evaluate their losses and profits in this process – and on which bases these relationships could be established, in a local context marked by the intensification of electoral competition and where it seems impossible to dispense with more immediate interchanges aiming at creating electoral majorities. It becomes clear from these reports how the ways by which representative democracy is reproduced at a local level subordinate, confine and condition participatory experiences. Something that could be potentially new, such as the Participatory Budget, is pervaded by the oldest patterns of Brazilian politics.

Another aspect of the same issue is the interviewees' evaluation of social achievements of the municipal government. According to interviewees, Marta Suplicy's administration has shown very positive results in what concerns the social area; but these seem to be unrelated to the channels of participation, and be more results achieved by her government program rather than by pressure exerted by the organizations. Where some result is due to the pressure exerted by the organizations, we can realize that such pressure has been exerted from outside the channels of participation rather than from within those channels. According to interviewees, Marta Suplicy's administration provided a kind of participation that implied basically in increasing the degree of "listening" in order to ensure the approval of her projects. Somehow, this context has created some disappointment with politics, the Workers' Party and democracy itself, even when positive social results have been achieved / despite the positive social results.

Marta Suplicy's administration did not try to establish a relationship between participatory democracy (driven by existing spaces of participation or created by her administration) and representative democracy, but did create a certain parallel "institutionalism", which actually did not have any impact on the political system: it has just managed to be on good terms with it. Differently from what happened in other municipal administrations, such as Rio Grande do Sul, for example, where the OP has strongly questioned patronage practice,[66] here the administration combined a logic with other logic, causing as it seems a debilitation in participatory practices as an alternative way of making politics (and building governance).

This "**parallel institutionalism**" has become patent when we observe the place the OP has in the administration. As Vitale (2004) has pointed out, the institution of the OP in São Paulo has not been followed by a wider administrative reform which could link the participatory process to central urban planning bodies and to the municipal government action.

> *This was a controversial point when the government program was being developed and, nevertheless, the option for not carrying out the reform at the very beginning of the administration prevailed. While the institution of the OP in the City of São Paulo was a relatively consensual issue, the same did not apply to the role the PB would play in the structure of the administration. When it comes to determine how much and to what degree power should be shared instead of the importance of or need for sharing it, we can assume that the issue has become more complex and led to higher tensions in the structure of the municipal government power. (VITALE, 2004:18)*

These tensions led to the option for creating a Coordinating Office for Participatory Budget, linked to the Secretariat of the Municipal Government. Besides that Coordinating Office, a Coordinating Office for Popular Participation was also created, without any links between the two. The Coordinating Office for Participatory Budget had to deal directly with other municipal secretariats, particularly with the Finance Secretariat. According to the OP coordinator himself, Felix Sanchez, a gradual strategy for introducing the program was adopted.

The introduction of the OP was discussed. The strategy adopted is as follows: 1) in 2001, pilot experiences were carried out in order to define a methodology and a proposal; 2) in 2002, the global introduction of the OP with a view to the 2003 OP; 3) within the 2002 Budget Law, presented to the City Council in late March 2001, conduct the first public consultation and present the city economic-financial situation and an draft of the OP proposed; 4) between June and September 2001, during elaboration of a proposal for the 2002 budget, choose regions and/or projects (still to be defined) where pilot experiences will be conducted for the introduction of the OP in 2002. (SANCHEZ, 2004:416)

Is it viable a different combination of participatory and representative democracy that would not lead to a parallel institutionalism? The answer to this question is not so simple if we consider that former mayor Marta Suplicy (as any other ruler) was elected as a result of a government program legitimated by this process. The acknowledgment of this fact is the starting point for a dialogue between government and society – a challenge to the participatory process –, as the Sub-prefecture Secretary states:

There is a government program that was discussed with the population, at least this became clearer in the last election; a government program that was approved and should be followed. Its main ideas were approved by voters in the election; the program should be followed; I think this is a limit for social participation; she cannot change the demands approved by voters in the election. In order to abide by the main ideas of a government program, there is a set of actions; lets call it this way, completely open to discussion. The format, scope, and amount of resources...I think everything is open to discussion. Fund raising, follow-up, involvement in the planning process so that one can meet everything as defined in the government program, I think this calls for participation. (…) The scope of such programs should be defined by social participation. [Municipal executive (1)]

The statement above goes back to the relationship between participatory and representative democracy and raises 2 questions. The first refers to the relation between government program and participation. Few governments have a well-defined program before they come into power. The workers' party (PT) is one of the few political parties to have one. All governments, including from the PT, suffer many

influences during the term which leads to changes to their programs. To what extent does participation change a government program? Or are there other elements that can change it to a greater extent?

The second question refers to the nature of conflicts that can and should be brought to the participatory processes. Which decisions can and should be brought to more comprehensive participatory processes? A question that goes back to the different expectations regarding participation when it comes to the essence of the matter, its purpose and the nature of its decisions, which also make us think about the complexity of the public policymaking process. As Marques (2000) points out, the public policymaking process includes a vast and diverse group of agents, formal or informal, acting in different realms, with different timing and dynamics, and able to mobilize different resources. The institutionalization of participation channels does not diminish the inherent complexity of the process; on the contrary, it makes it more complex not only because it allows the introduction of new players and the promotion of new interests, but also because of the establishment of a new logic in the relationship between the players and the reinforcement of the principles of legitimacy: participation, transparency, publicity and social control. This means that, in this complex and diversified field, the institutional participatory channels – like PPs, councils, forums, etc – are among the several agents and their actuating strength depends on their strategic positioning capability in the interior of this web, according with the clear determination of their identity and resources, when compared with the other actors. (TATAGIBA, 2004)

What is the impact of participatory and representative democracy interlacing in society movements and organizations? Our research also comes up with some clues to help the discussion. For the organizations, the question is how to relate to governments, particularly when it comes to the Workers' Party (PT), without risking to be manipulated by players that are always thinking according to the election calendar. In the interviews, one aspect of this scenario became clear when trying to identify the impact of power alternance – essential in any democracy – over the strategies of movement action. The interviews call the attention because social movements, when they do not question their role, identity and strategies when relating to each other, many times end up stuck in their own dynamics, temporality and pace in the electoral struggle.In the relationship between governments and political movements,

those people connected to opposing political parties stand out. It should be emphasized that such conflicts are not only between people of different political parties, but also within the Workers' Party (PT) when people are associated to different politicians or trends within the same party.

> Within the Workers' Party (PT) itself, in which there are many groups with different views, this is particularly difficult. When one begins to discuss a political project and they start to mention names: this belongs to X or Y. (…) Not always health and housing [policies] follow the same political line. (…) Divergences are more evident locally, within a small area. A group with people related to the City Hall is better for me, but it is more difficult for the other group. [Participant in a workshop presenting preliminary research results from the health movement]

These divergences are identified within the political party and discussed inside the political movement. In some cases divergences are not really significant, but because it is important to support the politician one is associated with, the struggle for space results in fewer opportunities for those who are not associated with any politician or political party to represent the community before the government.[67]

Another impact on society organizations refers to the identity of political movements. It is known that movement militants had a triple identity during Marta Suplicy's administration: apart from being a political movement, they also belonged to PT and, as PT was the political party in power, they were also in power and had to support the government before others inside the movement. This situation is not simple, because it has consequences for both the political movement and the individual. For the individual it is a personal crisis in the sense that the person wants to do more than he/she can and ends up being pushed from all sides. For the movement, the difficulty lies in having to declare a position, because some are close to government and wish protection from the government, whereas others don't feel so attached to the government and oppose it. When Marta Suplicy ran for a second term and failed to be elected again, many political movements started to think why they fell so easily into the "governance talk" and why, if disagreeing with Marta Suplicy's administration in many aspects, particularly as to the distribution of positions and the residual nature of participation, they failed to oppose the government and bring up the conflicts.

When we would talk to the sub-prefecture mayor or to the PT Steering Council, we would hear that governance was the important thing. And we have, as a political movement supporting the party, been very tolerant (…). We took no action with respect to the party. And now it hurts to realize that we have been respected at no time. [Participant in a workshop presenting preliminary research results]

Autonomy is a value and, as such, sets the limits for the relationship between political movements and the political system, which may result in manipulation, co-optation, etc. when not respected. In this sense, autonomy does not mean absence of a relationship – the usual way of looking at it – but it tells us the nature of such relationship, the role its players play. Thus, autonomy of political movements is related to the nature of the links they establish with the other players within the political system; to what extent they can choose their interlocutors based on their agendas, stand up for their interests, define the objectives of such interactions and to what extent they lead or are led. Autonomy can exist even when political movements keep permanent links with other players, such as political parties, unions, the government, council members and state representatives, especially when we consider that such links have been essential many times. In principle there is no problem when political movements ally with governments, political parties and council members to fight together and see their demands met. Besides, movements have always done that. The problem is the feeling, very clear in the interviews, that such relationships are more useful for the State, political parties and the government than to the movements themselves.

Such feeling reinforces the perception that the mechanisms of representative democracy are stronger than participatory mechanisms, which are based on principles such as transparency, social control and publicity. In this sense, when evaluating the real experiences, the interviewers revealed their political expectations of participatory spaces, allowing us to discuss the viable combination between representative and participatory democracy in different state reform projects. At the micro level, what is important is to know what are the results expected from institutional participation and to what extent it agrees, from the agents' perspective, with more traditional strategies to meet the demands, by means of a representative system and network mobilization.

CONCLUSION

This aim of this work is to understand the relation between participatory and representative democracy. It is based on the experience of Participatory Budgeting in the city of São Paulo under the Workers' Party (PT).

As it can be seen, a critical analysis of the experience prevailed, stressing the lack of concrete results regarding participation and an inclination to manipulation and manipulation of the participatory spaces, used as sources for government legitimization. Instead of contributing to a State democratic reform, Participatory Budgeting ended up as a parallel participatory institutionalization and subordinate to the representative democracy.

In this experience, it could be noted that participatory and representative institutions are governed – tensely and precariously – by a logic whose direction has primarily been established by the demands and challenges of the electoral competence. It is not, as mentioned previously, about a complementary situation, but a combination between participation and representation under the hegemonic guidance of the latter. The Workers' Party, at the same time it acknowledged the importance and created several new spaces for the interrelation between government and society, it did not see them as elements of a renewed institutional architecture to offer new and alternative paths towards a State democratic reform and governance guarantee.

NOTES

42. For assessments of these experiences, refer to, among others, Panfichi (2002); Albuquerque (2004); Fung, A. and Wright, E. O. (2003); Avritzer and Navarro (2003); Dagnino (2002); Coelho and Nobre (2004); Dagnino, Olvera and Panfichi (2006); Clemente and Smulovitz (2004); Olvera (2002); Valdes (2004); Villavicencio (2004); Llona (2004); Lombera (2004).

43. In this direction, Eli Diniz reasons that, in the Brazilian case, when the first signs of a reversal of trends appeared in the international arena, the process of erosion of the traditional relationship matrix State/society/market was already in full swing: "in the Latin American context, the case of Brazil illustrates the depletion of the State as a factor for containment of a civil society in the process of expansion and with increasing organizational density, a reason why the different state and society rhythms are the root of the current impasses" (DINIZ, 1996:163). It is, says the author, an overlap of the internal and external crisis, in a scenario marked by the collapse of the authoritarian regime and the requirements for the consolidation of a democratic order.

44. In the Brazilian case, in the debate over the crisis of the State during the 70's and 80's, two major political forces were present to offer their diagnoses and prescriptions for overcoming the crisis. As explained Sebastian Cruz Velasco (1994), on the one hand groups built around the new popular and trade union movements which, starting from a culture of criticism of the national developmentalism and of isolated practices of the technocracy state, found an alternative for overcoming the crisis in the democratization of the state-society relations and in the reconstruction of the public sphere. On the other hand, forces revolving around the "market-oriented reforms", seeking an alternative to neoliberalism, stressed the need for a new rationality in public administration, in which deregulation and fiscal balance would become a condition for efficiency and effectiveness of policies. At the end of the 80's, and especially during the 90's, these still diffuse concepts would materialize in government programs implemented at the municipal, state and federal levels. In experimenting new alternatives two major administration models have gained more defined contours: the popular-democratic model and the managerial model.

45. The strong consensus around the participatory ideas, from the 90's onward, was accompanied by a diversification of the regulative foundations which historically have given legitimacy to the participatory practice. Thus, if in the 70's and 80's participation was legitimized by reference to the contesting action of the "voiceless", in strong association with transforming utopias, beginning in the mid-90's this ethos starts to live together and to compete for the reputation and significance of participatory experiences with a new set of values that find their source of legitimacy on the challenges and expectations of an effective public administration. References of this debate can be found in Kliksberg (1999), Bresser Pereira and Cunill Grau (1998); Bresser Pereira and Spink (1998); Spink and Camarotti (2002).

46. The idea of a combination of a subordinated nature between participatory and representative democracy, under the hegemony of the latter, was mentioned by Ligia Lüchman in a workshop held in Porto Alegre, on August 2005, as part of the agenda for discussion of the Study Group about Democratic Construction.

47. This research was conducted within the "Monitoring the Rights of Citizens" project, coordinated by the Polis Institute, with support from the Ford Foundation.

48. In Brazil, the town is an entity of the Federation, in the same way as the state and the Union. There are executive and legislative powers in all three areas (municipal, state and federal). The municipality of São Paulo, with more than 10 million inhabitants, has sub prefectures. The sub-Mayors are not directly elected by the population, but are appointed by the Mayor. Established by the Organic Law of the Municipality of São Paulo, in 1990, the Law on Implementation of Sub prefectures – which replaced the Regional Administrations – was only adopted in 2002, during the Marta Suplicy administration, through the Municipal Act #13,339 of August 1st, 2002. The 31 approved sub-prefectures started operating – although precariously – in the year 2003. The Boards of Representatives, also established under the Municipal Act – and which should be installed in all sub-prefectures as a form of social control – were approved by law on July 2004 (Law #13881), and until the development of this study had not yet been implemented in spite of the strong social pressure.

49. The Sé sub-prefecture has 373,164 inhabitants, the Capela do Socorro has 546,861 inhabitants, and the São Mateus has 381,605 inhabitants. [www.portal.prefeitura.sp.gov.br, entered on 03/07/2005].

50. This research is published in Ribeiro and Grazia (2003).

51. The National Forum on People's Participation is an articulation of NGOs on the theme of popular participation, which promotes the exchange of experience, research and discussions since 1990.

52. "The Public Administration and Citizenship Program focuses on projects, programs or activities of the public administration which have at least one year of actual operation, are developed by governmental institutions of state or municipal levels and by indigenous peoples organizations. The activities, programs and projects may also be of intermunicipal, interstate or regional expanse. Everybody must have made innovations in administrative or technical strategies, showing an increase in the capacity of meeting community and social needs" (available at: www.fgvsp.br).

53. Created in 1980, PT is the result of the confluence of political subjects from the new unionism, led by Luis Inácio Lula da Silva; parliamentarians linked to the "popular trend", positioned to the left of the opposition party which functioned during the dictatorship (Brazilian Democratic Movement, MDB); of leftist organizations, especially of Trotskyist groups, which saw in the party a chance for institutional action, and of urban popular movements usually linked to the progressive wing of the Catholic Church (MENE-GUELLO, 1989). According to Meneguello (2005), two features of the party deserve to be highlighted: the proposal of a plural political party, not affiliated with any specific doctrine (not even Marxist), and the principle of internal democracy, which allows for democratic coexistence among different trends.

54. The municipal budget bill is formulated each year by the executive and must be approved by the municipal legislature to be implemented in the following year.

55. Even though São Paulo is among the top 30 Brazilian municipalities it is a territorially segregated city, according to the Atlas of Social Exclusion. "In the more socially included center are located 24 of the 96 districts of the city, with a Social Exclusion index between 0.6 and 1.0. Around the periphery, especially in the far south, in the far east and also in the extreme north, are located the 30 most socially excluded districts, with a of Social Exclusion index lower than 0.4" (VITALE, 2004). For an analysis linking the issue of inequality in São Paulo with the spatial distribution of poverty, see Marques and Torres (2005).

56. State Bank recently turned private.

57. In connection with the identification of the interviews, in order to preserve the confidentiality of respondents, we have defined the following record: interviewed field of action (civil society, local executive, legislative or municipal executive), followed by a number corresponding to the identification of the interview (each respondent receives a number, which restarts at 1 for each new region) and the region in which the respondent dwells (Sé, São Mateus and Capela do Socorro).

58. The Gini coefficient of Brazil is not only higher than the average for Latin America (0.552), but has grown over the decades: 0.603 (1981 to 1990), 0.638 (1991 to 1997) and 0.640 (1998 to 2002) (O'DONNELL, 2004).

59. "Malufismo is a populist right-wing trend, born in São Paulo at the end of the military regime, during the Paulo Salim Maluf administration in state government (1979-1982). With great influence in many areas, its social base was made up of middle class people, self-employed workers and small business owners" (PULS, 2000).

60. PSDB was founded in 1988 by politicians leaving PMDB (Brazilian Democratic Movement Party). It has among its main personalities the names of Mário Covas, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, José Serra and Geraldo Alckmin, who was recently the party candidate for the presidency of the Republic. The PSDB won the federal government in 1995, with Fernando Henrique Cardoso, who achieved re-election four years later. Today it is the main force opposing the Lula administration.

61. As suggested by Doimo, part of the popular movements in São Paulo, mainly those related to the progressive wing of the Catholic Church, showed a distinctive ethos of rejection to the institutions which negatively impacted the negotiations with the new government over the creation of new instances of collegial discussion with the State. "Prisoners of the distinctive ethos of rejecting political institutions because of revolutionary purposes, the leaders of the paulista social urban movements ended up not giving strength to the available potential to create new institutional forms of democracy and public space expansion, following the example of that which happened in Porto Alegre and Belo Horizonte" (DOIMO, 2004:172).

62. In the first year of her administration, Luiza Erundina created, by decree, five new Municipal Councils, four of them have being proposed and not approved during the execution of LOM (Organic Law of the City) , (Municipal Council of Real Estate Market Price, Municipal Council of Sports, Municipal Council for the Defense of Child and Adolescent Rights , and Grand Municipal Council for the Elderly) and the Municipal Council for Health, which were provided for in the LOM (Organic Law of the City) . From the nine municipal councils created in her government, four have a strong social support basis and a more political profile (Defense of Child and Adolescent Rights,

Health, the Elderly and the Handicapped Person); the others as the Municipal Council of Real Estate Market Price, and the City Council of Tariffs had a more technical character. Further more the Urban Political Council stands out in the context of the discussions of urban reform, a theme which had a strong power of mobilization in the city, in conjunction with the social movements. In the last months of her government Luiza Erundina instituted , by means of Law, the councils of the Disabled (Law Nº 11.315, of 12/21/92) and of the Elderly (Law Nº 11.242, of 09/24/92), which previously have been created by decree, and reorganized the Council of Municipal Culture (Law Nº 11.287, of 11/23/92).

63. In the second turn of the municipal elections, Marta Suplicy defeated Paulo Maluf by 59% of the votes For many people, this was the end of the malufismo.

64. Several of the spaces were created as an answer to the mobilization of the organized society, such as the movements for housing, that in the year 2002 managed to institutionalize the dialogue with the municipal executive creating the Council of Municipal Housing in the city of São Paulo, following the recommendation of the 1st Conference of Municipal Housing, held in 2001 (CYM-BALISTA and MOREIA, 2002) There is also the case of the creation of the Municipal Council on Food and Nutrition Safety, whose base was the solid mobilization of the society, which originated the first Conference on Food and Nutrition Safety in São Paulo in 2001, and from which Council was created and became officially recognized in 2003. In short, this government created seven councils for public policies in different areas.

65. This paper does not aim to go deeper into this discussion, but it is important to point administration can be. Different secretariats, sub-prefectures and party coalition allies may have and did have different points of view and corresponding actions in relation to popular participation. In this aspect, when we talk about the political project of government of Marta Suplicy concerning popular participation, we are talking about what has shown to be more hegemonic in such government and that prevailed in the perception of the interviewees.

66. Claudia Feres Farias in her analysis of the experience conducted by State Governor (1999-2002) Olivio Dutra in Rio Grande do Sul of making the PB statewide in scope also points out this aspect, calling the attention to that strategy of governance that focuses on the political struggle concerning government programs and projects: "The PB-RS forums therefore intervened in the traditional relationships between the state executive, local executive and the legislative po-wers. The negotiation concerning budget resources started to be discussed in the public forums implemented. This fact led to the adherence of the mayors to the plenary sessions of the PB-RS. Notwithstanding, such adherence was not always voluntary. As Guaíba vice-mayor (Brazilian Progressive Party – PPB) said to us: 'we could do nothing, the order was to participate'" (FARIA, 2005 page 237).

67. It is more and more important to discuss the forms of representation in participatory spaces. Contrary to belief that representation finds resistance in the Legislative and Executive, it is important to notice that participatory spaces are also spaces created by civil society leaders, who reproduce and are influenced by the representation through political parties and professional politicians. For further information, see Gurza Lavalle, Houtzager and Castello (2006 and 2006ª) and Pinto (2004).

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Housing – evaluation of the municipal policy (2005-2006)

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São Paulo's serious housing problems are well-known. Out of a population of 10 million inhabitants, the slum population is estimated to be 1.16 million, approximately 11% of the total population (CEM, 2002). The outskirts – which are subject to more environmental restrictions and enjoy less infra-structure within the city – are the regions that have shown greater population growth in the municipality.

Similarly, while the slum population grew in the 1990s at a rate of 2.97% per year, the city population grew only 0.9%. About 27.5 million dwellings put their dwellers' lives at high – or very high-risk. The number of empty dwellings reached 250,000 in São Paulo proper, and 420,000 in the metropolitan region (IBGE, Census 2000). Moreover, it is estimated that approximately 600,000 people live in tenements (FIPE, 1994), 1 million people in water spring areas (IBGE), and 1.5 million people in irregular or clandestine plots. One million of these residents of irregular or clandestine plots receive an income below five minimum salaries (Municipal Housing Plan). These figures clearly point out a contradiction in the way the city utilizes its urban areas.

Certainly, such figures represent an immense challenge for the city's housing policy city. In this study The Observatory of the Citizen's Rights, we analyze the housing policy in the Municipality of São Paulo in the period between January, 2005 and December, 2006, concluding our researches in April, 2007, which was when we completed this version of the text. In the period, two political parties were leading the Municipality: Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB) (Brazilian Social Democracy Party), of José Serra and the coalition PFL/DEM of Gilberto Kassab, who took over when mayor José Serra stepped down to run for state governor. In our attempt to contribute to the depth and availability of information regarding social policies in the Municipality of São Paulo, we also aim to provide social actors with tools for their struggles.

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We know that housing policies are not established in a short length of time. A more definitive performance evaluation of the housing policy is to take place at the end of this political term. In this study, only some aspects of the housing policy will be addressed – mainly the continuity/discontinuity elements of initiatives and programs in the period of 2005-2006 in relation with the previous term (2001-2004). Because of the rise of a newly elected political party to office in São Paulo, this was an especially sensitive period of transition.

In October 2004, José Serra (PSDB), a member of the opposition party to the former mayor Marta Suplicy (Workers' Party – PT) was elected mayor of São Paulo. In the case of Brazilian municipalities, a new ruling party has almost always resulted in the possibility of fundamental change in housing policy. According to the Constitution, the municipality is the federal entity responsible for the execution of a housing plan for the municipality. Although the municipality of São Paulo attracts many diverse investments, it is directly responsible for a significant part of the investments in housing policy. Added to that is the fact that Brazil still does not have a fully constituted National Housing System: only in 2005, was the Federal Law number 11.124/05 approved. This law established the National Housing System of Social Interest; however, the access to the scarce resources for social housing has turned out to be slow and difficult for the municipalities.

To evaluate housing policy is no simple task. A housing policy assumes a wide variety of objectives – from provision of new units, slum reurbanization, emission of ownership waivers, intervention in tenements, to rent subsidies. To add to this broad range of objectives, it has been difficult to assess official data. The mid-term situation has aggravated this difficulty. Because the official balance sheets are not consolidated, diverging versions of the same episode arise. We will attempt to identify the differences and similarities regarding the way some aspects of housing policy must be executed.

Note that in no moment in the recent housing policy has the municipality of São Paulo been able to face the extent of its housing shortage.[69] It is also important to note that housing does not appear as a government priority of newly elected officials in 2005. Nor was it a high priority in the previous administration.

Housing is not funded by resources with fixed percentages in the General Budget of the municipality, as it is the case of health and education, which have guaranteed funds on national, state and municipal levels, with "stamped" resources in the budget. Housing does not have a consolidated financing system because of the fact that the National Housing System is still a work in progress.

In this study, we will focus on the municipal budget as it reveals municipal decisions regarding its resources. An analysis of the municipal budget's execution shows great variation in the values of the General Budget of São Paulo Municipality. The parcels in the budget allocated to housing in Marta Suplicy's term (2001-2004) and José Serra's term were lesser than the values in the previous terms of Maluf (1993-1996) and Pitta (1997-2000) (see the graphs with raw values and percentage).

General Budget and SEHAB Budget (values in millions 1994 to 2006)

Year	General Budget	SEHAB Budget
1994 (Cruz.real)	2.745.99	49.81
1995 (R$)	5.826.31	141.99
1996	7.553.07	338.28
1997 Pitta	7.411.91	308.95
1998	7.872.96	238.51
1999	7.189.79	277.72
2000	6.618.32	354.36
2001 Marta Suplicy	8.181.45	229.01
2002	9.690.34	256.17
2003	11.511.39	212.64
2004	13.243.97	153.44
2005 Serra/Kassab	13.858.93	157.80
2006	16.469.00	396.09

Percentage of the General Budget as allocated by Sehab (1994 – 2006)

Year	Percentage
1994 (Cruz.real)	3.15%
1995 (R$)	2.92%
1996	4.14%
1997 Pitta	4.27%
1998	2.93%
1999	3.32%
2000	5.53%
2001 Marta Suplicy	2.81%
2002	2.54%
2003	1.83%
2004	1.65%
2005 Serra/Kassab	1.69%
2006	2.41%

Source: 1994 – 2005 – Councillor Paulo Fiorillo staff (1994 – 2005); NOVOSEO – PMSP (9 January 2007). Tabulation: Instituto Pólis, 2006.

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Even in years of more significant disbursements in the municipal budget, the city's housing situation continued to worsen. The proportion of the population living in sub-par settlements increased (although housing conditions improved in several aspects)[70] while the expansion of precarious and disqualified outskirts kept its course, coinciding with a decrease in population in the city center. Hence the position that at least in the last two decades, regardless of each mayor's political party, the housing problem has not been successfully addressed at the necessary scale by the different mayors.

It is nevertheless possible to identify some points of difference between the governmental administration policies led by PSDB and PFL/DEM (beginning in 2005) and those of the previous administration: the policies aimed at housing in the city center, which were based on a series of programs and projects; attitudes regarding the urbanization of slums and intervention in the existing city; the place of the organized population in politics. We also explore how the governmental administration that took post in 2005 has actively collaborated with the state government – a relationship which did not occur with the same intensity in other terms. Moreover, we introduce a topic that remains open to discussion: the revision of the city's Master Plan and its urbanizing tools that took place as this study was being conducted.

UNDERSTANDING SÃO PAULO'S HOUSING POLICY

It is likely that, more than any other municipality, São Paulo reflects the fragmentation and difficulties faced when one attempts to describe housing policy in Brazil comprehensively. Investments on the municipal, state and federal levels are juxtaposed with internationally funded projects as well as investment related to basic sanitation involving a strong housing component. Municipal resources may come from sources as numerous as the Municipal General Budget, the Budget of the *Secretaria de Habitação* (SEHAB) (Housing Secretary) and the *Fundo Municipal de Habitação* (FMH) (Municipal Housing Fund) These sources are in addition to agreements with the Companhia de Desenvolvimento Habitacional do Governo do Estado (CDHU) (State Government Company for Housing Development) or the Cities' Ministry, loans or donations from international agencies – regardless of whether the *Caixa Econômica Federal* (CEF) (Brazilian Federal Government Savings Bank) acts as intermediary. Besides SEHAB, other secretaries are responsible for initiatives such as the Urban Infra-structure and Planning, or entities of

the indirect administration such as the *Empresa Municipal de Urbanização* (EMURB) (Municipal Urbanization Enterprise) and the *Companhia Metropolitana de Habitação* (COHAB) (Metropolitan Housing Company). Besides these sources of funding, there are several options available to finance construction: subsidized sales, residential leasing, rents, and *"fundo perdido"* financing project (an investment without expecting a financial return).

From an administrative point of view, SEHAB's initiatives are executed through direct administration, indirect administration and participative instances. In the direct administration, SEHAB encompasses the initiatives of the Department of Buildings Approval (APROV), which directs requests for the construction and remodeling of medium – and large – size buildings; the Department of Sectorial Register (CASE), which manages technical registers; the Department of Building Regulation and Use (CONTRU), which is in charge of regulating the use of the building grounds by aiming to maintain the security of the buildings and the population; the Department of Ground Parceling and Urban Interventions (PARSOLO), which files lawsuits and establishes guidelines for the ground parceling; the Social Housing Inspectorate (HABI) under which is the Department of Ground Regularization (RESOLO), the organizational body responsible for the urban and land regularization of irregular or clandestine plots. Also affiliated with SEHAB is the São Paulo Metropolitan Housing Company (COHAB), through indirect administration, and two commissions that include representatives of the civil society: the Commission for Buildings and Ground Use (CEUSO) and the Commission for the Protection of the Urban Landscape (CPPU). This text will address the initiatives related to popular housing as they are carried out by HABI, COHAB and RESOLO specifically.

Until 2004, initiatives taken by the Municipality of São Paulo were organized into nine programs of varied ranges, some of which extended in subprograms:[71] Cool Neighborhood (urbanization and regularization of slums and subdivisions of plots, and interventions in water spring areas); Living in Downtown (housing in the central areas); *Mutirões (*collaborative efforts); PROVER (Slum Urbanization Project by Verticalization); PROCAV (interventions in valley bottoms for the canalization of streams), in addition to service programs such as the Novação (debt refinancing) and on-line Plans (SEHAB digitization of services and communications).

The new administration that took post in 2005 realigned its initiatives and partially redesigned the programs, dividing and designating the former among six programs. These programs are related more to the urban problems and processes of construction than to financing sources, thus giving greater legibility to the policy as a whole: slums,

plotting, water springs, Living in the Center, collaborative efforts, and on-line Plans. With the exception of on-line Plans, these programs will be analyzed in this study. Next, we will present the on-going initiatives of each program in an attempt to identify differences and similarities with the Municipality's previous administration.

Special attention will be given to social housing projects in the central areas of the city, which is the main issue of the grass-roots housing movements and those who strive for urban reform.

LIVING IN THE CENTER

One of the main differences in the housing policy strategies lies in public housing in the city's downtown area. The 2001-2004 city administration pledged to build housing units in the center of the city ever since its election campaign, highlighting the issue as one of the priorities of its housing policy. The party running for the Municipality based its decision to set housing as a priority on an analysis that pointed to considerable growth in the number of people living in slums and marginalized outskirts in the city. Coinciding with this growth was a large number of unoccupied housing units in the same region. The issue of public housing in the central areas is one of the main causes championed by both the movements for city housing as well as several organizations dedicated to urban reform.

Although the intervention accomplished has not yet reached the necessary scale, some advancement was accomplished in the 2001-2004 city administration. For the first time housing in the city center was considered a high-priority plan for the Municipality. This plan – Living in the Center – consisted of the following initiatives:

(a) construction or remodeling of buildings in the Arrendamento Residencial (PAR) (*Housing Leasing program*), to meet the needs of 4-to-6 range of minimum salaries, financed by *Caixa Econômica Federal*, which consists of a lease on a housing unit for 180 months, at the end of which the dweller receives a waiver of the housing unit.

(b) establishment of the Social Tenancy program, which consists of building and assigning housing units to low-income families earning from 0 to 3 minimum salaries through rental contracts;

(c) the conception of Perimeters of Integrated Rehabilitation of the Environment (PRIH), a program based on intervention in dilapidated areas with a high number of tenements, which would be subject to integrated intervention;

(d) the creation of Rent-Voucher, a temporary subsidy for rent payments to house families waiting for relocation to another housing enterprise;

(e) the creation of Special Zones of Social Interest 3 (ZEIS 3), areas predominantly having underutilized plots or buildings situated in regions with infrastructure, urban services and employment potential, delimited by the Master Plan as such, where the building of social housing must be given priority, as specified herein;

(f) the Tenement program, which involves the rehabilitation of shared housing.

We highlight that the point in question is not the range of the programs and projects developed by the previous government administration, but rather the formulation of a housing policy and the attitudes that underlie the policy's initiatives.

Although the Serra / Kassab administration has ceased initiatives to make public housing downtown viable (the program has been maintained with the same name), the current administration points to the difficulties of keeping a low-income population in the city center. The HABI superintendence states that an adequate corrective to the scale of housing deficit for the 0-to-3 minimum-salary income range would be the urbanization of slums. As it will be shown, this is also reflected in SEHAB's allocation of resources.

It is important to highlight that the Living in the Center program has been formulated and put into practice in the context of the municipal government's broader proposal to revitalize the downtown region. Despite resulting from negotiations, this proposal focused on social housing in the city center, among other initiatives. In the current administration, the contradictions (preexisting as they were) deepened: the initiatives by SEHAB for the city center coexist with proposals that might be even more exclusionary, such as an economic revitalization project for the Luz region.

Housing in the city center has become one of the most important contentious points of debate between the housing movements and the current administration (Serra / Kassab). In Mary 2006, the *Fórum Centro Vivo* (Forum Live Center) – the so called "Human Rights Transgressions in São Paulo Downtown Area" – was launched with initiatives aimed at diminishing the presence of the poor in the city center: increase in the eviction of low-income families, cessation of aid programs, changes in ongoing projects such as the PRIHs, withdrawal of shelters for the poor from downtown, financial stimulus packages distributed to migrants as incentives for reverse migration to their home towns.[72]

In January 2007, Carlos Henrique Loureiro, coordinator of the Housing and Urbanism Nucleus of the Public Legal Aid Service of São Paulo State, denounced the São

Paulo city government for its "spatial cleansing policy in the downtown area". Loureiro affirmed that "since the present administration took post in 2005, there has been a practice of eliminating poverty in the downtown area by driving it to the outskirts in an attempt to hide it from the middle class."[73] A report from the Carta Maior agency exposes an initiative by the Municipality to evict residents of *Favela do Moinho*, in the *Bom Retiro* neighborhood, by means of a dispossessing decree issued by the Secretary of Sub municipalities, Andrea Matarazzo. This decree, however, was eventually withdrawn.[74]

In regard to budgetary matters, SEHAB reduced allocation of resources (including the allocation of the Municipality Housing Fund) for the city center: in 2004, about R$46 million was spent on the region out of the R$ 85 million designated in the budget; in 2005, the expenditure was reduced to R$ 25 million out of the R$ 62 million designated in the budget; and in 2006, R$ 40 million was designated in the budget, but only R$ 9 million was spent. Such a budget reduction meant, in practice, that initiatives and ongoing projects were discontinued and redirected in the city center. The proportion of budgetary resources designated to the different areas of the city was significantly altered, as the table below shows.

Table – Sehab and Municipal Housing Fund initiatives planned and carried out effectively in the Budget – 2004 to 2006

Initiatives	2004		2005		2006	
	Carried	%	Carried	%	Carried	%
Downtown	45.811.511	39,22	24.693.104	21,18	9.471.357	4,32
Water Spring areas	37.084.950	31,75	37.188.841	31,90	82.435.001	37,56
Regularization and Urbanization (except for water spring areas)	33.919.262	29,04	54.699.634	46,92	127.590.351	58,13
Total		100%		100%		100%

Source: NOVOSEO-PMSP (9 January 2007). Tabulation: Instituto Pólis, 2006.

Note that the table above refers to the resources in the Municipal General Budget. Several initiatives have been carried out with resources from other sources.

The values in the table show that the investment policy of the municipality has changed. Whereas the previous administration took a balanced approach to investment in the city center, water spring areas, and the reurbanization of slums, the current administration avoids investment in the city center in favor of urbanizing slums and occupations throughout the city, including the water spring areas. There has also been a change in the reurbanization intervention, which leads to sanitation and timely urban reforms without promoting significant interferences in space, such as the opening of public spaces, sports areas, etc. These interventions allow people to remain where they live, recognizing their actual place of residence. They are different policies in the sense that, while one directs resources to integrate the population in areas that already have infrastructure, the other directs the resources to building infrastructure where it is inexistent (although it is not possible to say that the objectives of either policy have been met).

On the other hand, the study of the different initiatives related to social housing in the city center shows that after 2005 the situation was not at a complete standstill. Several initiatives have been carried out – all virtually continued from pre-existing projects. We are likely to face diverging positions regarding the awareness of the role of the Municipality's initiatives focused on the presence of the poor in the downtown area.

We present below an analysis of several subprograms inserted in the Living in the Center program promoted by SEHAB. Failing to express a clear proposal for resettling the city center with social housing, these subprograms likewise refrain from expressing the intention to expel the poor from downtown São Paulo.

SOCIAL TENANCY

The Social Tenancy subprogram consists of building and delivering housing units through rental contracts to low-income families earning from 0 to 3 minimum salaries. The aim of the program is to guarantee housing for low-income families in the city center while avoiding speculation by the beneficiaries of the buildings, who, once participating in housing acquisition programs, often sell the residence and move back to accommodations in precarious conditions.

The Social Tenancy program was considered to be a response on behalf of the public sphere to the challenge of addressing the housing problem downtown areas. In some ways, it is what most approximates social housing as a public service offered to the low-income population. Up to the end of 2004 only two housing projects were delivered, *Olarias* and *Parque do Gato*, the latter of which was incomplete. Some initiatives related to the job creation and income distribution were not carried out effectively. The program has been subject to controversies and criticism on behalf of the new city administration in regard to two points:

(a) On the one hand, the Municipality points out a nearly total default of the tenants. The program was conceived not to give ownership of the property of each housing unit to beneficiaries. This restriction on the property would enable the Municipality to recover the units should the tenants default. A large part of the Social Tenancy beneficiaries came from tenement dwellings where they regularly paid rents; otherwise they would face eviction. Thus the Municipality expected them to continue paying rent – which has not happened in many cases.

(b) On the other hand, there are great difficulties in managing housing units that have already been delivered, which according to the program guidelines is under COHAB's responsibility. As for the *Olarias*, HABI's superintendence pointed out that, after an elevator which was broken for months was finally fixed by the Municipality, it ceased functioning again within a week. These circumstances indicate that there is still a lack of efficient mechanisms to the management of the undertaking already built in the program. Another component of Social Tenancy, the *Parque do Gato*, presents fewer problems related to condominium management.[75] Yet, according to the leadership of the of the pro-housing movement, the park that was to be built next to the project – in addition to equipment complimentary to the project – has not been executed by the Municipality.

The Live Center Forum dossier affirms that in April 2006, the initiatives taken by the Social Tenancy Project had been interrupted or paralysed.[76] According to the Municipality, the idea that the Social Tenancy program would be discontinued is fallacious. The Municipality's objective is to assume ongoing projects, which has been done, for example, in the case of the *Vila dos Idosos* (145 units), a project planned by the 2001-2004 city administration targeted specifically to the elderly population.[77] The Municipal Housing Council defined the criteria to meet the demand[78] and the project was in the

later stages of construction at the end of 2006. The project will be managed as originally planned in the Social Tenancy program.

The Municipality also restarted remodeling the *Asdrúbal do Nascimento* (40 units), *Senador Feijó* (45 units), and *Riachuelo* (132 units) buildings. The deadline for completion is the first semester of 2008[11]. Unlikely the other two projects already completed by the previous city administration, in addition to *Vila dos Idosos*, these three buildings are being remodeled thanks to an agreement between the São Paulo city government, the São Paulo state government, and *Caixa Econômica Federal (*CEF*)*. Instead of being incorporated in the Social Tenancy program, these units will be sold to the beneficiaries. In these three projects, there has been collision of interests between the Municipality and the grass-roots movements in regard to the demand to be met. At the start of the project in 2003, the movements presented a list of families to be accommodated in the units. While the Municipality accepted and promised to recognize this list, families that either did not meet the requirements to occupy the units or could not be located would not be replaced by other families in the movement. The movement argues that the units do not belong to the families, but to the movement; therefore, the movement should have the right to direct the substitutions. On the other hand, until the end of 2006, other undertakings of the Social Tenancy program were not continued, such as the *Assembléia* (interrupted after the executive project was completed), and the *Cônego Vicente Marinho* (interrupted after the basic project was completed). Both of these projects were the result of of a public contest promoted by the Municipality in partnership with the Institute of Architects of Brazil (IAB) in 2004.[79] Other projects, *Belém* (200 units, plot purchased with resources from the Municipal Housing Fund), *Bresser* XIV (120 units, plot bought by COHAB), and *Carlos Gomes* (64 units) have not resulted in housing construction.

Despite the Municipality's participation in the ongoing projects, the administration indicates that it does not intend to extend the program to new undertakings; that is, the Municipality does not intend to proceed with initiatives that confer upon the Municipality not only the role of producer, but also manager of housing units.

HOUSING LEASING PROGRAM (PAR)

PAR is the name of a program sponsored by the *Caixa Econômica Federal* (CEF) – Brazilian federal government savings bank – aimed at people of low income who earn

between 3 and 6 times the minimum wage. The PAR-Remodeling modality, which involves the recycling of properties, was applied in the central area of São Paulo. The role of the Municipality in this program is essentially to act as an intermediary between players. The remodeling of five buildings was concluded under this program up to 2004, and work on another five was ongoing or under negotiation when the Municipality mandates changed: *Edifício São Paulo* (152 units), *Joaquim Carlos* (93 units), *25 de Janeiro* (385 units), *São Vito* (375 units), and *Rua do Ouvidor* (54 units). Unlike the Social Tenancy projects, the buildings already remodeled do not pose too much of a challenge in terms of management because the responsibilities of the Municipality in condominium management are greatly reduced after the handover of the property.

On the other hand, the trajectory of some of the projects ongoing during the change of mandates reveals that the new administration has been taking different positions when compared with the previous one.

In the case of *Edifício São Paulo* (also known as the former *São Paulo Hotel*) a conflict arose in relation to the indication of which families should occupy the units. The *Fórum de Cortiços e Sem-teto do Centro* (Forum of Tenements and Downtown Homeless) had occupied the building in 1999, and had taken part in the whole process of negotiating its financing. In 2004 the Municipality expropriated the building and transferred it to the *Caixa Econômica Federal* (CEF), to build apartments under the PAR program. In the same year, the Forum of Tenements had forwarded to the Municipality a list with the names of the families to be housed, and in 2005 the Forum negotiated this list with the new administration. The list was then forwarded to CEF, responsible for approving the financing for each unit. However, due to CEF's strict requirements, many applicants did not qualify to receive the apartments. A conflict then arose between the Forum of Tenements and the Municipality, both believing that they had the right to indicate the demand for the units remaining after CEF's rejection. At the end of negotiations, half of the properties were assigned to the Forum of Tenements, and the other half to families registered with COHAB[80] (Metropolitan Housing Company).

São Vito building was expropriated in 2004, the building owners received compensation and the tenants were transferred to units rented by the Rent-Relief program, as described below. The project for the building, which involved a reducing in the number of apartments and the introduction of services, came to a standstill. At the beginning of 2006, the former dwellers of *São Vito's*, beneficiaries of the Rent-Relief program, were

informed they would not return to the building and would instead be included in other housing programs of the Municipality. According to COHAB, 80% of the families showed an interest in receiving letters of credit to acquire a property somewhere else. CDHU (Company of Urban and Housing Development of São Paulo) made available to the dwellers 145 letters of credit, which, by the time of the preparation of this publication, had not yet been delivered. In October 2006, the Municipality took sides in favor of demolition of the building, after having concluded that the units that remained after the requalification project would become too expensive, over R$ 40,000, for the project to be realized under the PAR program. According to the Secretary of Coordination of Sub-Municipalities and Under-Secretary of the Sé, Andrea Matarazzo, "the viable solution is to demolish (…) it is not possible to revitalize it and in seven years to be still the same."[81] However, up to the middle of 2007, the municipality had not carried out the demolition process.

The Municipality carried on the *Joaquim Carlos* building works and took into consideration the indication suggested by Unification Movement for Tenements (ULC) in relation to the demand to be met. The building was inaugurated in December 2006.

The movements state that there is no municipal policy for new housing projects in central areas. The *Maria Domitila* building is an exception, with resources from the Federal government complemented by those of the Municipal Housing Fund. The Municipality states that there is a policy for the central area, which consists of restoration of tenements, and initiatives aimed at the homeless in shelter accommodation. On the other hand, the Municipality also states that the housing units that have been provided in the central areas are excessively expensive, reaching over R$ 60,000 in some cases.

RENT-RELIEF

The Rent-Relief program, approved by the Municipal Housing Council, consists of a temporary subsidy for the payment of rent to accommodate families who are waiting for relocation to another housing project, with resources from the Municipal Housing Fund.[82] The main objective of the program, when it was created, was to deal with the serious problems faced by the population living in risk areas. Unlike other programs, Rent Relief does not propose the acquisition of the property but rather provides a subsidy given in installments, thereby avoiding a hefty public investment. The idea behind

the program is to provide a transitory aid lasting no more than 30 months. From 2006 onwards, when the Rent-Relief contracts expired, the Municipality started discontinuing these benefits, the intention being to call a halt to the program. According to the Municipality, there were 1,500 families involved at the beginning of the program, and in February 2007 only 706 families, roughly half that number, remained in it.

Up to the date of this publication, the deadlock over the end of the program remains. The Municipality even notified those who were receiving the Rent-Relief about the discontinuation of the program at the end of 2007. In the same month, the Public Legal Aid Service of São Paulo State lodged an appeal requesting the revocation of the decision that would strip the dwellers evicted from *São Vito* building of their right to receive Rent-Relief, alleging that, according to the law, the benefit should last until the people concerned were included in a definitive social housing program.

Considering that by the end of 2006 there were already in the municipality several families at risk of being evicted – in February 2007 the estimation was nearly 52 repossession cases underway and 2,500 families involved[83] – , if the Courts intervened and ordered the Municipality to keep the program going, such decision would be helpful to those families.

The municipality offers some alternatives to replace Rent-Relief: (1) letter of credit, availability of housing credit as long as the family fits the required conditions for financing; (2) housing subsidy to acquire another property, immediate financial aid, valued at R$ 8,000; or (3) housing subsidy, immediate financial aid at R$ 5,000 to enable the family to return to their home town (pejoratively called "back home" check). These options necessarily involve family relocation, which is not the case with the Rent-Relief program.

TENEMENT INTERVENTION

In the 2001-2004 governmental administration, investments were made to restore some tenements by undertaking or concluding building works which promoted strong transformation in the buildings. However, the number of families helped by these works was limited: about 100 families in 5 projects of tenement requalification.[84] The *Maria Paula* and *Riskalah Jorge* buildings were remodeled and part of their units was assigned to families who formerly lived in tenements.

The governmental administration started in 2005 focused mainly on smaller interventions in tenements, aiming at keeping the families living in them, and trying to make the owners of the tenement buildings pay for their restoration. Based on a tenement census carried out by the Action on Tenements (PAC) program, sponsored by the State government, SEHAB gives guidance to the sub-municipalities which supervise the buildings and warn the owners about the irregularities of buildings' conditions and their non-compliance with the standards specified in *Lei Moura* (Moura Law) (municipal legislation n° 10,928/91). SEHAB makes available technical assistance, oversees the works, and acts to improve the dwellers' capabilities. In cases of excessive population density, the families who must vacate the building receive letters of credit or are relocated to SEHAB or CDHU projects. In January 2007, 17 of the 527 tenements in the *Mooca* neighborhood were undergoing restoration under this project. In view of the fact that it was the mandate's mid-term, it is licit to doubt whether this initiative will fulfill its initial proposal, "to tackle widely the problem of tenements in the city of São Paulo."[85]

It should be mentioned that a proposal with a design similar to that of the *Mooca* tenements had also been planned by the previous governmental administration, as explained in the 2001-2004 administrative term report. Such interventions are part of a continuous effort that dates back to at least the end of the 1980s, in which the city and the State government have been creating instruments and processes to intervene more efficiently in tenements. *Lei Moura* (Moura Law) (n° 10,928/91) was a key-factor in this because it established standards for tenement housing, making it easier for public interventions to reach these parameters.[86]

Formerly the intervention was more directed at helping the families who exerted pressure, whereas now there are interventions in whole tenements.

The conclusion of the project that targeted action in the Perimeters of Integrated Rehabilitation of the Environment, known as PRIHs, indicates a change in the basic principles of the intervention. If the PRIHs targeted a simultaneous intervention in tenements and in the underutilized buildings and nearby spaces within the perimeter limits, now the intervention is restricted to the tenements and does not necessarily include (though it may happen) the physical-territorial connection between occupied spaces and new projects.

SLUMS

The slum urbanization and regularization was basically carried out between 2001 and 2004 by two programs: *Bairro Legal* (Cool Neighborhood) and *PROVER* (PROVIDE).

Slum urbanization is a priority in the housing policy of the present administration. There is a reasonable degree of continuity between the initiatives of the 2001-2004 administration and the following administration started in 2005. According to HABI (Social Housing Inspectorate), 14 slum urbanization projects that had already been offered for bidding by the previous administration were "sold' to the CDHU, which, according to those responsible for the present policy, has expedited the Municipality actions. The total value of these 14 projects is R$ 400 million.

Some projects are being carried out without revision of the original plan, but that is not always the case. According to HABI's superintendence, some projects presupposed large-scale vacating of properties and building of new units, contrary to the present administration's decision of executing minimum vacatings and maximum maintenance of the previous urban structure of the slum, thereby reducing costs and providing assistance to the highest possible number of homes. This policy was clearly proposed by the superintendence, which saw it as a change of direction in relation to the previous administration; the aim would be to reach the highest possible number of families. As an example of a policy with an excessive number of vacatings, the *Nova Jaguaré* slum was mentioned. It has 1,900 families, of which 1,000 would remain and 900 should be relocated according to the project of Marta Suplicy's administration.

The intervention project in the *Paraisópolis* slum, which was under preliminary consideration when the city administration management changed, suffered modifications that reduced the urban alterations previously proposed. According to interviewees:

> *Paraisópolis [project] underwent a significant change: there is a good side that is a more concrete proposal, much more realistic, feasible; the bad side is that it does not aggregate the urbanistic quality that was intended at the time of the occupation. So, you know, you win on one hand, and lose on the other.*

Paraisópolis is understood to be one of the priorities of the present administration, which has, for example, concentrated resources given by the Cities' Ministry for the re-urbanization of *Paraisópolis*.

Some friction with the housing movements arose when the projects were revised. The reurbanization project of part of *Heliópolis* slum has been one of the points of conflict. The previous project was revised, reducing the numbers of planned vacatings.

Other slum remodeling projects are ongoing, such as, the *Tietê* slum in São Mateus, the *Jardim Senice* in Vila Curuçá, and the *Nova Tereza*, in Ermelino Matarazzo.

According to HABI's superintendence, the urbanization of the slums is the more appropriate project to meet the needs of families earning as little as 0 to 3 minimum wage salaries. People on this income range could not possibly be placed in new housing units because they would not have the economic means of paying condominium charges and other expenses. As we have already mentioned, the extremely high default levels in people under the Social Tenancy program served as a warning sign about the difficulties in meeting the housing needs of families in this income range.

LAND REGULARIZATION

According to HABI's superintendence, the present administration has continued the processes of land regularization started by the previous administration. A hundred and forty public areas were granted use during the previous administration, and now a second lot of regularization of public areas is under way. This second lot has presented some problems; there are five lawsuits in the Public Prosecution Office about regularization procedures that were not followed by urbanization plans. The new processes should be coming together with urbanization plans, as stipulated by law.[87] According to the Municipality's official data, from January 2005 to December 2006 ownership titles had been given to 115,500 housing units, of which 41,000 were situated in public areas, 11,500 in private areas, and 63,000 in COHAB's housing estates.[88]

Land regularization initiatives have been carried out with resources from the Cities' Ministry and complemented with the Municipality's own resources.

COLLABORATIVE EFFORT ("MUTIRÕES")

One of the means of providing housing adopted since the beginning of the 1990s is the so called *mutirões (collaborative effort)*, in which the beneficiaries participate in the building of the housing unit. According to SEHAB's report, by the end of 2004 the construction of 6,949 housing units had started under the *"mutirão"* regime.[89] The Municipality's site stated in January 2007 that, at that point in time, São Paulo's COHAB had 123 ongoing projects under the *mutirão* system, and that in 2005 it had allocated R$18 million "to resume the *mutirão* buildings interrupted in 1989", which would meet the needs of 24 "collaborative effort" projects. In 2006, another R$ 81 million was allocated for the building of 27 new *"mutirão"* projects.[90] Thus the total amount of R$100 million was invested in 51 new and pre-existing projects. At the moment we face conflicting versions: whereas the 2001-2004 administration does not admit the hypothesis of having allowed the *"mutirões"* to come to a standstill, the grass-roots housing movements refer to 35 "mutirões" that have had their building work stopped.

The resources for the *"mutirões"* come from the Municipal Housing Fund, whose management has been under the responsibility of the Municipal Housing Council, and the new composition of the Council is likely to have been interfering in the choice of projects to be carried out.

Another important point for reflection is the fact that some projects designed originally to be carried out under the *"mutirão"* regime are now being continued under the "global enterprise" system, which means that contractors and building companies play a more important role in the execution of the project. It is also important to note the fact that the Municipality handed over to CDHU the execution of some *"mutirões"* – a sign of greater articulation between the Municipality and State policies.

WATER SPRING INTERVENTIONS

The interventions in water springs date back to Luiza Erundina's administration term, initially as a municipal initiative, and later with the creation of the Guarapiranga program, articulating both the State and the Municipality of São Paulo, which received resources from BIRD (World Bank) for its execution; they consisted of the urbanization and sanitation of 14 areas in the Guarapiranga river basin. BIRD's financing lasted until

the year 2,000. During this period there was no interruption in the process of urbanization and density of the region.

In the year 2000, when the international loan resources came to an end, and without the expected results, Marta Suplicy's administration opted for the continuation of the program and for the implementation of initiatives to urbanize slums in some of the areas already included in the initial plan. The resources spent in the 2004 and 2005 budgets were as much as R$ 35 million per year.

Following that, the Serra/Kassab administration carried on with the program, and, as table 1 indicates, has allocated more resources in the water spring areas than the previous administration. Large part of the technicians that are presently managing the program consists of the same people who managed the program both in the State and in the Municipality during the administration of Covas and Pitta; therefore they have been involved in the region's problems and processes for a long time.

The 2006 budget execution reveals that nearly R$ 47 million was spent on projects proposed by amendments, and approximately R$ 35million was spent on the Water Spring program, totaling R$ 82 million, which is twice as much as what had been spent in the previous years. This clearly reveals a change of priorities in the policy.

It is important to highlight that the prioritization of the program with municipal resources does not derive exclusively from an initiative of the Executive. Over the last years, the Public Prosecutions Office has pressed the Municipality to comply with the state legislation on water springs, which prevents dense urban occupation in protected areas, and demanded that the Municipality withdraw the population occupying risk areas, such as on the margins of brooks. The pressure exerted by the Public Prosecutions Office over the Municipality culminated with the creation of a municipal government's Emergency Plan determining the areas that required most urgent intervention. A deadline was set for the Municipality to do the works in order to assist the population living in those areas.

It must not be forgotten that the priority of the loan that originated the program was the improvement of the conditions of the city's water reservoirs, which has not been happening. Although urbanization with sanitation has been taking place in several areas, SABESP's work (Basic Sanitation Company of the State of São Paulo) on the mains that would transfer sewage to be treated in Barueri was not concluded. That means that the housing estates that already have sewage collection throw it faster into the dam,

without any treatment. The condition of the environment and of the water has not improved. Neither have the initiatives of the program already ongoing for over a decade managed successfully to transform the occupation pattern in the region. Therefore, the challenge to transform the qualitatively the expansion pattern and urban density in the water spring areas still remains.

INTERNATIONAL FINANCING

Besides budgetary resources and agreements with other governmental departments, a significant part of the resources for housing comes from international sources. During Marta Suplicy's term of administration, these resources were articulated with ongoing projects, for example, the agreement with the World Bank, through BIRD/Cities Alliance – Cities without Slums, which financed District Plans for Urban and Housing Initiatives in areas included in the Cool Neighborhood program in *Brasilândia, Cidade Tiradentes*, and *Jardim Ângela* – neighborhoods stricken by extreme social and economic exclusion and violence. According to Cities Alliance's technicians, this financial input took place, in its first stage, between 2001 and 2003. When the Municipality administration changed, the second stage was reconsidered and, instead of continuing the Cool Neighborhood program, there was a change in scope. Now the agreement has turned to the elaboration of a strategy for sustainable planning, financing, and implementation of the Housing and Urban Development Policy for low-income people in the Municipality of São Paulo. The new agreement drawn up between SEHAB-Municipality, World Bank and Cities Alliance in September 2005 established that the World Bank would participate with US$ 450,000, and the Municipality through SEHAB with R$ 661,933, and other financial institutions with US$ 295,000.

Hence, the project amounts to US$ 1,411,933 and is supposed to run from December 2005 to November 2007, by which occasion what is called "strategic planning" will have been concluded and revised.

Another example of international financing is the Downtown Intervention program, which in Marta Suplicy's term of office counted on US$ 100million financing from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and US$ 68 million as the Municipality's corresponding complement. Twenty per cent of the total amount as designated for promoting the housing policy in central area. However, the whole amount was not used,

according to the *Fórum Centro Vivo* dossier. As per the Municipality of São Paulo's own documents, in December 2004, at the end of the first year of the program management, the initiatives had already started but the new administration that took over in 2005 proposed to IDB to redefine the program. Until the middle of 2007, the new version of the contract relating to the loan had not yet been signed.

Marta's governmental administration also negotiated with the European Community over a *"fundo perdido"* financing project (an investment without expecting a financial return) for the requalification of central neighborhoods through the implementation of PRIH, which was not taken forward by the administration started in 2005. The scope of this project was adjusted under the terms of a so called "Adjustment",[91] which aims to "contribute to the social inclusion in the center of São Paulo, and to include socially, economically and culturally the most vulnerable groups".[92] This program covers activities such as: the creation of ten local Offices and Local Plan of Development; registration and/or updating of data, assistance , monitoring and observation of the social trajectory of 80% of the population living in the tenements in the central areas of the city; establishment of Centers to Enable Professional Training to insert this population in the labor market; creation of a Center for Women's Guidance, Treatment and Protection, multiplying its content and empowering women; and an Office for the Coordination and Management of the project.[93]

According to the Municipal Secretary of Social Assistance and Development, the total budget of the new project amounts to 15,403,180 euros, in which the European community share is 7,5million euros, and the Municipality is responsible for the 7,903,180 euros. This project is supposed to run for four years. Rather than implanting social housing in the downtown area, proposed by Marta Suplicy's administration, the present administration opted for physical interventions linked to the road system and to care in the old "patronizing" way – care that does not revert the precarious situation of the population that live in the central areas of the city – that is, people crammed together in tenements and the homeless. The financing plans follow this change of scope.

MASTER PLAN AND URBAN INSTRUMENTS

One of the ways of intervening in the city's housing policy occurs through urban regularization that may make plots of land available for housing policy, facilitate the rules

for regularization or establish equivalent amounts to be paid by real estate developers, thereby generating resources for housing. This constitutes one of the main platforms for the Urban Reform Movement in recent years, having attained successful goals such as the approval of the City Statute (Federal Law nº 10,259/01) – the national law that regulates urban policy on democratic and progressive guidelines.

Many instruments within the City Statute can only be applied if there is a Master Plan. São Paulo was one of the first cities to design a Master Plan, after the approval of the City Statute. In 2002 the São Paulo's Strategic Master Plan was approved. Despite its rather ambiguous content, it regulated by law some of the old demands made by progressive sectors:

 – the Onerous Grant of the Right to Build, which requires equivalent amounts of cash by the developers, in exchange for the right to build beyond the basic proportional ratios of land use approved for the city;

– the Social Interest Special Zones over unoccupied plots and properties in the city (ZEIS 3), meaning the creation of a reserve of plots of land that can only be used for social housing, defined as *"[…] areas with predominantly underutilized plots or buildings, as stipulated in this law, appropriate for urbanization, where there is public interest, expressed by this law, or by regional plans, or by specific laws, to promote urban restoration, land regularization, building of Social Housing (HIS) or of housing for the popular market (HMP), and to improve the housing conditions of its dwellers."*

– the Social Interest Special Zones over areas occupied by slums and areas of spring water, making the urban demands more flexible and facilitating land regularization;

– the definition of criteria for the attainment of the property's social function, otherwise the owners of the plots of land would be subject to sanctions for non-compliance, such as compulsory building and the time-progressive IPTU (Tax on Urban Properties and Buildings).

Since his campaign for mayor of the city, José Serra stated that he would proceed with the revision to the Plan, because, according to him, it presented some ambiguities. Indeed, the municipal administration that took post in 2005 was carrying out the revision of the Master Plan. This process came under serious criticism (at the time of the preparation of this study) from a wide range of social movements (such as, *Defenda São Paulo*), groups in support of popular housing, and civil society organizations, because it was a process with little participation.

The revision of the Master Plan started with the evaluation of the present Plan, carried out by the sub-municipalities; plenary sessions, at the sub-municipalities, in August and September 2006, discussed the Plan evaluation. The discussion on the ZEIS and the proposal of new perimeters are being carried out by SEHAB.

On the whole, the ZEIS' demarcation of the slum areas and areas on water spring is an instrument welcomed by the present governmental administration because it facilitates the public bodies' intervention and the regularization of the settlements; they are, therefore, likely to be kept in the Master Plan.

As for the ZEIS demarcation of vacant buildings, there is still no official position about their handling. The present city governmental administration is rumored to defend the extinction of the ZEIS in the downtown areas; however, there have been no public discussions about it so far. Although the instrument represents an important tool for the democratization of the central areas it should be highlighted that the demarcation of the perimeters by itself does not increase the supply of housing downtown. In the 2001-2004 governmental administration there were no significant advances in the occupation of ZEIS 3, mainly related to the convincing of players from the real estate market about the need to provide social housing. The ZEIS 3 matter is also being discusses by the Housing Council.

A municipal decree regulated the possibility of Transfer of the Building Potential of plots in *Paraisópolis* slum with the proviso that the owners donate the plot to the Municipality for land regularization and reurbanization. It is not, however, the regularization strategy inserted in the Master Plan, but rather an isolated initiative aiming at the solution of a specific problem.

RELATIONSHIP WITH THE STATE GOVERNMENT

For the first time since redemocratization, during 2005 and in the first few months of 2006, both the São Paulo's mayor and the State governor were members of the same political party (PSDB). This made viable the cooperation work between the Municipality and the CDHU, such as the urbanization of 14 slums already offered for bidding in 2004 by the previous administration, and interventions in tenements. According to the HABI's superintendence, the fact that the former Housing Vice-Secretary had taken over the CDHU's presidency was a facilitating factor.

Cooperation initiatives between the CDHU and the Municipality of São Paulo were already happening, for example, the building of units by the CDHU on plots of land belonging to the COHAB. Yet, the present cooperation is different: the CDHU has been carrying out reurbanization works already bid for and as part of the municipality's planning, adapting thus to its housing management. The staff in the present administration refer to these operations as projects that "we sold to the CDHU".

Besides, the Action on Tenements (PAC) program has also been the object of partnership between the State government and the Municipality, which means a revision in the program practices. It is a program of intervention in tenements, promoted by the State government, which in its original plan used mainly to re-house dwellers by moving them out of tenements and placing them into housing projects.

PAC was in a deadlock as the transfer of tenement dwellers to CDHU housing projects was producing scarce results because its service criteria demanded proof of income levels that few people could attain. During the present administration, the PAC's resources have been redirected to support remodeling of the tenements. SEHAB inspects the tenements and warns the owner of those which, although habitable, are not in an adequate condition, that the buildings must meet the requirements stipulated in the Moura Law, or else risk a fine. If the owner agrees to participate in the program, each family receives a subsidy worth R$900 for the restoration of the building. According to SEHAB, almost 200, of a total of about 400 tenements in *Mooca*, will be included in the Program. In the sub-municipality of *Sé*, the expected support for the program is weaker, because the Municipality realized that the owners are more careless about their property than those in *Mooca*.

DIALOGUE WITH THE SOCIAL ACTORS

There are differences in the idea behind the organized social movements' role in the housing policy in the two governmental administrations. That is reflected in the government team itself. In the 2001-2004 governmental administration, the Housing Secretary was Paulo Teixeira, whose political career has always been linked to the movements in support of popular housing. In SEHAB there was a team in charge of dealing with the popular participation, responsible for organizing meetings' schedules and agendas together with the grass-root movements in support of popular housing. They also pre-

pared the meetings of the Municipal Housing Council, sending out agendas and background documents, inviting the participants, among other activities. This team helped to prepare the first Municipal City Conference. It was informally known as the "sector of popular participation", formed by five members closely linked with the movements for better housing, and one secretary.

The Housing Secretary that took post in 2005, Orlando de Almeida Filho, has a professional career linked to the real estate market. Among the institutional functions that he has fulfilled are the presidency of the *Sindicato dos Corretores de Imóveis do Estado de São Paulo* (Trade Union of Realtors in the State of São Paulo) (SCIESP) and presidency of the *Conselho Federal dos Corretores de Imóveis* (Realtors' Federal Council) (COFECI). In his team there were no representatives of the movements for better housing, and the team responsible for dialogue with the housing movements was dissolved. The daily-based relationship was interrupted, which made some groups argue for a tighter relation with the Secretary. The leadership of the *Prestes Maia* occupation group complains that "there are no meetings with the Secretary; he does not want to sit with the housing movements' people".

It was then agreed that the *União de Luta por Moradia* (Unification Movement for Housing) would have periodic meetings with the HABI's superintendence. The housing movements complain of little support from the Municipality in relation to the 2005 City Conference, which, according to them, was only made possible due to pressure by civil society and the Federal Government. The deadline for informing of the organization of the conference had elapsed and São Paulo State Government still showed no sign of interest in it, but, in the end, it relinquished and the event ended up taking place.

The 2001-2004 administration had also invested in some institutionalized spaces, such as the Housing Council, whose first members were elected in 2003, a space that is analyzed in another part of this study.

Other spaces were also created in the 2001-2004 administration, such as the Executive Commission of the Downtown Action program. Even though it was not a space for political deliberation, it was a space for exchanging information between the government and civil society for the running of the Downtown Action program. The Executive Commission was located at EMURB, and used to meet every fortnight until 2004, but after 2005 it did not meet any longer. The "antenna-offices", for local level planning, based in the PRIHs, were also deactivated.

Besides the more institutional spaces, it is in the daily practices that the differences can be noticed regarding the approach to organized movements. Throughout the previous administration, it was common practice for the housing movements to indicate the families that would occupy the housing units in the Municipality's projects, according to their own score criteria, which generally rewarded those with a more active participation in the groups' meetings, activities and demonstrations. The current government administration disagrees with this criterion, arguing that there need to be criteria valid for all, independently of their participation in the housing movements. The movement may indicate families for the Municipality's register, but it cannot determine which families should be the recipients of the units. According to Veronika Kroll, of the Tenement Forum, talking in relation to the Hotel São Paulo, the indications of the demand caused a lot of pressure, "it became a question of honor for us".[94]

From 2001 to 2004, some activities external to the policies resulted in evictions being cancelled, or in the creation of alternatives for the population that was evicted. However, this has no longer been occurring, and the evictions have increased during the new administration.

The housing movements' pressure over the Municipality after the Housing Council's election, in which the movements did not get elected, has enabled a schedule of monthly meetings with some groups, such as the Unification Movement for Housing, and the Front for Better Housing. These meetings are bilateral with each movement.

It is no easy task to get information about ongoing projects. The quantity of public information on the projects is restricted, for example, on the Municipality's site.

NEW PLAYERS OR NEW PERFORMANCE OF PLAYERS IN THE STRUGGLE TO KEEP THE LOW-INCOME POPULATION IN CENTRAL AREAS

Changes of the policy to promote the permanence of the poorest population in the downtown areas – where there is infra-structure, offers of services, equipment and jobs – to a policy that does not prioritize this Downtown population have prompted the renewal and strengthening of forums and grass-roots organizations that publicly demonstrate their opposition to these changes. The *Fórum Centro Vivo* (Forum Live Center) is one of these organizations and its "dossier denounce" gathers together several social groups affected by the present policy.

Furthermore, the housing movements' strategy has also triggered the occupation of underutilized buildings and a series of public demonstrations bringing to the realm of public debate certain questions about housing policy, such as, among others, the eviction cases to vacate buildings, nearly always involving violence.

Besides, the change of policy has also made evident the role of other federative organs, such as the Cities' Ministry, Social Security and CEF (Brazilian federal government savings bank). The Cities' Ministry, for example, through a policy of negotiation and pressure over the *Instituto Nacional do Seguro Social* (National Institute for Social Security), INSS, has contributed in getting the INSS to give authorization to CEF for it to select enterprises to implement housing projects of social interest in three buildings belonging to the INSS in the central area of São Paulo, through PAR (Housing Leasing Program), with resources coming from the *Fundo de Arrendamento Residencial (*Housing Leasing Fund), FAR:

• On the plot located on Rua Maria Domitila (Center) a new residential building will be built (see PAR item in this study);

• The former INSS building, located on Avenida Nove de Julho, which was first abandoned, and later burnt, will be restructured to shelter 117 low-income families.

• On the plot just beside the last item herein mentioned, on Avenida Nove de Julho, a new building of social interest will be built with 139 housing units (source: site of the Ministry of Social Security, January 2007).

For these projects to happen, it was necessary for the Municipality to sign an agreement with the federal government. These turned out to be the only interventions in the central area geared towards the stay of the population, with the Municipality's endorsement.

Another example of the same approach was the agreement to vacate *Edifício Prestes Maia* (925 people), agreement reached through negotiations that involved the Housing Movement, the Municipality, and the Cities' Ministry. The agreement included Rent-Relief for six months to the homeless while waiting for the building of definitive housing accommodation. The resources came from the *Plano de Aceleração do Crescimento* (Acceleration Plan for Growth), PAC, launched in January by President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who plans to allocate R$20 million to São Paulo.[95]

Another piece of news in the fight for the postponement or cancellation of evictions was the creation of the Public Legal Aid Service of São Paulo State in January 2006, a new player that has often been moved to action by the housing movements attempting

to stay downtown and to safeguard their housing and city rights. The Public Legal Aid Service has acted in an articulated way with the Public Prosecution Office, and especially with the Social Inclusion Team. Since its inception the Public Legal Aid Service has been striving constantly for there to be a relocation plan for people suffering eviction and re-possession processes, for maintenance of Rent-Relief and it has also been trying to avoid the withdrawal of the ZEIS areas demarcated in the Strategic Master Plan which is now under revision, among other actions.

POINTS FOR REFLECTION

Here are some points that must be highlighted in this analysis of the housing policy in the period 2005-2006.

There is a clear shift in focus in relation to housing in the central areas of the city. The city governmental administration started in 2005 has been concentrating less on housing in downtown areas, not only in terms of programs, but also financing and urbanistic instruments. The lack of priority is not a simple matter, especially when the city in question is São Paulo, a large, sprawled city, in which the place where one lives has a bearing on one's social conditions. Recent studies have reiterated the fact that people who live in central areas have more opportunities in life, more jobs, etc., demonstrating, for instance, that people with the same level of school education who live in different districts of the same town will experience different living conditions. Marques and Torres (2005) maintain that space location is a constitutive dimension of social conditions in general and of urban poverty in particular. For that reason, they state that territorial locality should be incorporated in strategies to fight social destitution, considering social policies in their wider scope.

A housing policy should be accompanied by an urban policy. The option of non-prioritization of new housing projects for the low-income population in the Center has implications for the density of other areas, eventually even in peripheral or water springs areas.

A second point for reflection is that s̲lum urbanization projects and land regularization *projects have been having reasonable continuity and have even suffered an increase in the number of interventions*, accompanied by a considerable growth in the municipal budget forecast besides other existing sources of financing.

The density of projects, resources and measures will certainly affect the conditions of the occupations that today are irregular and precarious, and in water spring areas.

We cannot know, however, whether the real effect of these policies will contribute to the preservation of areas not yet occupied and with significant vegetation, or whether it will contribute to direct to those areas other new processes of urban expansion. Furthermore, the main effort to sanitize those areas is still to come, and is in large part the responsibility of the State government through SABESP.

The non-prioritization of a policy to promote housing in downtown areas coupled with high level of investment in slum urbanization seems to be the option taken by the Serra/Kassab administration. This has meant the adoption of different political and investment priorities from those of Marta Suplicy's administration, which distributed in a more balanced way the resources assigned to different regions of the city and to housing matters (new housing projects, slum urbanization, etc.). Slum urbanization is a very important topic for the city and it is a good thing that it has resources (the more, the better). However, if such an option is not accompanied by a specific policy for downtown areas, it will be unable to reverse the current urban contradiction of having, on the one hand, a high housing deficit and, on the other, a high number of empty or underutilized properties. The city will still be badly occupied.

In specific projects of slum urbanization, there is an apparent dispute between models to be adopted: either more structural interventions (which are more expensive and require more vacatings), or interventions more focused on infra-structure facilities (less expensive and requiring less vacatings). The 2005-2008 administration has been leaning towards the second model, stating that it ensures that a larger number of people is helped. It is necessary to advance this view, to develop indicators, and to build knowledge in which to base pertinent responses.

Another relevant point to consider is the definition of the demand that will be benefitted by such projects. This is particularly important: neither the Municipality nor the housing movements have defended more public processes for the definition of this demand, for example, in the Housing Council. This ends up, in practice, weakening the institutional ways of defining policy in favor of negotiations case by case. There is nothing to ensure that the choices made result in actual help to the most vulnerable people.

With regard to the management of condominiums, there is another point to consider. The definition of the State's role in the administration of the policy is still open. If, on the one hand, there is some difficulty in the management of the projects that require a lot of time, energy and resources; on the other hand, the total absence of the State is

not viable. Public powers must take over the role of moderator and enabler in order to improve the quality of condominium life. It is necessary to become aware of the difficulties faced throughout the projects, the need for repairs to buildings after their occupation, the need to organize the dwellers, that means the various social processes involved in housing promotion. How could the State input become more balanced so that the social results become less violent, more inclusive, and more qualitative?

An important difference in the Serra/Kassab administration when compared with the previous administration lies in its relationship with the CDHU, that is, with the State Government. The political party alignment among government sectors has significantly contributed for the handing over of resources and support to the Municipality's projects. This fact, among others, has enabled an exchange of ideas between municipal and State policies. Nevertheless, when political party-lines affect policies, then this is a certain indication of the political fragility in which we are placed, where agreements and alignments lie behind political decisions, often in a way that is quite distant from the real municipal needs and from the priorities defined in State plans.

A further matter to reflect upon relates to the policies based only on opportunities. In both the 2001-2004 government administration and in the administration started in 2005, policy was rather characterized by adding project points, the accomplishment being defined by opportunities dictated by buildings, plots, financing and loans, instead of being characterized by a proper, previously designed, plan for housing. Although the policies may differ in several respects, these differences seem to be much more based on principles than on planning.

Finally, it should be pointed out that a great constant in the housing policy of the last few years has been the inability of the public powers to face the true scale of the housing deficit. The interventions may have been timely but they have been unable to reduce demand for housing in the city during any of the governmental administrations of recent years.

NOTES

68. Pólis Institute's researchers.

69. See AMARAL, Angela. "Habitação – avaliação da política municipal." ("Housing – assessment of the municipal policy") Cadernos Observatório dos Direitos do Cidadão, 4. São Paulo: Instituto Pólis/PUC-SP, set. 2001,p.26. In this study there is a table showing the total number of new units produced in the previous terms (since mayor Luíza Erundina, in 1989), in which it is evident that the maximum number of units constructed amounted to nearly 36,000, while the housing deficit rose quickly and at higher rates than the population growth rate, as presented in the introduction of the present study.

70. MARQUES, Eduardo; GONÇAVES, Renata; SARAIVA, Camila. "Asymmetry and misunderstanding: the social conditions in São Paulo metropolis in the 1990s". In: Novos Estudos Cebrap n. 73, novembro 2005, pp. 89-1080.

71. A more detailed description of the programs carried out in the 2001-2004 administration is found in CARDOSO, Adauto L. Habitação: balanço da política municipal 2001-2003. Cadernos do Observatório dos Direitos do Cidadão 21. São Paulo: Instituto Pólis/PUC-SP, março 2004, pp. 54-68. (Housing: abalance of the 2001-2003 municipal policy)

72. Forum Live Center. Violations of Human Rights in the Center of São Paulo: proposals and demands for public policies. Dossier Denouncement. São Paulo, June 2006.)

73. "Public Defender charges Municipality for promoting 'social cleansing' ". Agência Carta Maior, 20 January 2007.

74 "Slums are new target of cleansing in São Paulo", Rafael Sampaio. Agência Carta Maior, 17 January 2007.

75. A project dedicated to condominium management was being developed under Marta Suplicy's administration together with the work of consultants and social assistants, which aimed at overcoming management problems. This project was not continued.

76. See FORUM LIVE CENTER (org.) Violações dos Direitos Humanos no Centro de São Paulo: propostas e reivindicações para políticas públicas(.Forum Live Center. Violations of Human Rights in the Center of São Paulo: proposals and demands for public policies. Dossier Denouncement. São Paulo, June 2006, p17-18).

77. According to SEHAB's "Qualitative Balance of 2001-2004 city administration", the Vila dos Idosos was presented as one of the twelve projects that "are underway" in the Social Tenancy program (p.34).

78. Resolução do Conselho Municipal de Habitação no 17 de 22 de fevereiro de 2006. Municipal Housing Council Resolution – nº 17 17 February 2006.

79. News published on 8 August 2006 on the São Paulo Municipality site.

80. News of the Municipality of São Paulo: www.prefeitura.sp.gov.br, 20 December 2006.

81. Folha de S. Paulo, Tuesday 10 October 2006.

82. The Rent-Relief program was regulated by the Normative Instruction SEHAB-G n° 1 of 19 February 2004, based on resolutions n° 5 and 6 of the Municipal Housing Council of J 30 January 2004.

83. See the article "Prefeitura de São Paulo cortará subsídio habitacional de 2.500 pessoas" ("Municipality of São Paulo will cut housing subsidy to2,500 people" from the site of Agência Carta Maior http://www.cartamaior.com.br/templates/materiaMostrar.cfm?materia_id=13540&editoria_id=5, in April 2007.

84. According to the "Qualitative Balance of the 2001-2004 governmental administration, p. 40, in that period SEHAB "gave priority" to the following projects: Casarão da Rua do Carmo – Sé (25 units), Vilinha 25 de Janeiro – Luz (33), Imoroti (8), Eiras Garcia (15), and Pedro Fachhini (12).

85. "Prefeitura inicia amplo programa de reforma de cortiços na cidade" ("Municipality starts wide program of tenement reform in the city") Official site of SEHAB-Prefeitura de São Paulo: www.prefeitura.sp.gov.br/noticias/sec/habitação/2006/08/0010 on 10 January 2007.

86. Qualitative Balance of tem administration of 2001-2004, pp. 41-42.

87. Municipal Law n° 13.514/03.

88. SEHAB official site: www.prefeitura.sp.gov.br/secretarias/habitacao/programas/0003 on January 22, 2006.

89. 2001-2004 administration quantitative balance, p. 84.

90. SEHAB site: www.portal.prefeitura.sp.gov.br/secretarias/habitacao , programa mutirões ("mutirões" program).

91. Complementary Adjustment of Cooperation ALA/BRA 17-576, 8 March 2006. Information extracted from the publication: Global Operational Plan – Urban Social Inclusion "We from Downtown" Project. São Paulo: Municipal Government of São Paulo, Municipal Department of Social Development and Assistance, May 2006, p.6.

92. (Global Operational Plan – Social and Urban Inclusion Project "We Downtown", São Paulo: Municipal Government of São Paulo, Municipal Department of Social Assistance and Development), May 2006, p.19.

93. (Global Operational Plan – Social and Urban Inclusion Project "We Downtown", São Paulo: Municipal Government of São Paulo, Municipal Department of Social Assistance and Development), May 2006, p.19.-21.

94. Forum Live Center. Violations of Human Rights in the Center of São Paulo: proposals and demands for public policies. Dossier Denouncement. São Paulo, 2006, p.21.

95. Source: "Union releases R$20 million from the PAC for SP homeless") Report in UOL site, 13 April 2007. Withdrawn from the site in August 2007.

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The role of the Housing Council of the Municipality of São Paulo in the city's housing policy

LUCIANA TATAGIBA AND ANA CLÁUDIA CHAVES TEIXEIRA

Since the 1990s we have been witnessing an unprecedented expansion of institutionalized participation in housing policy by the insertion of new players, issues, conflicts, and interests. This expansion has been altering traditional patterns of policy formulation and implementation. However, the intensity and direction of these ongoing changes often fall short of the expectations that motivated their creation. In the specific case of the managing Councils, the object of this study, the bibliography suggests that this new participative institutionality has still been occupying marginalized place in the decision making processes that involve the definition of policies in their specific areas. Even though the problems mentioned vary in nature and extension, it is not uncommon to find studies concluding with the same affirmation: Councils "do not deliberate".

Though agreeing with this general diagnosis, we have to recognize that it is not enough. After all, after over 15 years of experimentation, it is now necessary to go forward in the analysis and provide a more defined outline of these new participative instances, specifying – in the ample range of players and processes that compose the policies' production dynamics – their specific identity and form of action.

Should it be true that the Councils do not deliberate, then what do they actually do? What are they for? Beyond the stipulations of the legislation, what role are they really playing in the various phases of production of public policies? Reaching farther than the expectations and focusing on the "real experiences", what have been the place, role and function of these new instances, and what does it mean in terms of their institutional identity? To what extent and how do the Councils influence public policies?

These questions present us with a challenge and justify a new investigative effort. We believe that it is essential to face such issues at this moment, when an attempt is being made to evaluate the results of going for institutional participation. Our study does not have the ambition to answer this question. What we intend and hope to do is to offer more subsidies so that this debate may go forward. We believe that only information will provide the means of avoiding the simplifying traps that either lead to a blind option for institutional participation or suggest abandoning any type of involvement with institutionalized participative dynamics.

In order to intervene in this debate, this research focuses on the analysis of the co-relation between the production of public policy and the Council's activities in the areas of social assistance, children and youths, health, and housing.[96] As we have stated before, it is our intention to understand whether and to what extent the Councils have acted as instances of public policies formulation, and how able these instances have been of influencing the actions of the State and in which direction. For this purpose, the research is structured around the following analytical dimensions: (i) identity: institutional design and political trajectory; (ii) decision making ability and levels of influence on public policies. Below we present a brief overview of each of these dimensions.

ANALYSIS' DIMENSIONS

The first central dimension of our analysis remits to the following question: what are the Councils? To this end, we adopt the following definition: the managing Councils are permanent participative institutions, legally defined as part of the structure of the State, whose function is to influence public policies in specific areas, producing decisions (that sometimes may take the shape of State regulations) and whose composition may count with the participation of representatives of the State and of society, as members with equal rights to speak and vote. Beyond these general principles, each Council has its own identity which may be partially understood by the consideration of two fundamental variables: *institutional design* and *political trajectory*.

The institutional design provides the parameters for the Councils' actions, presenting the basic outlines of their political identity. In the laws referring to their creation and internal regulation are defined the rules for their composition and representation, for the nature of their participation, for the decision making dynamics, for the procedural ritu-

als, etc..These, in turn, indicate the potentialities and limits of each space concerning the results expected from their participation (this discussion is presented in item 1 of this text). As suggested by Lüchman, institutional design is an important analytical dimension "as it constitutes a substratum or support of political dynamics", defining "the conditions of enlargement and sustainability of participative experiences" (LÜCHMAN, 2002: 47).

However, throughout our research, we could observe that the Councils find themselves at different stages of development and consolidation. Variations in the ability to influence policies, in the form of dialogue with the State, in the dynamics of participation, in the relationship with other political players, etc., can be perceived in the different administrations of Council management: all this without any other change in the institutional pattern. Such fact evidences that the Councils undergo phases or distinct moments along their trajectory, that they are transformed over time and that this process has implications for the construction of their political identity. Thus it was essential for our investigation to recover the history of the Councils, which allowed us to do a very useful exercise: to compare a Council with itself over time (the results can be verified in item 2).

The second important analytical dimension remits to the expectations towards the deliberative capacity of the Councils. As mentioned in the first paragraphs, studies commonly conclude that "the Councils do not deliberate". In our investigation, we tried to replace the "deliberate / do not deliberate" dichotomy with a richer and more complex evaluation that tries to understand the different levels of the Councils' influence over the different phases of public policy.

We start with the distinction between deliberation and decision. While the concept of decision remits to the result of a process that involves election or choice among alternatives, the notion of deliberation refers to the quality of the process that leads to the decision. The concept of deliberation remits to a decision making process that is preceded by a well informed debate about the alternatives regarding the definition of problems and ways of intervention. The pattern of interaction is demanding in terms of the expectation that each one should present his or her reasons and be willing to re-evaluate his or her opinions after dialogue with another player, who is seen as an equal in terms of rights to express and publicly support his or her interests and values in the light of reasonable arguments (BOHMAN, 1996). It is this process that is going to determine whether a decision is legitimate or not.

In view of this distinction, this study will use the term "decision" rather than deliberation because we have no means of exploring variables that remit to the quality of the decision-taking process, such as: existence or non-existence of debate and discussion prior to the decision, the plurality of interests involved in the dispute, the nature of the reasons presented, the level of autonomy of the individuals involved in the support of positions, each player/segment's greater or lesser power in the setting up of the agenda, etc. In other words, we will only try to analyze the types of problems the Council has tackled over its trajectory and those that have been deemed important enough for the Council to take a public stand and make decisions about them. Our research does not comprehend all the decisions taken by the Councils; it has concentrated, however, on a specific kind of decision: those decisions that are expressed as resolutions. The resolution is a Council's decision on a certain aspect of public policy, which assumes the form of a State regulation. It is a "strong modality" of decision, potentially able to link departments of public administration and private agents.[97]

The second movement – fundamental to the understanding of how the Council influences – is to investigate *the policy phases* to which these decisions generally refer. To make the discussion easier, we will define our understanding of "policy phases'.

It can be said that public policies have a cycle: birth, growth, maturity and transformation (DRAIBE, 2001). In general terms, the development of a public policy is said to involve two fundamental processes that are not linear (not like time evolution, because they may happen simultaneously).

1) The process of formulation of public policies, which involves: a) the identification of an issue to be solved or rights to be fulfilled, arising from the diagnosis of a problem. In Draibe's terms, this point would establish the setting up of the public agenda around the public policy under analysis; b) the formulation of an action plan to deal with the problem, evidently marked out by the confrontation of alternatives. This action plan, in general, is spelled out in an Annual Plan of public policy, with detailed programs and projects; c) inside this plan, the decision and choice of priority actions, pointing out what and how to invest public funds, or private (in the case of some public funds that invest private resources), that is, defining implementation strategies.

2) The implementation of public policy, including activities as a means, which render viable the development of the program, and activities as an end, or the actual execution. Draibe identifies the following subprocesses in the implementation phase: (a)

management and decision making system; (b) divulging and information processes; (c) selection processes (involving implementing agents and/or beneficiaries): (d) enabling processes (for agents and/or beneficiaries); (e) logistic and operational systems (activity as an end).

Throughout all these phases, monitoring and supervision may occur, carried out by governmental departments or by the civil society's players. As we also know, public policy does not necessarily go through all these phases. It is not always well planned, or sometimes it does not manage to get totally implemented or evaluated. That is due to transitions between governments with different priorities or changes in priorities within the same government.

The Council's level of influence may vary in different phases of the policy, or even be restricted to a sub-process inside each phase. The Council may have a strong level of influence in the planning phase and weak in the implementation phase (and vice-versa); it may concentrate action on the last phase, with an ex-post social control; or, still, it may not influence at all the policy's production cycles. In order to evaluate the kind of influence the Council has on the policy it is fundamental to know *its institutional design*, in which are defined the expectations in relation to this influence – for example, there are Councils whose legal attribution is only to follow the execution of a certain action in a program – , and also to know the Council's *political trajectory* through which the Council takes over the performance of certain functions that may or may not coincide with what is stipulated in its legal definition.

Having traced the general outline of our research, we will present below the case study, which constitutes the main part of this text.

CASE STUDY — THE HOUSING COUNCIL OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF SÃO PAULO

The aim of this text is to analyze the Housing Council of the Municipality of São Paulo (CMH), focusing on the relationship of the Council with public policy in the housing sector in the municipality of São Paulo, having as temporal slice the end of the first Council's administration (2003-2005) and the beginning of the second administration (2005-2007), which coincides with the Serra/Kassab's governmental administration. Moreover, we have extended the documental analysis to the beginning of the first Coun-

cil management in an attempt to build a more adequate perspective for the analysis of challenges and possibilities of the present. It should be reminded that the CMH is the most recent Council studied in this research.[98] It is only three years old and its councilors had not even completed the second term when this study was carried out. When compared to other Councils, such as the Municipal Council for the Rights of Children and Youths (CMDCA), this is a very recently formed Council in the city.

Our methodological strategy consists of two movements. First, we will try to investigate the Council's topics for the agenda. The topics discussed and the tasks that the CMH is responsible for are a good indicator of the function that it is effectively fulfilling in the context of municipal politics. It is not our interest herein to reconstruct the process of agenda setting within the Council (though a very important issue, it is beyond our possibilities of analysis at present); our aim is rather to identify its most recurring themes. Second, we will try to compare this Council's agenda with the public policy agenda. That is, at this moment we will try to advance the evaluation of the CMH's agenda with a support which is external to the Council: public policy for housing.

To accomplish these objectives, we used research complementary strategies. The first of them was documental analysis. The minutes between June 2003 and May 2006, amounting to 28 minutes, were analyzed. The second kind of document to be analyzed was the CMH's resolutions. Besides these documents, we carried out interviews with Councilors representing the government and civil society, totaling seven interviews. We also attended three CMH meetings which took place between 22 February 2006 and 26 July 2006, which yielded field diaries.[99]

We believe that the association between these research strategies has allowed us to widen our understanding of the CMH as a political participative institution, and, above all, the place it has occupied in the housing policy in São Paulo. However, we know that our choices also result in clear limits in terms of the interpretation of the research "findings". As our study does not include the analysis of patterns in the political disputes within the CMH,[100] nor the way it relates with other governmental and non-governmental institutions involved in housing policy, we are not able to determine why certain issues are important in the Council's agenda while others are not; who are the players with more ability to influence this process; to what extent decisions are preceded or not by deliberation; what force the Council exerts to impose attention to its decisions, etc.. These themes surely represent dimensions of our prob-

lem that unfortunately will not be approached in this study. Although our objective, as already mentioned, is more modest, it is at the same time deeply challenging: we want to study the CMH's thematic map in order to try to shed light on CMH's place, role and function in the housing policy of São Paulo.

<p style="text-align:center">★ ★ ★</p>

Our text is divided in four parts. In the first, we try to characterize the CMH briefly, focusing on some of its institutional dimensions in order to understand what place and role the legislation confers vis-à-vis other players in the field. In the second part, we try to rescue fragments of the CMH's history through a comparison between the different administrations. In this exercise, we do not give much emphasis to a detailed description of each stage but rather we try to identify the moments of possible curvature in the CMH's trajectory that help to understand its institutional identity. In the third part, studying the resolutions produced by the CMH, we try to understand what kind of problems it has mainly offered solutions to, by means of its production of legal regulations. Finally, by consulting the minutes and taking part in meetings, we try to follow through the Council's first and second administration terms, particularly in the periods between January 2005 and July 2006, which coincides with the beginning of José Serra's mayoral administration.

INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN: COMPETENCIES AND WORKING DYNAMICS[101]

The CMH was one of the Councils created by mayoress Marta Suplicy (2001-2004), a year after the First Municipal Housing Conference, which took place from 03 to 05 August 2001. According to the law that created it, Decree number 13.425, dated 02 September 2002, the CMH is a *deliberative*, *supervisory* and *consulting* entity, whose basic objectives are the establishment, follow-up, control and evaluation of the municipal housing policy. In terms of institutional links, the CMH is bound to the Department of Municipal Housing and Urban Development. The Council's first meeting took place on 25 June 2003.

As for its working dynamics, the CMH's Internal Statute makes provisions for bimonthly meetings, but as will be demonstrated below, during its first term, meetings were held almost monthly. As for its composition, the Law establishes that the

CMH must work with a body of 48 members, from which 16 are government representatives, 16 come from community organizations and grass-roots movements related with the housing issue, and 16 members from other organizations from the civil society, also linked with the housing issue. Amid the government's representation, it is established that 13 members come from the Municipality administration. Most of these come from departments connected with the Department of Housing and Urban Development, besides representatives from the Department for Work, Planning and Finance, and from Companhia Metropolitana de Habitação (OCOHAB) (Metropolitan Housing Company), one representative from the State Housing Department, one from Caixa Econômica Federal (CEF) (Brazilian Federal Government Savings Bank), another from Companhia de Desenvolvimento Habitacional e Urbano do Estado de São Paulo (CDHU) (Company of Housing and Urban Development of the State of São Paulo). Amid the 16 representatives from the civil society are included universities, professional organizations, trade unions of workers in the civil building industry, associations or trade unions representing the employers in the civil building industry, technical support teams, NGOs, main trade unions, the Council of the housing professional category, and the Council of the legal professional category. The government's representatives are appointed by the Executive. The representatives of the civil society are elected by their respective segments. This Council, unlike others, introduced an innovation in the elections of part of its representatives. The selection of the representatives of grass-roots entities and organizations is made by direct elections. The first election even counted with support from the Tribunal Regional Eleitoral (TRE) (Regional Electoral Court), which provided electronic ballot boxes. The term of time for all representatives is two years.

The Council also has an Executive Commission, composed of 9 members: the Municipal Housing and Urban Development Secretary (SEHAB), the Superintendent of Popular Housing linked to SEHAB, the president of COHAB; 3 representatives of community entities and grass-roots organizations pertaining to the housing issue, one representative of associations or employers' trade unions in the production chain of the civil building industry; one representative from the universities linked with the housing sector, one representative of the housing professional organizations.

Both the Council and the Executive Commission are presided by the Municipal Housing and Urban Development Secretary.

Concerning the Council's competence in the process of policy production, article 3 states that the Council is responsible for: a) *participating* in the elaboration and supervision of the implementation of plans and programs related to the housing policy with a social interest, *deliberating* over its guidelines, strategies and priorities; b) *following up* and *evaluating* the economic, social and financial management of resources and the performance of the approved programs and projects; c) *participating* in the elaboration of a plan for the application of funds from the federal, state and municipal governments or funds repassed by international conveniums and consignated by SEHAB; d) *supervising* the movements of financial resources allocated to housing programs; e) constituting technical teams, special (temporary or permanent) commissions, whenever deemed necessary for the good fulfillment of its functions; f) forming a special commission for the organization of regional housing Councils; g) estimulating the participation and grass-roots control over the implementation of housing and urban development public policies; h) making available to the population and to public and private institutions ample information about topics and issues pertaining to housing policy; i) convene the Municipal Housing Conference; j) establishing relationships with municipal departments, Councils and forums involved in the elaboration of the Municipal Budget and in the definition of urban policy; k) elaborating, approving and amending its Internal Statute; l) articulating with other instances of popular participation in the Municipality; m) defining the service criteria based on different realities and problems related to the housing issue in the Municipality.

Besides all this the Council also has responsibility for the supervising of the Fundo Municipal de Habitação (FMH) (Housing Municipal Fund), in the following specific terms: a) establishing the guidelines and programs for the FMH's resources' allocation according to the criteria defined by Law number 11.632/94, in line with municipal housing policy; b) following up and approving annually the FMH's budget proposal and its plan of objectives; c) approving the Fund's accounts before they are sent to internal control departments; d) extinguishing any doubts concerning the application of guidelines and regulations related to the FMH in matters of its competence; e) defining operational regulations, procedures and conditions; f) fixing the remuneration of the FMH's operating department; g) publishing in the Diário Oficial do Município (Municipal Official Press) the FMH's decisions, analyses of the accounts and expressed expert opinions.

According to the Law that created the CMH, it can be said that CMH must act, therefore, in four large fronts: in the participation to define government's plans and programs; in supervision; in the mobilization of society, mainly by means of conferences; and in the articulation with other sectors of the government. However, there is one objective of the Council that still does not seem to have been implemented, and that is the creation of regional housing Councils, as has already occurred in the health sector.

As for the FMH, it is important to stress that it has its own history in the city, which cannot be tackled here. In order to manage this fund, a fund Council was initially constituted (ROSSETTO, 2003). In order to avoid superimposition of functions, when the CMH was created the Housing Fund Council was dissolved and the CMH therefore incorporated, among its functions, the control and follow up of this fund. As it will be demonstrated, several actions of this Council thus consist of reviewing resolutions made by the former Council concerning the use of the fund. According to Rossetto, in the years prior to the merger, the only function that the Fund accomplished – and with great difficulty – was to finance the mutirões (collaborative effort to build popular housing).

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According to the Law that created the CMH, we can say that in terms of institutional design, this Council is a recent participative institution with a role in planning and supervision. In terms of program and action planning, the word used in the Law is (to) "participate" in those stages. In terms of supervision, the emphasis does not fall on concrete actions performed in the housing by the Municipality, but on the municipal public resources and on funds transferred to the Municipality.

From the analysis of the institutional design, we can also apprehend that decisions about housing policies involve many players, involving several decision levels and financing departments, such as the CDHU and the CEF, in the federal and state levels. That is why these players also take part in the composition of this Council.

That is what we can sum up from the analysis of the Council's institutional design. In practice, we know that the division of functions, competencies and powers between the Council and the administrative and bureaucratic institutions in terms of the definition, execution and supervision of policies, is far from being settled just by

the disposition present in the legislation, which is quite vague about the place and role of each player. Thus our next step is to try to find new elements in the fragments of the CMH's trajectory new elements that could allow us to advance the understanding of its political identity.

ENLARGING THE PERSPECTIVE: THE CMH'S TRAJECTORY

We know that the history of participative institutions in the Municipality of São Paulo must be understood inside a wider panel of reference, which remits, among other facts to: a) the deep fissures in the Municipal Executive plan occurred in a succession of government administrations with different ethic-political principles; b) the actions of social movements and organizations in their tense and ambiguous relationship with the political institutionality; c) São Paulo's politico-electoral weight and its impact on the party politics dominating political practice in the capital.[102] These three dimensions seem to represent limits, potentialities and challenges to the participative dynamics in the city. Based on this general panel, we will try in this item to rebuild fragments of the CMH's trajectory in search of a more adequate perspective of analysis of our problem.

The CMH is a participative institution with a recent history; however, it is the result of pressure by the housing movements, which are social movements with strong associative tradition in the city (AVRITZER, RECAMAN and VENTURI, 2004). Legally created in 2002, during Marta Suplicy's administrative term, the Council was in its second term at the time this study was being prepared. In the table below, we try to recover, by means of comparison, the general traces that marked each one of the government administrations, taking as reference studies already produced on the subject.[103]

As already mentioned, there was originally a housing fund and a housing Council. Part of the new Council's task is to manage the "liabilities" left by the fund Council and reorganize the housing policy. Another challenge seems to be that it is necessary to think through and to structure the entire housing policy in the Municipality, involving COHAB, a mixed economy corporation, whose main shareholder is the São Paulo Municipal Government that holds 99% of its preferred stock.

Table l

CMH'S MANAGEMENTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

CMH's	GOVERNMENTS	CMH – MAIN LINES OF ACTION IN EACH GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION
First 2003 - 2005	Marta Suplicy	**2003** • Discussion and approval of the internal regulation • Approval of the Letter of Credit Program • Approval of the Housing Overview Program • Approval of the FMH's accounts – period 2002 and 2003 • Approval of the Rent Relief Program **2004** • Approval of the Housing Production in Self-Managed Collective Effort "Mutirão" Regime Program • Prorrogation of CMH's resolution 21 • Autorization for Hotel São Paulo's disposal • Establishement of rules for defining the sale value and dwellings to be designated to the Programa de Subsídio Habitacional do Governo Federal (PSH) (Federal Government Housing Subsidy Program) • Approval of FMH's accounts • Regulation of social leasing, rent, public tariffs, condominiums and resources for the program • Debate on the organization of the Conference
First January-June 2005	José Serra	• Discussion of investment priorities • Council Election • Debate on the Second Housing Conference • Debate on Tenements Program • Government's presentation of the SEHAB and COHAB's situation

| Second 2005-2007 (up to July 2006) | José Serra e Gilberto Kassab | • Debate on the Council agenda for the following years; among the themes is the importance of structuring the Municipal Housing Plan
• Approval of the FMH's accounts
• Appointment of the executive commission
• Transference of the collective effort "Mutirões" program to CDHU
• Guidelines for the selective process of social demand
• Convenium with CDHU for slum reurbanization
• Supervision of FMH's accounts
• System for charging FMH's mortgagors
• Creation of one only system of Social Demand
• Creation of two work teams: a) Master Plan Review and b) Analysis of Law n° 3.057/00 and Review of Plot Law
• Council's running: bimonthly meetings – Executive Commission meeting in one month, and the Council's meeting in the other. |

Source: own elaboration based on Council minutes and resolutions and information from Cadernos do Observatório issues 4, 10, 14 and 21, and field registers.

According to what is reported in the table above, we may point out three phases in the Council's trajectory across the two administration managements up to the present time.

The first moment was quite productive in relation to the Council's regulatory capacity. Between ordinary and extraordinary meetings there was an average of one meeting per month. Table 2 shows that a lot of resolutions were approved then. The second moment may be considered, all in all, very conflicting in terms of the relationship between government and society. It was characterized by little productivity, with lots of debates but no resolution at all. It is clear in this phase (which lasted six months) that the newly-elected Serra's administration, was taking control of the Department, the Fund and COHAB's situation. Therefore the grass-roots organizations were worried whether the previous programs and projects would be continued or not. The third phase is marked by few conflicts, few meetings (5 meetings between ordinary and extraordinary – which means an average of one meeting every two months) and a change in the kind of intervention the Council operated in the policy. In terms of content, the debate tends to turn towards partnership with CDHU, criteria to access the FMH's resources and the

supervision of the Fund's application of resources. Furthermore, the minutes and our observations of the Council's meetings indicate that the meetings became shorter. While the meetings in the first term of management would last up to six hours, in the second management administration the meetings last approximately two hours.

Table II

NUMBER OF MEETINGS AND RESOLUTIONS IN A COMPARED PERSPECTIVE

CMH's management	Governments	Months	Number of meetings	Number of resolutions
First 2003-2004	Marta Suplicy	19	8 ordinary meetings 7 extraordinary meetings 7 executive commission meetings	15
First January-June 2005	José Serra	6	2 ordinary meetings 1 extraordinary meeting There is no mention of any meeting of the executive commission	None
Second July 2005-2007 (up to July 2006)	José Serra e Gilberto Kassab	13	4 ordinary meetings 1 extraordinary meeting There is no mention of any meeting of the executive commission	2

Source: own elaboration based on the Council's minutes.

We will now try to point out briefly, in terms of content of the debates and decisions, the major trends in each of these moments. The first phase, from 2003 to 2004, is marked by a high degree of sharing political projects between the representatives of the municipal administration on one side, and the representatives of the grass-roots movements and certain sectors of the civil society on the other, and also by great deliberative and normative capacity in relation to projects and programs approved by the Council. At the same time there seems to be at the Council in this phase considerable room to make conflicts explicit. The minutes reveal that there seems to have been some questioning when a particular decision apparently lacked depth and there is room (especially by calling extraordinary meetings) for in-depth debate.

The hypothesis is that people occupying leading positions in these instances were committed to the inversion of priorities in the policy of this sector, with emphasis on the value of demands and issues that have historically constituted the agenda of the social housing movements. The programs presented for the Council's approval – such as Cool Neighborhood, Living Downtown, On-Line Plans and Housing Provision, as well as the Municipal Housing Plan, the Municipal Letter of Credit Program, Rent Relief Program, "Mutirões" (Collective Effort to Build Houses Program) and the Slum and Tenement Urbanization Programs – seem to be a good indicator of this trend. There was among these sectors a shared consensus about which should be the political priorities and the role of the public power in politics that would not prevent the existence of conflicts, but rather would make them productive.

It is worth mentioning that this first phase raises some questions about a very common thesis according to which Councils at an earlier stage tend to favor questions about its internal running instead of political deliberation. That is not to what we have seen at CMH. Though the issue of internal ruling was present, its discussion did not consume Councilors, neither did it prevent the discussion of substantial questions about public policies. Also in this first phase, mainly at the end of 2004, a certain feeling of urgency to approve certain topics is noticed, possibly due to a general fear of the changes that might come, and in fact did come, when the government changed.

The second phase starts in January 2005, when José Serra takes up his post as Mayor of the Municipality, and ends in November 2005, when the new Councilors start their administrative term at the CMH. This period is characterized by a lesser degree of sharing between political projects of the government and sectors of the social movements. Thus

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the conflicts increase in relation to the first moment and the capacity to take decisions falls markedly, which is testified by the fact that not a single resolution was approved at this point.[104] In January 2005 Serra starts his administrative term at the Municipality and the former representative of the real estate sector at the CMH is installed as Housing Secretary. The intense conflicts between the public administration and the non-governmental Councilors are little productive. That is, there are very combative groups with a defined agenda for discussion with effective proposals for the area that clash with a government that has another vision of the city, of society and housing policy. The Council thus enters a phase of debate and confrontation oriented by different conceptions about what would be the public interest in this specific sector.

The discussion brought about by the government seems to change the emphasis to the government's control and supervision of the users and the revision of criteria and subsidy ranges. The minutes make evident the different visions of the movements' representatives and of the public power over what should be the priorities of the political agenda. While the new governmental management emphasizes increasing supervision, making users pay for the services, preventing the action of intermediaries, etc, the grass-roots movements want to guarantee their right to housing. Theoretically speaking, one point of view does not necessarily exclude the other. However, at this moment, it is clear that they compose agendas that are too disparate. For example, the minutes of the meeting on 30 May reveal a deep dispute about the political sense of the mutirões (collective effort), in a heated debate started by the Secretary, who compared the mutirões to the Cingapura. In the debate, the Secretary says that families that occupy dwellings built under the collective effort regime have to pay their due value, to which the members of the movement reacted replying that the government had not done its part, that is, to provide the infrastructure. "The people took on the role of public power. That happened in 104 mutirões in the city." (Minutes of the meeting on 30 May 2007, CMH). Following the same lines, there are other debates between the movements and the municipal administration about the building of popular housing downtown – a very important conflict that will be analyzed next. In this phase, the movements present in the Council meeting react strongly by the power of oratory. The result they obtain, however, is just to "immobilize", retard or hinder the implementation of policies intended by the government – but they do not build alternatives.

The third phase starts with the beginning of the Council's second management term and the exit of all popular movements' representatives belonging to the former management. It is important to highlight the coincidence of the date of the CMH's elections and the elections for the Processo de Eleição Direta (PED) (Direct Election Process) of the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) (Workers' Party), which consists of the election of the party's leaders. That may help explain the variation in the number of voters in the CMH's two elections, as shown in the table below.

Table III

NUMBERS OF VOTERS AT THE ELECTIONS OF CMH

Elections for the administration 2003-2005

	Popular Entities	Civil Society - NGOs	Professional Entities	Councils of Professional Category
Number of voters:	31.765	1078	170	339
Blank votes:	N/A	03	01	01
Annulled votes	N/A	16	01	02

Elections for the administration 2005-2007

	Popular Entities	Civil Society - NGOs	Professional Entities	Councils of Professional Category
Number of voters:	18.067	1.153	128	194
Blank votes:	66	N/A	N/A	N/A
Annulled votes	1.480	N/A	N/A	N/A

Source: Municipal Government, Housing Council Department.

As a result of the election, the social movements closer to PT, which were present in the Council's first administration ended up not being re-elected. Only five members remained: two representatives of the civil society (one representing the University of São Paulo (USP), another representing the sector's companies); two from the public administration (one representing CDHU, and the other SEHAB); and one in a different position: Orlando de Almeida Filho, who in the first administration term represented the realtors' union, and who in the second term returns to the Council as Secretary of the SMH (Municipal Housing Department), and thus President of CMH. In comparison with the first election, there is, in the case of representatives of popular organizations, an evident reduction in the number of voters: from 31,765 to 18,067, and a considerable increase in the number of annulled votes. Concerning the NGOs, there is a little upward variation, and in the case of Councils of professional categories there is a downward variation. By looking at the names of the Council's organizations in the first and second administration, we realize that in the case of the civil society's organizations, while there was also a renovation of names, such renovation did not occur in relation to the profile of the participating organizations: only 5 out of 16 organizations participating in the first management did not manage to get a seat in the Council's second administrative term. In the case of popular organizations the opposite happened: none of the organizations/movements present in the first administrative term managed to get a seat in the Council in the second term. There was a complete renovation of this segment, more combative movements linked to the housing in the city issue left, while women's associations, mothers' club and dwellers' associations entered.

It is worth asking at this point if there would have been a prioritization for these social movements to participate in the PT rather than in the Council. If that is what happened, we should ask about the reasons and the impact of this action on the Council itself. By consulting another research (TEIXEIRA, TATAGIBA, 2005), we find that many members of the movements have a triple militancy – movement, party, and when the party is in government, they feel themselves to be partially in government, even without actually occupying positions in the government. This type of affiliation, linked with the CMH's recent history, may make participative democracy – namely the CMH – become subordinated to the logic of representative democracy (TATAGIBA, TEIXEIRA, 2006), possibly placing in second place the Council's functions: to provide guidelines for public policies, as well as to act as a supervisor of public spending.

The point is that, with all these changes, one of the characteristics of the third moment is the increase in the "sharing of political projects" by the new government and the elected popular movements' organizations. Likewise, by verifying the minutes, we see that the conflict level diminished as well as the decision making ability. It is interesting to observe that in this phase the minutes become more direct, more formal and show absence of debate. The government brings a proposal and in general it is approved without much questioning. As we have already mentioned, the meetings turned out to be shorter. In the field diary, in the meeting of May 2006, we see the following note by Mateus Bertolini:

> An aspect that should be highlighted here is that the use of speech was restricted to very few people. The Councilors, particularly those belonging to dwellers' associations, have virtually not manifested any opinion. The debate was loaded with technical and legal terms, which made the understanding, including mine, about what was being discussed, very difficult. (Field Diary, CMH, 20 May 2006)

Concerning the content of public policies, the debate brought about by the government remains the same, but with fewer arguments on the part of the civil society attending the Council.

Nevertheless, that does not mean that the debate is not followed by the movements that left the Council. In a Council's observation report, we verified that one of the meetings was postponed because the former members tried to participate in order to hear the decisions, and the meeting had to be held somewhere else. In parts of the field work report, Mateus Bertolini explains his and other people's difficulty in entering the building where the Council's meeting would take place:

> Just at the entrance of the Caixa Econômica building, where the CMH's meeting would take place, there was a queue of about 30 people waiting to enter. I could not identify promptly whether they were from the Council or from housing movements. In the reception area, there were two official lists of names: one listing the Councilors, and the other listing the Housing Secretary's team. As my name could not be found in either list, it was added to a third list that was being prepared by hand. The large number of people whose names did not figure in the official list caused a little tumult at the reception desk. Talking to some Councilors and other people standing there, I got the information that those who were standing in the queue outside the building belonged

to the housing movements and that they were not being allowed to enter. By talking with the Vila Nova Cachoeirinha's community leader, Mr. Raimundo (connected with the Mutirões Forum and the Fórum de Luta Por Moradia – FML – Struggle for Housing Forum), I learned that he was trying to negotiate with the Council's representatives so that at least the movements' leaders could be present at the CMH's meeting by arguing that it was a public hearing and that they were entitled to participate. According to this community leader's information, other movements were represented there: Prestes Maia – MSTC/FLM Movement of Downtown Homeless/Front for the Fight for Housing) – and representatives of Olaria Tenement (Downtown region) – connected to the União dos Movimentos de Moradia – UMM (Housing Movements Union) and to the Tenements' Forum. (Field Diary, February 2 2006)

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The short trajectory of the CMH blends with the polarization of disputes at municipal and national level between PT (Workers' Party) and Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB) (Brazilian Social Democracy Party). While in other Councils it is not easy to detect whether there is a link between political parties and members of movements and civil society, in the CMH these links are apparent. During Marta Suplicy's administration, certain movements close to PT take seat in Council. These players, however, are not reelected during Serra's administration, and are replaced by other factions. We cannot say definitely whether in fact they can be identified with PSDB, but judging from their positioning during meetings it becomes evident that they differ very little from the views held by the government.

This non-reelection of the movements that were present at the first administration merits some consideration. If we cannot state with certainty that the movements took a clear option to participate in the internal elections of PT to the detriment of the Council's own elections, what we can say is that one dynamic force certainly interfered with the other. Furthermore, it must also be reiterated that the movements closer to PT continued trying to take part in the Council's dynamics.

In this example about CMH we can perceive that the role the Council played in governmental strategies and in the movements has varied in each conjuncture. In the third phase, it became quite clearly a place with less conflict and less expression of possible disagreements – these must have found other channels of mediation. The

result, in terms of concrete policies, will be displayed in item 4. We will continue next to investigate the Council's trajectory, taking as reference the decisions made by the Council along its history.

Our objective in this item is to deepen our understanding of the place and function occupied by CMH in the process of sectorial policy making, by the investigation of topics which were the subject of a specific type of decision, along the short history of the Council.

As pointed out in Table 2, the CMH published in its minutes fifteen resolutions in the years 2003-2004. As for 2005, no resolution was published. In 2006, until the month of July, two resolutions were approved.[105] These numbers demonstrate the decrease in the decision making ability of the Council in the transition period between Marta Suplicy's administration and Serra/Kassab's, as already alluded to. What are the topics deliberated by the CMH along its history? Which issues incited the Council's decisions? The following qualitative analysis may answer these questions.

In the table below we present a synthesis of the resolutions made between 2003 and 2006.

Table IV

TOPICS OF RESOLUTIONS CMH 2003-2006

Topics	N° of resolutions	%
About programs or policies (elaboration, discussion, approval, procedure rules)	10	58,82
FMH – approval of accounts, resolutions about financial statements, prorogation of deadlines for conclusion of works, reorganization of resources	5	29,41
Running of Council, regulations	1	5,88
Accord	0	0,00
No data	1	5,88
Total	**17**	**100,0**

Source: Own elaboration from CMH minutes

As can be seen, the main concern of the Council during this period was in connection with programs and policies in the housing sector. The following programs were debated and approved: Rent Relief, Housing Provision in Self-Managed Collective Effort ("Mutirão") Regime, Social Rent Program, and Tenements Program. Only two resolutions in the table above refer to the Serra/Kassab government, which leads us to infer that in the Marta Suplicy government the emphasis was on new programs and projects. In the Serra/Kassab government the decisions about programs and projects decrease significantly. This might either have something to do with the fact that it was the first year of the administration (2005) – when the ability to make proposals in general tends to be weaker – or perhaps to the fact that the municipal government might not have had many proposals for the housing sector. In the discussion about policy developed in this study, we note that between one administration and the next the programs suffered practically no modification. What happened instead was a reorganization of resources, with more stress in slum urbanization. While Marta's government was an "administration that invested in central areas, water spring sources and slum reurbanization in a balanced way", Serra/Kassab's administration invests little in the central areas, "while investing heavily in slum urbanization and land/property occupation around the whole town, including in water spring areas, undertaking sanitation and small urban reforms without major spacial interference such as the opening up of public spaces, small areas, etc." (CYMBALISTA and SANTORO, in this study).

The second significant topic in the resolutions refers to FMH (Fundo Municipal de Habitação) (Municipal Housing Fund). As explained earlier, CMH took over the Fund and it is understandable, therefore, that a major part of CMH's issues relate to the Fund. Their main preoccupation seems to be the approval of the financial statements, an important function of the Council. Furthermore, it is worth noting that few resolutions refer to the running of Council, a theme often present in other councils studied in the course of this research, particularly in the periods coinciding with the running of elections for new councilors.

In the previous item we tried to understand the CMH's role in supervising its own decisions. In this item, we will try to deepen this analysis by identifying the issues discussed by the Council. To that end, we opted for a defined temporal slice, taking as empirical reference the period that goes from January 2005 to June 2006, which coincides with the beginning of the Serra/Kassab administration term. We started by analyzing the minutes,[106] trying to recover the thematic map of the Council. Eight minutes in the defined temporal mark were analyzed.

Table V

FREQUENCY OF THEMES IN THE MINUTES
OF CMH'S MEETING JANUARY 2005 TO JUNE 2006

Issues	Number of meetings
Evaluation and debate of ongoing programs and projects	6
Internal issues: councilors' election, approval of minutes, executive committee selection, creation of working teams	5
FMH	4
Master Plan Review	3
New Projects	2
Realização das Conferências Organization of Conferences	1

Source: own elaboration based on the CMH's minutes.

The Council's first most debated issue is related to what we could call "evaluation of ongoing programs and projects". It is interesting to observe that there are no concrete proposals made by the government or by the organized society represented in the second administration in terms of the cancellation of programs or projects presented by the previous administration. Nevertheless, the government often criticizes decisions and programs previously decided. In fact, what the government proposes is to expand the

criteria and the level of supervision of previous projects. That does not necessarily mean, at least at present, getting rid of them.

There are discussions about charging the mortgagors, increasing the supervision of FMH's resources, creating a system to organize the social demand and criteria to define who is entitled to the resources. As we will see now, these new decisions are related to the criticism that the government – and members of the popular organizations elected in the second term – make about the pressure exerted by the organized society, such as occupations. This is condemned by both the players in the public sector and the organizations in the civil society.

The second most debated issue is related to internal issues. As mentioned before, that is partly due to the conflicts between members of the social movements and the government at the beginning of Serra's administration and the whole debate about the elections to the new Council. It should be highlighted that this has created a certain decision inertia in the Council, which during six months, did not take any decision. In a second phase it generated proposals for new configurations of the working dynamics inside the Council. The impression is that the sudden changes in the government's composition, in a first phase, created extreme conflicts with the civil society, which led to the necessary realignment of the Council's own dynamics. As the elections for the councilors' new term were getting closer, many decisions were linked with that. At a second moment, the Council needs to find its new dynamics and define its role: who will take part in the executive committee, how many meetings will take place, etc. Neither the rules nor the Law that created it have been altered, but the dynamics seem to be totally different if we compare the two governments and the two compositions of the civil society.

In the third place, issues related to the FMH arise. It is not the case of an ample debate about the allocation of resources (which did not seem to happen in Marta's administration either) but rather decisions about the allocation of the fund's resources, always in a timely way, such as the decision to transfer FMH's resources to the Programa de Arrendamento Residencial (PAR) (Housing Leasing program), as a kind of counter payment.

The subject of the Master Plan seems to be raised especially by the civil society, basically because of its mandatory review that would take place in 2006. However, despite the importance of this theme, no decision has been taken about it inside the Council.

In addition, it should be highlighted the focus given to CDHU by the Secretary, especially redirecting the mutirões and land regularization programs to that department. The way in which this relationship with the CDHU – a State department – occurs is quite noticeable. Although the State is expected to transfer some responsibilities to the Municipality, the opposite seems to be happening. As made clear in the text about Housing Policies, the CDHU would have resources available from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), and, in the government's own terms, would be "buying" these projects from the Municipality. It is evident that the closeness between the same party (and the same alliance PSDB-PFL – presently DEM) in the State and Municipal governments enables this kind of joint action to happen.

THE POLITICAL AGENDA VS. THE COUNCIL'S AGENDA

The present text in this study about housing policy points out the six programs in the city in the period Serra/Kassab: slums, subdivision of plots, water springs, living downtown, mutirões and on line plans. With the analysis of minutes and interviews it is possible to say that all those issues have been through the Council – except for the debate on water springs that has not appeared in either the minutes or in the interviews. In this sense, it is correct to say that the CMH can be considered as a space through which the public policy themes go across. The question to be discussed, in our view, is how these themes pass through the Council.

Some are presented as given themes that do not need any other debate and are just brought to the councilors' knowledge. Others are passed on by social players to other forums but are not tackled by the Council. Some others, still are debated but lead to no decision taking. And finally, there are some that are subject of voting and decision, but are little or barely debated, as the case of the so called partnership with the CDHU for the slum urbanization. We are now going to evaluate how some topics entered the Council's agenda.

One of the present Council's central topics, brought up by the government, is the *default* of the beneficiaries of the FMH's programs. Along with it, the strong discourse of *criticism to the occupations* by both the government's team and the popular organizations, and the need for *criteria* for meeting the social demand that would not benefit the occupations ("jumping the queue", as government calls them):

There is a prevailing position, even inside the movements that participate in the Council and the government that consider (sic) that the occupations are a way of jumping the queue for housing and should not be contemplated, they defend property generally. (Representattive of the Architects' Union)

In these organs there is not a project for discussion, the project for discussion is invasion and invasion turns into conflict, so the Council today is seriously thinking about solving or at least minimizing the housing problem, but if there are no good and objective criteria, there is no way for us to end up this housing problem because it turns into a political thing. I even joke with the Council team that while we are discussing housing policy, we won't be solving the problem. And I say that we have a lot to take from the housing policy, but have to discuss a housing project, because housing policy should go farther. The mayor today is Mr. so and so, from PSDB, the other is from PT – then one is going to give houses to people affiliated to PT, and the other will give houses to PSDB's sympathizers. What we have to do is discuss with the organizations about a housing project for São Paulo. Then a great difference will be felt; otherwise São Paulo's housing problem will remain, it will never end. (Representative of a popular organization)

As stated by the representative linked with the university and who has had a seat in the Council in the two administrative terms:

[The present government is] against any activity that comes from social organization, that is, mutirão is bad; in favor of everything that is done by contractors as per the CDHU's models; people in waiting lists for housing; allocation of units by draw, that is, there is on one hand the policy to favor the contractors, and on the other hand, to explicitly demobilize the social movement.

[In my view] social movement is social capital and not a matter of jumping the queue as suggested by the Secretary, and I get very annoyed every time he says so. This is not a relationship about favors, but we cannot imagine that you're going to do a public housing policy ignoring the people's capacity to get organized and manage, because surely the public power does not have the capacity and dimension to manage this size of problem. (Representative of the University)

These speeches denote distinct concerns, and serious enough to merit discussion. First of all, let's look at the criteria that benefit the people who need a dwelling. There is a strong criticism to occupation as a way of getting organized. It is evident that those who do not get organized in that way need somehow to be considered by the housing policies. It cannot be that only the people involved with occupations are considered for housing. On the other hand, this form of organization cannot be criminalized, or discriminated against as an illegitimate form to accomplish people's rights. Second, party politics should not take precedence over housing policy, leaving the latter in a second place. Before accepting or rejecting this hypothesis, it is necessary to know if in fact there are differences between the two ways of conducting housing policies in the two administrative terms. If we take into account that, more than political parties, what is at stake are two different models of housing policy – as stated in the text about housing policy (in this Study) –, when we talk about debate based on political parties, as in this case, it seems we are talking about a collision between two distinctive emphases of political practice. The first model, tending to turn more towards downtown dwelling, with emphasis on popular organization, by means, for example, of resuming the mutirões. And the second model, bending towards providing conditions so that the people stay where they are, increasing, for example, spending on water spring areas and on slum regularizations while giving less importance to occupations and forms of organization such as the mutirões.

These elements clearly pervade the debates about occupation in São Paulo downtown. An item widely discussed in the Council was the position shared by the popular organizations – and quite different from the previous administration – that social *housing in the center of the city is not viable*. About housing programs for the downtown area, the position of the new secretary is definite: there is no possibility of social housing in areas where the square meter is expensive, because if that happened, the other properties in the region would suffer devaluation. At the meeting of November 2005, already with the new composition of the Council, after the Municipality's decision to suspend the utilization of a building in the downtown area for popular housing, the representative of OAB (Brazilian Bar Association) stated:

> He could not keep this rent contract after having certified an incurable vice; unfortunately the contract will have to be annulled. It seems to me that it is a worldwide trend to have the properties in downtown areas occupied by middle – or upper-class people as

a way to revitalize the Center, because the Center of our city is historic, and thus able to attract tourists here. Low-income people even though deserving to be housed, the Center of the city is not an adequate site for them, and this applies all over the world. The center of town is to be revitalized with enterprises, people, and services. The Secretary should be congratulated on the initiative to annul the contract; I don't know the details but if in fact there is this incurable vice, we cannot let it continue. CMH, minutes of meeting in November 2005.

This was a remaining topic when we asked the interviewees which would be the topics generating most conflicts in Council, as can be verified in the following fragments:

When the town center is discussed, there is a certain polemic [in Council]. Because some buildings were occupied and the people…occupied the building and press the government to buy the buildings, the apartments, and we, the Council, do not agree on these questions. We have already had some dissention, but we came to an agreement that it should not be that way. Then, we have this situation about occupations here downtown that we don't agree with, because these people are invading, it's not right. So, apart from this political aspect – because then it's a political question – they invade the building, put pressure on COHAB to buy, remodel the apartments to accommodate those families, but if we are to follow this line, there is not the least chance of the Council agreeing with their thesis to attend these people that are invading and occupying areas. There is dissention only in this sense. (Representative of a popular organization)

Another discussion also exists as to how to approach the housing issue in the downtown areas. There is the Secretary's position that says that social housing is incompatible with the central area of the city; and the other position, that it should be prioritized, including with costs, because it has higher costs. (Representative of the Architects' Union)

Another example of this is the building that was already assigned and the Secretary's assessment that the building was not in an appropriate condition. Thus, it is evident that he has taken a deliberate decision that the Center of the city is not for the poor. (Representative of the University)

In the text about housing policy it becomes evident that downtown is not a priority for housing policy for the Serra / Kassab administrative term.

Another conflicting topic in Council, according to some interviewees, was its close connection with CDHU, which was very intense in the second administrative term:

> *The Council's management is more focused on searching for partnerships of resources, and it is very operative on how to bring in resources to carry out its work, while in the other administration, there was ample discussion about principles, etc. and somehow there were fewer resources and much fewer executive actions in the Council. That was the main difference I noticed between the two administrative terms. (CDHU's representative)*

To some, this is the interpretation of what is happening:

> *Rather than bringing money to the Municipality, in fact, municipal plots are gushing into CDHU. I have got it: statization in the sense of ESTADIZAÇÃO, going to the state [of São Paulo], it is not coming from the private sector to the public sector, doubtlessly. This is something I don't agree with. Let's synthesize, I think there are three main approaches: give privileges to the contractors; dissolve social movement; and to pass, have agreements passing things to the State rather than the opposite. (University Representative)*

> *There is another important polarization that is about... it's not even such a strong polarization, but it's important anyway, that is, how to deal with the ongoing works and the ongoing programs that came from the previous administration. Then there is a different position by the government in terms of reviewing ongoing programs, though maintaining in speeches that nothing is going to be stopped, etc.. Because of that, many mutirões have been redirected to CDHU – nobody is against this transfer – using the CDHU's resources to implement the Municipality's policy is seen under a positive light by everybody. However, this should not imply changes and alterations to the nature of the programs. Let's put it like this – in a certain way, roughly speaking, you've got there a certain polarization between the predominantly average vision of what was implemented in the other administration by PT (Workers' Party) and a not very clear*

vision of this administration that not clearly expressed itself in political proposals, but that consider with restrictions what was being developed before. (Representative of the Architects' Union)

Another prominent point in the interviews is the *lack of a Municipal housing plan*. The fragments are discussed rather than the policy in a wide sense. It seems there is a lack of space for the housing topic in the municipality, and thus, for the CMH itself. A point raised by various councilors was that the government should present the municipal housing plan, while discussing the previous one and considering what kind of changes the government intended to make. According to the minutes, the government did not present or discuss the plan as a whole, alleging that it had just started its administrative term. The councilors complained that, since the plan was not discussed, they would be dealing with very timely issues without being able to see how that would impact on the more ample plan for housing in the city.

The housing policy – I think that, first of all, there is something that is fundamental to say, it is the Municipal Housing Plan that the city of São Paulo does not have. The previous administration had a program that was transferred to the Executive, which, however, did not become a Law, then the Municipality of São Paulo is lacking it. Also, in our work on the Master Plan's review, we have placed this issue as a main point. Because when I'm asked about the Kassab's administrative term, it is lacking in this, because [if] you do not have a municipal housing plan, there is no such guideline, there is no plan. So, in my view, the first thing to discuss is the municipal housing plan. By the way, the municipal strategic plan states that a municipal housing plan should be approved, but there is no plan. Then that's what I say, that the housing plan is missing, because if you say 'I'm going to provide a thousand units'… it's good to make a thousand units, but it should be placed inside this conceptualization of a housing program as a whole, including the housing shortage, dwellings in areas of risk. We were not presented with this proposal, and neither was this question discussed in the Council. 'look, I'm going to make a thousand, ten thousand, we are giving priority to the mutirão because of that'. In terms of the Council discussion, this was not discussed, it is a rough housing package because I think what is missing is a discussion of the issue as a whole. (Sinduscon (Building Industry Trade Union) Representative)

The lack of a municipal housing policy also generates disintegration between federative departments:

> *The lack of integration between the housing policies makes the programs clash against each other and causes problems related to poor use of resources. In general, resources to use in social housing are not short, but we have a poor distribution, a bad use of these resources even because of the multiplicity of programs and the lack of integration between programs. To me, it is incomprehensible that two undertakings laid out side by side geographically with the same kind of product, designed for the same population, get to the public-user with disparaging prices. That is a noxious phenomenon of lack of integration of the housing policies. Then it seems to me this problem must be faced, and the Municipality of São Paulo is not different from the rest of the country. We have to discuss this in Council. As I have said, we have a tight agenda, too many people to discuss the matters and each councilor's intervention in each topic ends up being much reduced – I would say that we have hardly managed – or badly – to present for discussion in council the timely questions for São Paulo. I think this is a point that deserves to be better tackled. The more you discuss in theory how the policies should function, well, this a point that should be approached in a better way, only I don't know how to do it myself – maybe we should create a special group to discuss this topic or even get some space in the Council's agenda to create this kind of discussion. (Secovi (Housing Union) Representative)*

Finally, a proviso must be made about the FMH. Only one interviewee criticized the way the fund is discussed:

> *Well, the fund's follow up is done (sic) in two ways: they start coming, the government starts bringing, the Council's president brings us the resources that have to be approved to be allocated to this or that undertaking (…) It is only when we have to check the accounts, when everything that was spent on mutirões, building work, welfare retention, notary's costs, that everything is told. That is when we can see what has been spent at the Council. (Representative of Sinduscon)*

Though hardly mentioned, this topic does not seem lesser, because a large part of the Council's responsibility is just to monitor the fund, and, according to the analysis of the decisions and minutes, part of the decisions taken are related to it. It would be important to check to what extent the Council is or is not managing to meet its responsibilities in relation to the FMH.

Though not appearing in the minutes of council meetings, in the interviews a very strong concern about the Council's role seems to be expressed, the question seems to be badly resolved, perhaps because it is a recent and not connected to a completely implemented national system of housing participation. Here are some voices:

> The Law stipulates that it is the Council's responsibility to define the application of the Municipal Housing Fund. Nevertheless, how much effectively is the Council's responsibility <u>and how much it is obligatory to go to Council</u> is something a little undefined and that…well, we are not very clear about and surely is far from saying that the Council participates in the policy's direction. Actually <u>the Council is consulted in smaller parts of this policy, in the details</u>, and that is where we end up saying, voting, etc. There is no way of saying: 'look, about X, that was done, but forcibly it should have been passed in Council, and it did not.' <u>It is nothing as clear as that</u>. And from the last administration's experience, what is clear is that (…) there was a minimum basic direction. (…) In the last administration's experience, actually what we have seen was this: operational questions, let's say: rent relief is going to start, how it will work was discussed in the Council. It was a collective construction, very cool and productive. (…) this kind of thing is not happening much, because things come sort of ready. (Representative of the University)

> What I think is: the Council hasn't occupied its space totally, or the space in which the Law defines the Council's role, for example, here in the Law it says to elaborate, supervise and implement housing plans and programs. I think that this is still something that… we have not yet occupied totally our space in the Council, because what has come a lot… Actually we have approved things, but we have not fermented, or initiated any program born there in the Council. But I think that there is still a place to be occupied by the Council. (Representative of the Sinduscon)

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> *The Council is a Council of social control and participation or [at least] it should be, that means, the policy should be discussed in the Council, the priorities established, the policy execution supervised, the budget discussed, the legal Bills discussed, theoretically that is what it should be. But it is very clear this is now a problem, but what is not very clear is what specifically the role of the Municipal Housing Council is in the formulation of the policy, because the present management formulates the policy and the Council has not had an important role in that. Once in a while the Council is called to vote on some questions, but many questions are decided without having the Council's approval; therefore this Council role of social control is very little used in the present administration. (Representative of the Architects' Union)*

As pointed out by a popular organization's councilor at the time of our study, the responsibility is to "supervise and approve" (Representative of popular organizations). It does not use the terms debate, discuss, control, let alone decide. And this does not seem mere forgetfulness, but a perception that the role is rather more of approving what comes from the government. It is interesting that he did not even mention the possibility of non-approval of something coming from the government.

It is also important to highlight that a good part of the discussion with the popular organizations – not only those elected for the present Council, but also those that lost the election – often occurs out of the Council's meetings, in unilateral meetings with representatives of the government – a fact that helps lessen the strength of this participative instance.

> *What apparently happens now and happened in the other administration as far as I have heard, is that the government discusses a lot with the movements outside the Council, it establishes priorities, it answers requests, then what comes to the Council are the things that would be more important. They are already somehow sorted out with the movement, and the government plus the movement are the majority in the Council, thus this empties the Council tremendously. (Representative of the Architects' Union)*

This practice only increases the challenge to try to understand what the Council is for and what should its role be within a space where democracy is enlarged, if part of the decisions is taken out of council.

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In the analysis of the second administrative term, we saw that the CMH occupied a peripheral place in the decision circuit in relation to the elaboration of public policies. Although it has been the space for presentation of the government's programs and projects, it was not a player that was in fact taken seriously in the complex processes of production of policies in the housing area. The Council ended up acting in retail, from a constant state leadership that oriented its rhythm, dynamics and agenda. The non-discussion of the municipal housing plan evidences and aggravates this sensation of the no-place occupied by the CMH in the network of policy production. The lack of important movements in the area contributes, in this second administration, to the Council becoming empty, thus strengthening other channels and forms of conflict mediation.

CONCLUSION

This text has tried to understand the CMH's place and role in the process of housing policy production in the Municipality of São Paulo. Since the beginning of our research, we have decided to avoid the Council's idealized image – which many times emerges from the analysis of its institutional design – and which states "that the Council can do everything"; and/or a fatalist look that, based on the reality, affirms: "the Council serves no purpose". We knew that the challenge was to unravel the complexity that involves the performance of the Councils which, as well said by Sônia Draibe, "do not easily let themselves be known".

In the CMH's case, what has called our attention most were the changes in the Council's composition and their impact on the capacity of this instance to be translated as a forum for discussion and expression of conflicts.

We have seen in our study that the Council's profile alters significantly in relation to the profile of governmental and non-governmental councilors that compose it, and in relation to the group that has hegemony in certain moments. The members' profile in each Council's administrative term is translated in differentiated patterns of political dispute, with impact on the process of agenda formation, on the level of expression and handling of conflicts, the logics of interaction between the government and society, which, in turn, are translated in differentiated levels of the Council's political influence

on policies. Among the variables that may confer greater intelligibility to this process, we highlight the question of the political project[107] and the players' strategies.

The importance of the variable political Project became very evident at the time of change of leadership in the municipal executive level. As it was demonstrated in the chapter about the Council's trajectory, each change of the government produced very significant alterations in its performance capacity. That calls the attention to the Council's low autonomy in relation to the Executive. In other words, if the Executive does not want something, it is very difficult for a Council to go ahead. This dependence of the Council is based on the budgetary question, but it also goes beyond it. The Councils have assumed to a large extent the State's own language and way of behaving and have ended up entangled in the bureaucratic webs, in the logics of the State performance. Although we recognize the governments' own resistance, as a whole, to sharing the power of decision, we have also seen that the governments that are closer to the democratic/progressive tendency tend to give more value to the Council than those governments that lack this link.

Beyond the governments' political projects, our study also made evident the heterogeneity of projects in the civil society and their impact on the nature of the Council's performance. The interests that make the organizations and movements compete for a seat in the Councils are numerous, as are the notions of what it means to participate in policy formulation. Depending on which group of the civil society has hegemony in the Council at a certain moment, the Council's dynamics will suffer significant change spelled out in a greater or lesser level of accommodation in relation to agenda items to be discussed and interests of the municipal Executive, and, therefore, greater or lesser level of conflict intensity.

In the CMH'S recent trajectory, these variables allowed us to identify three phases or distinct moments. The first phase, from 2003 to 2004, may be characterized by: (i) greater "sharing of political projects"; (ii) greater conflict; (iii) greater deliberative/regulatory capacity. This first phase is characterized by a greater sharing of political projects among members of the municipal administration and the representatives of popular movements and certain sectors of the civil society inside the Council. The hypothesis is that people occupying leading positions in these instances were committed to the inversion of policy priorities in the sector, with emphasis on the value of demands and fronts that have historically constituted the agenda of the social housing movements. Despite

the differences, there was among the members of the Council a shared basis on which should lie the policy's priorities and the role of the public power that did not prevent the existence of conflict, but made it productive. The second phase starts in January and extends to November 2005, when the new Councilors start their administrative term at the Council. This period is characterized by: (i) minor "sharing political projects"; ii) minor conflict: (iii) minor deliberative/regulatory capacity. In this phase, we identified a serious conflict between government and society, which obliterates the Council's deliberative capacity – hardly a productive conflict. The third phase starts with the new Council's management term – second term – after the exit of all the representatives of popular movements as well as the most combative groups. This period is characterized by: (i) greater "sharing political projects"; (ii) minor conflicts; (iii) minor deliberative/regulatory capacity. In this phase the Housing Council looks more like the other Councils we investigated in this research, in the sense that the State predominates more strongly. The succinct, straight-to-the-point, formal minutes show the absence of debates. The government constructs the policies' agenda, informs the Council about programs and projects to be implemented and submits its proposals, when necessary, to the Council's approval, without much resistance in most cases. That means that in this phase the conflict is reduced and so is the Council's capacity to make propose.

In conclusion, our research also makes evident how the decision to get involved in institutionalized participative processes goes beyond maintaining close links to political projects. It relates very strongly to specific interests and to different possibilities presented by the political conjuncture for the fulfillment of those interests. A strong example of this occurred when the housing movement decided to prioritize its influence on party-related instances rather than to occupy seats in the Council, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, when the PSDB invested strongly in the occupation of seats in the Council for Children and Youths and the Housing Council as a strategy to enlarge its political bases. One of the subjects to be analyzed in-depth in future research is the investigation of the place that institutional participation occupies in the strategies of governments and movements in different political contexts.

NOTES

96. This chapter completes the "Observatório" series, which has analyzed the interface between social control and public policies already mentioned.

97. In his study on the Municipal Health Council of Curitiba, Fuks (2004) identified five types of deliberation: resolution, accountability, approval, motion, matters to be taken forward. The author grouped these types under three modalities: "Weak Modality" – involving an "approval" of plenary Council in relation to issues with decisions involving, for instance, the indication of a representative of the Council to participate in events or commissions, approval of the proposition of matters to be taken forward at Conference, etc.; "Strong Modality" – involving decisions of substantive nature, such as resolutions and accountability. We have started from this general indication when deciding to consider resolutions as our empirical point of reference.

98. Besides the Housing Council, we are also studying the municipal Councils of Social Services, Health, and Children and Youths.

99. We wish to register out thanks to Mateus Bertolini de Moraes, soon to graduate in Social Sciences, USP, and intern with the team of Citizenship Participation of Instituto Pólis at the time of this research, for taking part in the meetings as well as conducting the majority of interviews and also for locating the minutes of meetings.

100. Accordingly, we know that our slice leaves out some important issues, such as, for example, the division of power resources among the various segments which compose the Council, the disputes, negotiations and articulations between camps, the asymmetries and strategies employed by the players in worse situation to overcome them, etc..

101. For a more detailed analysis of the CMH's work dynamics see Cadernos do Observatório (publications of The Observatory of the Citizen's Rights), issues 4, 10, 14, and 21.

102. TEIXEIRA and TATAGIBA, 2005.

103. Will base our analysis particularly on Cadernos do Observatório (publications of The Observatory of the Citizen's Rights) issues 4,10,14 and 21. We will just make a quick register remitting the substantial discussions to the mentioned studies.

104. It should be mentioned that part of this difficulty may be related to the beginning of the administrative term and with the difficulties experienced by the government in structuring its agenda. The governments are known for the strong capacity to lead the Councils' agenda (the same occurred in the previous government administration of Marta Suplicy). Thus the meetings' little productivity in terms of taking decisions may be related to this initial difficulty faced by every new government.

105. It is worth noting that in the meeting of 28/09/2006, and obviously that comprises the second semester of 2006, seven resolutions were approved. This denotes, on the one hand, that a series of topics remained untouched for quite some time, creating therefore a "repressed demand" for decisions; and on the other hand, it is very difficult to believe that all seven topics could have been debated in one single meeting.

106. We would like to highlight that we are aware that the minutes, though important, are limited as a resource for analysis, not only because of the nature of the records – that we find in general rather succinct –, but also for the fact that the minutes we refer to are plenary sessions' minutes rather than minutes of the meetings of working groups, where the themes are discussed in-depth. In the plenary, generally speaking, an indication made by the working group is either approved or not approved. For an in-depth research, it would be important to have the minutes of the working groups' meetings so that it could be really possible to follow the trajectory that goes from the presentation of the theme up to the decision taking (or to no decision being taken).

107. The notion of political projects denotes "the compound of beliefs, interests, world views, ideas about what life in society should be, that give direction to the political action of different subjects", p. 38 and following pages. This citation is found in Dagnino, E., Olvera, A. and Panfichi, A. "Para uma outra leitura da disputa pela construção democrática na América Latina" (For another interpretation of the fight for democratic construction in Latin America), in: Dagnino e Panfichi, 2006.

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Challenges in the construction of participatory democracy in Brazil: the practice of public policy management councils

PEDRO PONTUAL[108]

This text seeks to dialog with the work of the Observatório dos Direitos do Cidadão,[109] with other works on councils, and with the sum of discussions amongst several networks that dedicate themselves to the theme of citizen participation, in search of assessment and critical reflection on the activities of public policy management councils and the challenges they present to the current process of constructing a participatory democracy in Brazil.

More immediately, this reflection will be based on the most recent studies produced by Luciana Tatagiba and Ana Claudia Teixeira (2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2007d) about the role and functioning of the Councils of Health, Children and Adolescents, Social Work, and Housing in the municipality of São Paulo from 2004 to 2006.[110]

Twenty years having passed since the promulgation of our latest Constitution (1988), considered the principal mark of the creation of a decentralized and participatory system of social policy management, and at the moment in which several networks of social movements and NGOs look to widen the scope of discussion of political reforms to include the debate over mechanisms of direct and participatory democracy, it seems to us essential to have a critical vision with respect to the role that such mechanisms have assumed throughout this historic period since its creation. The question that is in the air is: was all that political investment made to strengthen those institutional channels of participation worth it? Was it the correct wager?

We want to offer a contribution that overcomes two opposite tendencies frequently encountered in the literature about the theme: one which, wanting to emphasize the historical novelty that management councils represent for Brazilian democracy, tends

toward a chauvinist assessment about its actions which can be summarized by the idea that they "can do anything," and another which, burdened by difficulties and obstacles encountered by the same, tends toward a defeatist view that they "can't do anything," coming in some cases to question if it had been worth it to invest so much in institutional channels, if it continues to be valid to wager this type of participation in order to reach the democratization of public policies. The analysis that follows tries to offer a contribution that values at the same time what victories the councils have achieved, but also points out their difficulties and impasses in light of what they overcame and the reformulation of council practices in the sense that they can be efficient and effective in their proposal for social control and democratization of public policies.

From the Brazilian society historical point of view, it's good to highlight that the almost 20 years that mark the creation and implementation of the management councils comprise a relatively short period next to the profoundly elitist and authoritarian tradition that always marked the relation of the state to society in Brazil and that has in clientelism its most expressive phenomenon. In this context the relatively recent creation of several instructional channels of popular participation in public policy, among which the councils rate highest in number and social capillarity, must be seen as part of the long and complex process of constructing a democracy and a Brazilian citizenship.

It's worth mentioning still that the institutionalization of the experience of the management councils in Brazil at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s in some way goes against what was occurring in the international level and in Brazil with the implementation of neoliberal policies. Raichelis (2000) portrays such a setting:

> *While in Brazil we were approving a Constitution that incorporates democratizing and decentralizing mechanisms for social policy, that amplifies social rights, strengthening the social responsibility of the State, the models of the Social State enter into crisis on the international level, in Social Welfare States and the Socialist State alike. And from this process emerges a more ample crisis, which leads into the so-called neoliberal project and the proposals of reduction of the state and its social role. This is going to have a very large impact on our experience of democratization of social policy (p.41).*

In that context, the discussion about State Reform in Brazil was hegemonized by the neoliberal view that was emphasizing the economic and administrative aspects, from

the perspective of the reduction of their functions, leaving aside the political aspects of the State reform and further still the dimension of social control over the same.

Among the several expectations of change created with the 2002 victory of the political forces that lifted Lula to the government was the creation of a new standard for the relationship of the State with society and with the political institutions more generally. Though adopting a participationist discourse and having established several spaces for social dialog (most of all through councils and conferences), it opted for a practice of governability in its relation with the parties and with the national Congress that conserved the traditional standards of Brazilian politics of clientelism and physiologism. This choice weakened the possibilities of advancement from the perspective of a policy of extended governability (incorporating new social actors) and democratic (adopting transparent procedures and basing them in the practice of debate and public deliberation) governability and ended up withdrawing political reform from the agenda of the Government and Congress.

After the political crisis provoked by the denunciations of corruption in 2005 and 2006, which fully struck the partisan system and the three powers of the Brazilian State, were put into check various aspects of the representative democracy model that characterizes our political and electoral system. On the other hand, alternatives were sought, in the still fragile mechanisms of direct and participatory democracy, capable of reforming the Brazilian political system and of creating a democratic base of social control over the Brazilian State. But could such mechanisms have presented a practice and results that validate them as an effective force of renewal? Taking into consideration this questioning, we believe to be necessary and urgent a critical analysis of the current role and mode of functioning of the councils, as a contribution to the more general debate about the political reforms necessary for the advancement of the democratic construction process in Brazil.

THE MANAGEMENT COUNCILS AS INSTITUTIONAL CHANNELS OF REPRESENTATION

The management councils, understood as institutional channels of representation created as part of the State apparatus, differ substantially from the proposition of the popular councils, understood as autonomous spheres of civil society actors' organization in order to be reflected in public policy. The management councils present institutional

configurations, and much diversified identities and histories. Thus the necessity of setting out criteria and variables of analysis to reach a characterization and a systematic assessment of its practices are sought.

Raichelis (1998) presents five categories that in her conception ought to orient the analysis of a public sphere as well as how the councils are: a) social visibility, in which the actions and the discourse of the subjects must be expressed with transparency not only for those directly involved, but also for those implicated in political decisions; b) social control, which signifies access to the processes that inform the decisions in the political society scope, which makes possible the participation of organized civil society in the formulation and the revision of rules that direct the negotiations and arbitrage over the interests at stake, besides the accompaniment of the implementation of those decisions, according to agreed-upon criteria; c) representation of collective interests, which implies the constitution of active social subjects, that are presented in the public scene from the qualification of collective demands, in relation to those requiring mediation; d) democratization, which implies the dialectic between conflict and consensus, such that the different and multiple interests can be qualified and confronted, thus resulting in the public interlocution capable of generating agreements and understandings that orient collective decisions; e) political culture, which implies the confrontation of social authoritarianism and of the "privatist culture" of appropriating from the public by the private, remitting the construction of socio-political mediations from interests of the social subjects to be recognized, represented, and negotiated on the visible stage of the public sphere.

Tatagiba and Teixeira (2007b), proposing as a relative dimension of analysis the institutional design and the political trajectory of each council, set off with a general definition about what the councils are:

> Management councils are permanent participatory institutions, legally defined as part of the State structure, whose function is to reflect on public policies in specific areas, producing decisions (that sometimes can assume the form of statutory norm), e that rely in their composition on the participation of representatives of the State and of society under the condition of membership with equal right to voice and vote (p. 62-63).

Following this, the authors propose two fundamental criteria to be taken into consideration in a councils' practices analysis:

For besides these more general principles, each council possesses its own identity which can be partially learned from consideration of two fundamental variables: the institutional design and the political trajectory (p. 63).

The studies about the Councils of Health, Children and Adolescents, Social Work and Housing in the municipality of São Paulo, published in 2007 by the Observatório, showed that these councils find themselves in different stages of development and consolidation. Besides this, it can be observed that, in the different managements of the same council, variations are perceived regarding what is referred to as the capacity to influence policies, the form of dialog with the State, the participatory dynamic, the relation with other political actors etc. without which any alteration in their institutional standard would have been verified. From this observation Tatagiba and Teixeira conclude (2007b):

The councils go through distinct phases or moments in the course of their trajectory, which transform them in time, and that this process has implications in their political identity construction (p. 63).

This initial verification raises some important questions for a deeper analysis of the councils' political trajectory: what are the necessary conditions for the advancement of the capacity of the councils to influence in the public policy democratization? What is the relative weight of the action of the councils in the modification of public policy? What is the role of the different actors (of civil society and of the government)? Which dynamics favor and which make more difficult the advancement of the council's potential for action?

Seen together, the different stages of development and degrees of consolidation of the councils seem to express also the political trajectory of constructing participatory systems from the policies to which they correspond, the mobilization degree and organization of the civil society actors, represented there, as well as the mode of action of the government agents involved.

The legal demarcation of the Constitution of 1988 made possible the organization of national systems of participatory and decentralized management of social policy. Through the posterior approval of specific laws for each area (Constitutional Health

Law (Lei Orgânica da Saúde), Children and Adolescents' Statute (Estatuto da Criança e do Adolescente), Constitutional Social Work Law (Lei Orgânica da Assistência Social), Cities' Statute (Estatuto das Cidades), spaces for negotiation and co-management of these policies were created, being that civil society played a fundamental role in the approval of these laws. More in-depth studies about the history of the constitution of such participatory systems are necessary in order to be able to understand the context and the network of the civil society actors that were involved in each one of them and that probably have influence over the different stages of development and consolidation of their respective councils.

When it comes to the participation of civil society, although its fundamental role in the creation of participatory systems and their respective councils is recognized, through, most of all, the action of the social movements and the constitution of Forums and Networks, not always is this initial vigor, that characterized the autonomous mobilization and organization of civil society, maintained in the long-term.

The current retraction and relative disarticulation of such autonomous spaces has differentiated trajectories, but whenever they occurred, they hindered the effectiveness of action among civil society representatives in their respective councils. That's because it's the autonomous spaces of civil society organization that can promote social mobilization and pressure over the councils to reinforce the power of their representatives in disputes and conflicts of interest that exist there. Also it is the forums, networks, and movements which are the most adequate spaces for the generation of proposals and construction of agreements between the several organizations that constitute the heterogeneous civil society field of forces. For all the good will they might have, if the council members don't count on such civil society spaces to back their actions, they turn into representatives of themselves and easy prisoners of institutional co-optation.

In many cases the political fragmentation that marks the social movements situation (most of all near electoral periods) and also a certain demobilization provoked by the relation of agreements aimed at regulating services conducted for the public power are factors observed to affect the autonomous organizations of movements and forums, thus causing repercussions in the dynamic of action of civil society in the councils.

The very straight and subordinated linkage of determined leaderships of social movements with political parties and, more specifically with parliamentary cabinets, has provoked several fissures in the movements that are reflected in divisions not only in

their bases, but also on the councils in which their representatives have a seat, many times weakening their unity of action in those spaces. These types of links were seen in the 1980s as possibilities of strengthening the movements since they were providing an infrastructure that the movements didn't have, besides providing the ticket for determined leaderships in institutional spaces of representation. In fact today with the profound change in the standards of political action of the parties, which used to maintain an identity with the movements, it seems that this type of linkage today is the source of more problems than benefits for the movements and their leaderships. Would it be time to do a critical assessment of this type of relation and to update their presuppositions and strategies?

When it comes to the relation of the movements to executive power, the recent transformation of the movements into offerers of services and executers of several social programs of the government seems to have provoked ambiguities in the relation of the same to governments and, in some cases, visible signs of loss of political autonomy. Also in this aspect it would be necessary to carry out a critical assessment of this type of relation and a redesign of strategies. This "crisis" of the movements in their relations with the State and with the parties has directly affected the representation of the same together with the councils.

When it comes to governments' action in relation to the councils, though it can be stated that the political and partisan cleavages of the same (greater or lesser compromise with the democratization of public management) are relevant in the institutional design and in the political trajectory of the councils, it cannot be affirmed that such cleavages are the sole determiners of the functional dynamic of the same. That is because on one side the governments are not monolithic and on the other the agents that represent them on the councils don't always have behavioral standards absolutely coherent with the more general political orientation of the government. That is, the studies of the Observatório show situations where authoritarian standards of behavior can mark the action of the government agents despite a democratic discourse of the same, and vice-versa. Also the quality of government representation on the councils and the procedures relative to transparency and capacity of dialog are important variables in the analysis of the action of the government on the councils. The possibility of taking advantage from such contradictions between government agents depends in turn on the degree of unity of the representatives of civil society in that specific situation.

The studies performed by the Observatório also show that the councils' institutional design offers the parameters for its action, offering its political identity basic contours. Through the laws of creation and of the internal regiments are defined the rules for their composition and representation, nature of participation, decision-making dynamic, procedural rites etc., which, in turn, indicate the potentialities and the limits of each space when it comes to the expected results of participation.

The observation of the functioning of several councils shows that the greater the participation of civil society in the elaboration and constant evaluation of those instruments that delimit the institutional design of the councils, the greater its co-responsibility for their observance and their compromise in defense of the participatory processes. When it comes to the most common positioning of the governments with relation to the institutional design of the councils, the observation of Raichellis (2000) is valid:

> What bothers the governments in the question of the Councils isn't their existence, but exactly the nature of their duties, the fact of having a deliberative character legally guaranteed, since the procedures are many times slower and open to debate and conflicts of positions for having to pass through the approval of the Councils. The budget resources and the finance funds for the areas of Social Assistance, Health, Child and Adolescent are obligatorily submitted to the approval of the councils (p. 43).

In any case it can be observed that the contradictions between the practices of a council and its institutional design can't be understood if we don't examine their concrete political trajectory and the relations and dynamics established between the actors involved. This can explain why some councils with deliberative power aren't able to exercise it effectively and on the contrary, others that don't have that right are able to exercise it in practice in some moments of their trajectory. Vera Schattan and M. Nobre (2004) relating the results of research on the councils of health of the city of São Paulo thus conclude about the importance of the dynamic of relations among the actors in the effectiveness of the councils' practices:

> This brief assessment shows that the existence of formal mechanisms that assure the right of civil society to participate in the definition of social policy isn't sufficient to guarantee this participation. But it also shows that this picture changes with

the presence of an organized civil society and/or political authorities committed to participatory democracy (p. 256 and 257).

This causes us to consider that, besides fighting over a definition of the councils' duties that assures them the necessary decision-making power, it is fundamental to care for the conditions necessary so that the process of deliberation grants equitable conditions to the actors for the practices of dialog and conflict resolution present in the processes of making decisions. As much in the several segments of civil society as among this and the government agents, there exists various asymmetries with relation to the information and knowledge necessary for greater effectiveness of their participation in the deliberation processes. Procedures of transparency in the presentation of information and presentation and auditing of accounts, as well as investments in formative actions with continuity are some of the necessary actions for the overcoming of these asymmetries and to augment the degree of the deliberative processes legitimacy.

ANALYZING THE DELIBERATIVE POWER OF THE COUNCILS

Tatagiba and Teixeira (2007a) make an important distinction between deliberation and decision from the formulations of Bohman (1996):

While the concept of decision remits to the result of a process that involves the election or choice between alternatives; the notion of deliberation deals with the quality of the process that leads to the decision.

The deliberation concept refers to a decision-making process that is preceded by a well-informed debate around the alternatives presented about the problems definition and the intervention forms.

The studies of the Observatório show evidence of significant variation in the number and type of resolutions produced by the councils in accord with the political orientation of the government. Being so, when dealing with a government that doesn't believe in participation and in the councils, there is a tendency for these to be induced to a certain paralysis in their functions, which provokes the loss of legitimacy and force of the councils. Such a situation requires, especially on the part of the members of civil society,

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endeavors and determination in demanding that the council continue functioning normally and be set in motion on the occasion of the principal decisions about the policies and programs of the area. The discontinuity of policies and programs in each term must be one of the main targets of the councils' actions of social control, looking to assure the fulfillment of the decisions made in the council and demanding from the government the establishment of indicators and goals for the evaluation of already-existent programs and those yet to be implemented.

Another factor which should strongly influence to differentiate the types of resolutions most common to each council is the nature of its functions and competencies. It can be observed, in the meantime, that generally on the councils studied the discussion of policies and programs of the area isn't the strong point of its decisions which many times refer only to periphery aspects of the policies. Even when the councils are able to discuss policies and programs of the area, their actions inscribe themselves in a more accentuated way in relation to the phase of implementation of the same. Corroborating the results of other studies and of practical observations it can be affirmed that the councils have reflected most on the aspects of implementation of policies fulfilling the role of inspection of the same and, to a lesser degree, in the aspects relative to the elaboration of the policies and in the exercise of a more propositional role in relation to the same. In what is referred to as the aspects of policy implementation, accompanied by the Observatório, it can be observed that there is variation in the type of action prioritized by the council, conforming to the nature of its duties (some more inclined to the normatization of actions and agreements, others to an evaluation of the services quality), but generally it can be affirmed that the issues relative to the evaluation of the services quality are a common item on the agenda of those councils.

One essential aspect for the exercising of the councils deliberative power is the domain of budgetary questions, which make possible better identification of the priorities and of the redistributive power of the policies and programs. The absence and/or precariousness of the mechanisms of transparency in relations to the budgetary questions added to the lack of preparation of the majority of civil society sectors in relation to the subject makes the budget a great instrument of the manipulation of interests and the limitation of the effective deliberative power of the councils. The absence in the majority of municipalities of the Participatory Budget practice or the limitations of many of the experiences currently, make the vision of the councils over the budget partial and

sector-restricted, complicating the discussion about resources and their priorities. For all of these reasons, we might ask: Can the deliberative power of the councils be spoken of when the same have little reflection in the resources allocation in the budget?

Without looking down on the importance of the actions of the councils in the questions relative to the implementation of policies, it is necessary to recognize that the small incidence of the same in the stage of elaboration of policies and in the discussion of the content of programs and government actions constitutes a strong limitation on the power of decision of the councils that should include both stages of the cycle of public policy.

This scene shows on one hand that the decision power of the councils has a relation with the duties predicted in its institutional design, but it is consolidated or not, depending on the political context in which it is inserted, and the capacity of intervention by civil society. As Tatagiba and Teixeira (2007) affirm, it is very important to analyze the quality of the decision-making process (deliberative process) that involves important variables: the existence or not of debate and discussion prior to the decision; the plurality of interests involved in the dispute; the nature of the reasons presented; the level of autonomy of the subjects involved to sustain positions; the greater or lesser power of each actor/segment in the construction of the agenda etc. An analysis that combines an evaluation of the content of decisions made and their process of deliberation can supply us with greater information about the decisions sustainability and about what can be expected in terms of their effectiveness. That is, the process as much as the product are important and inseparable dimensions in the evaluation of the social control effectiveness over public policies.

It can be observed that the deliberative power attributed to the councils in the principal participatory systems of social policy created after the Constitution of 1988, have increasingly been the object of questioning on the part of governments of different politico-ideological orientations. On one side, researches of the Observatório establish the attempts of conservative governments to withdraw such power from the existent councils. On the other, President Lula's own government, initiated in 2003 with participationist discourse and social dialog actions, created new councils, however granting them only consultative powers, just as it accepted the indication of representatives of civil society in several cases.

In light of this scene and the variables discussed above that affect the decision power exercised effectively by the councils, it is important to reaffirm, in the meantime, that the deliberative power of the councils continues being a fundamental parameter to evaluate to what extent an effective co-management of public policy is reached.

The studies of the Observatório show that the councils studied occupy a peripheral place in the decision-making cycle when it comes to the elaboration and implementation of the policies in their respective areas. In some cases this manifests itself in the time dispensed in the discussions of the councils on subjects such as the definition of their own meeting agenda and questions of procedure. In other cases, conflicted and polarized relations among the participants cause these to deteriorate, complicate the establishment of a productive dialog and thus damage the quality of the deliberative processes even when relevant subjects are discussed.

Another aspect observed in that research is that when the government puts on the agenda of the councils subjects about programs and policies, these are almost always circumscribed to issues referring to their execution and implementation, and very rarely the councils have the opportunity to discuss programs and policies in their stage of elaboration. When they are brought to discussion, they are already elaborated and the government only fulfills the rite of presentation on the council and of informing it of the beginning of their implementation.

These verifications coincide with observations from other studies and statements of participants on councils in other spheres on the state as much as the federal level. This means that the councils have little reflection on the core nucleus of policy and this can be one of the most important variables in the formation of a "perception" of erosion of these channels and in a certain questioning, on the part of some sectors of the social movements, about the validity of continuing to wager that such channels can lead to new policies and changes in existing ones.

It can be verified, therefore, that there is generally a dissociation between the agenda of the policies and the councils. The Conferences carried out periodically in several areas of social policy seem to be a more ample space of participation that has made it possible for organizations of civil society to add subjects to the agenda for discussion and present proposals referring to programs and policies in their respective areas. Still we lack systematic studies about the degree of incorporation of such proposals in the programs and policies to be implemented. At times the lack of transparency in the information about the programs and policies or their excessively technicist language of presentation makes it difficult for civil society organizations to recognize their proposals in the same

and still permit manipulations in the governmental discourse about the incorporation of the civil society presented proposals in the directives approved in the Conferences and in the policies and programs to be developed by the government.

This dissociation between the agenda of the policies and the councils becomes even more critical in what refers to the budgetary aspects of the programs and policies. Whether it is in relation to the budgetary predictions or when it comes to Public Funds resources, little incidence is verified of the councils in the discussion of the same, which constitutes a serious limitation of its powers given the absolute relevancy of such aspects in the determination of the possibilities and limits of such programs and policies. The social control of the Funds' resources on the part of civil society has been very difficult, whether it's that the governments don't pass on the necessary information, or it's the difficulty of the counselors of civil society to deal with that type of information.

The fiscal crisis of the State and the known annulments of allocated funds and reorientation of priorities are rarely the object of decisions on the councils, being that only in the best-case scenario they are informed about these. Even in municipalities that develop participatory budgets it has been difficult to attain the necessary junction between the deliberations of the participatory budgets and the agenda of the counselors and vice-versa.

This limitation on the budget social control is even more critical on the federal level. The current government elected in 2002 generated strong expectations that initiatives for social control of the federal budget would be carried out, given the accumulation of experiences of the PT and of other leftist parties, in municipal governments and even in some cases on the state level. In fact, except for the process of consultation about the PPA[111] done in 2003 with public audiences carried out with organized civil society in various states in Brazil, other initiatives relevant in the sense of democratizing the discussion of the public budget were not taken, and even complete information about the subject was not made available. Only this year (2008) were work groups constituted, through presidential decree charged with suggesting alternatives that make greater social participation in the social control of the federal public budget possible. Until the present date the referred work group hasn't produced its proposals. In this context, the liberation of parliamentary amendments to the budget appears as the most coherent alternative with the governability logic adopted by the government and as contradictory to some initiatives aiming at a social participation in the control of the public budget.

Also the absence on the agenda of the councils and of the conferences on the subject of tax reform always puts them in a defensive position in relation to questions about budgetary possibilities and limits.

It can be observed that the councils have been absorbed in such a way by technico-administrative functions that seem to have suffocated their possibility of acting in the politicization of new subjects and issues. Elenaldo Celso Teixeira (2000) affirms:

> *The strengthening of civil society, therefore, occurs when its demands, processed by the councils and other mechanisms and spaces, turn into public policies that orient governmental actions and when the regulation that belongs to the State isn't done anymore without social representation discussing it and formulating propositions (p. 108).*

In sum it can be said that the possibility of the councils being the effective space of deliberation of public policy and its programs of action depends on the effective attempt of the government to share with the councils this level of decision and on the capacity of civil society to set the agenda of the councils with propositions about the policies and priorities of action.

THE POLITICAL PROJECT AND THE AGENDA OF THE COUNCILS

the studies of the councils performed by the Observatório showed that the council profile is modified significantly according to the profile of the government counselors and of civil society that compose it and of the group that exercises hegemony in certain moments. The profile of the participants in each term of the council is expressed in differentiated standards of political dispute, with consequences for the process of forming the council's agenda, about how explicit conflicts are and how they are directed, about the logic of interaction between the government and society that in turn is translated in differentiated levels of political influence of the council on the respective public policy.

Tatagiba and Teixeira (2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2007d) highlight the issue of the political project and the strategy of the actors as those political variables that can help us in this process comprehension. The importance of the political project variable was much in evidence in the analysis of the impacts produced on the practice of the councils when

changes in the political command of governments occurred. Though they also present some instances of resistance to sharing power, the studies demonstrate that democratic/progressive governments tend to value the councils more than governments without that type of commitment. This in turn shows that low level of autonomy of the councils in relation to executive power, that is, if the Executive doesn't want it to, it's very difficult for the council to walk on its own legs.

The heterogeneity of civil society political projects also produces impacts on the political dynamic of the councils. The interests that cause the entities, organizations, and movements to secure a seat on the councils are the most varied, such as the very understanding of what it is to participate in the policy formulation. Depending on what group assumes hegemony on the council in a determined moment, the council dynamic suffers significant alteration, translating in a greater or lesser accommodation in relation to the agendas and interests of the executive and, however, greater or lesser intensity of the conflicts.

In this context, even though the parity that orients the composition of the majority of the councils is an important achievement, its translation in the practice of the councils will depend in large part on the correlation of forces that establish themselves in the political dispute. Raichellis (2000) thus makes this relation explicit:

> *Parity isn't reduced to a numerical question of half-half. Parity implies correlation of forces, struggle against hegemony, alliances that should be established to consolidate a determined project and a determined proposal of direction in the scope of the Councils (p.44).*

The analysis of parity in the councils also must take into account the existent asymmetries between the governmental and non-governmental representation, among which are highlighted the question of access to information about public power and public policies. For this reason the transparency and the practice of systematic formation of the counselors, especially from civil society, is an indispensable condition for making equity possible in the conditions of participation and decision-making. Celso Daniel (2000) in an interview with the magazine Pólis about social policy management Councils reaffirms the democratizing sense of the investments in the formation of counselors.

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One of the challenges for the strengthening of the Councils is to create more adequate conditions so that new protagonists gain the public scene, so that leaderships are multiplied, people interested in participating in public management (p.126).

Another important variable to take into consideration in the constitution of a political project for action on the councils is the traditional fragmentation of public policies that reinforces the sector-based character of discussions on the councils.

Elenaldo Celso Teixeira (2000) analyzing the conditions of civil society participation on the councils from the perspective of public policy transformation thus refers to the theme:

In order for the Councils to effectively become constituted in elements of a new public and democratic institutionality, it is necessary still that civil society and its political and social representatives constitute a global political and strategic project that is referential for the deliberations of sector-based policies, without which it becomes impossible to prevent these policies' fragmentation, set into action by the government (p.106).

Further ahead the author concludes with a challenge to the practice of councils:

We are facing a great challenge which is creating strategies to recompose the totality of social policy. The Councils should have this task, which transcends sector-based and specific politics (p.45).

To this effect the creation of spaces and forms of articulation among the councils seems to be an important route from the perspective of integration of policies. Raichellis (2000) thus makes this challenge explicit:

A large task is to think integration and articulation strategies among the councils, create common agendas and more ample forums that contribute to overcoming the segmentation of social policy (p.46).

Also the change in the standard of the government management and of the political machine procedures in the sense of a greater articulation of the policies and programs is

indispensable in order to stimulate greater articulation of the councils and better integration of policies and programs.

These variables demonstrate that the mere creation of the councils as mechanisms of civil society participation in setting public policy is not a guarantee of the effectiveness of these spaces for the democratization of public policy. Vera Schattan P. Coelho (2004) analyzing the effectiveness of the actions of the councils of health concludes:

> *This brief assessment shows that the existence of formal mechanisms that assure the right of civil society to participate in the definition of social policy is not sufficient to guarantee this participation. But it also shows that this scene changes with the presence of an organized civil society and/or political authorities committed to participatory democracy (p.256 and 257).*

Thus when different segments of civil society point out the necessity of a "new architecture" of participation it is necessary to take into account this complexity of variables involved in the dynamic of the councils in the discussion of alternatives that can turn out to be so, effective instances of social control over the State and democratization of the public policy management. In this sense it is appropriate to inquire whether the number of existent councils and their always heterogeneous vitality of functioning don't constitute factors that complicate a better articulation among the councils.

THE COUNCILS AND THE AGENDA OF POLITICAL REFORM

Since the moment in which the Constitution of 1988 enshrined the principle of popular participation in public policy and several, decentralized, and participatory systems of social policy management were created, debate was established between several political and social forces about the relations between the mechanisms and practices of direct and participatory democracy and the traditional mechanisms of representative democracy exercising. The conservative field of Brazilian society always placed in doubt the validity and legitimacy of the representativity of the councils and other forms of participatory democracy arguing that the same would have a deficit of representativity when compared with the legitimacy of the representatives in the executive and in the legislative elected by universal vote. Parting from this conception these sectors look in

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the exercise of governments and in the parliament to ignore the existence or diminish the importance of proposals and decisions taken in spaces and instances of participatory democracy. In other situations they prefer the strategy of pursuing representation in these spaces in order to be able to weaken them afterwards, turning them into auxiliary lines of the government directed by them.

In the democratic and progressive field that fought for the creation of those new spaces for the exercise of democracy, the argument and the wager always predominated that these, having created a new level that incorporated citizens as political subjects in the State social control, would serve as mechanisms that contributed to the perfection of representative democracy, not as opposition to it. However oftentimes having assumed the exercise of governments, such sectors have had a practice of undervaluing and investing little in the mechanisms of direct and participatory democracy in face of the presumption of their wisdom and competency in relation to the population necessities and the solutions for the same. There are few experiences of practicing with vigor the principle of power sharing through the councils and other forms of participatory democracy.

Twenty years having passed since such mechanisms of participatory democracy were created, with the public policy management councils standing out, it can be affirmed that this wager wasn't confirmed with all the force of the expectations that were deposited in it. Despite the advance that the councils represented in many aspects, in the democratization sense and greater public policy social control, this experience didn't yet have the force and the necessary qualities to produce the political impacts necessary to alter the clientelist logic that historically marked the relation of the State with the political party system that gives sustenance to the election of representatives by universal vote. Such logic is the matrix of old and well-known mechanisms of corruption, physiologism and private appropriations of public resources that for many years are practiced in relation to the State and to public resources. This logic acquired such a force that even the social and political forces that struggle for their radical alteration are not immune to the same and in some cases turned into prisoners of the very clientelism so combated.

Such a context took us to the apparently paradoxical situation of close coexistence between growing practices of participation and social control over the State and at the same time the permanence of the traditional practices of corruption and private appropriation of public resources and of relations in the political and partisan system founded on the mechanism of clientelism and its traditional give-and-take.

Such a situation has come to create the understanding in several sectors of civil society and a few segments of the political parties about the necessity and urgency of political reforms in Brazil. Such reforms are indispensable in order to regulate and create mechanisms of demandability of rights in relation to the institutionalization of several mechanisms of participatory democracy as the councils, conferences, and participatory budgets are, and of direct democracy, as is the case of the plebiscites, referendum, and projects of popular initiative. This deals with the advance of a new logic of relation of society with the State where the former can exercise an effective social control over the State. Unfortunately there is still little consensus about the amplitude of such reforms and about their content. More serious than this, there is very little political will among the forces that compose the current National Congress to carry out such reforms.

As a result of this scene since 2005 a group of civil society networks and organizations has been mobilizing for the construction and public debate of the *Social Movements Platform for the Political System reform* composed of five axes for discussion: strengthening of direct democracy; strengthening of participatory democracy; improvement of representative democracy: electoral system and political parties; democratization of information and communication and judicial transparency. The amplitude of this platform's axes, and those of the proposals contained in each, seeks to express the understanding of their protagonists that it is absolutely necessary that political reforms transcend the scope of electoral and partisan legislation changes to include the issues involved in social and democratic control over the State as well.

In relation to this text's most immediate object, some of the proposals of the platform mentioned that refer to the theme of the councils and their strengthening as spaces of policy democratization and social control over the State are highlighted.

A primary aspect to be considered is that, although the councils have amplified significantly their articulation with sector-based public policy, they still have not been able to establish relations with the main instances and organs responsible for economic policy and development decision-making. With respect to the theme, therefore, the platform pronounces:

> *Creation of participation, deliberation, and social control mechanisms for economic policy and development.*

Participation and social control mechanisms do not exist in economic policy. We defend the creation of these mechanisms, considering the several spheres of participation and the importance of debates of local scope, where the policies are, in fact, executed.

We propose that the creation of social control mechanisms over the Central Bank, the CMN (National Monetary Council) and the COFIEX (Foreign Finance Commission), as well as those instances where there is definition and execution of para-fiscal resources, like the BNDES (National Bank of Economic and Social Development), Caixa Econômica Federal, Banco do Brasil, Banco do Nordeste, and Banco da Amazônia, be prioritized.

Another central aspect refers to the proposition of creating, in all government spheres, participation and social control mechanisms for the budgetary cycle. The participatory budget practices developed in several municipalities have demonstrated, despite their heterogeneity and highly differentiated reaches, that social participation in the budgetary cycle is possible and desirable. With respect to this, the platform thus pronounces:

Creation of budgetary cycle participation and control mechanisms

We defend the creation of budgetary cycle participation and control mechanisms, including those already-existent structures of participation (councils, conferences, plebiscites, referendum, etc.). This demands the regulation of these structures, establishing forms of articulation between several structures and, equally, the deliberative power of decisions made in these spheres of social participation, including foreseeing the Executive branch's duty to respect, in the budget's elaboration, the deliberations of the councils and conferences.

In relation to the councils and conferences, what is being proposed is their perfection, from the perspective of constructing participatory and decentralized systems in relation to the public policy in all government spheres. The necessity of creating interlocution and articulation mechanisms among these is highlighted, in the sense of overcoming the fragmentation of their actions and thus contributing to the integration of policies with which they dialog. About this issue the platform thus pronounces:

Mechanisms of dialog among different spaces of social control

In recent years, several councils were created in the three levels of government related to different areas of public policy. These councils, along with the National Conferences constructed in a decentralized manner from their state and municipal counterparts, form a decentralized and participatory system of social control. We defend the necessity of perfecting these systems, especially through dialog and interlocution between different spaces.

One final aspect considered fundamentally important are the investments in transparency of public information and citizenship formation programs, which can create the necessary equality among the several actors involved in policies for the effective exercise of participation and decision-making. On this question the platform pronounces:

Construction of a public policy of citizenship education

Considering the enormous deficits of information necessary for the full exercise of participation, we propose that the three branches (Executive, Legislative and Judiciary) create educational programs and campaigns with the objective of supplying the population with the information and instruments necessary for the exercise of a more qualified participation in the several participatory spaces that influence public policy. In the same way, governmental publicity must assume an eminently educational character.

Such actions ought not intend to substitute the role already played by many nongovernmental organizations in this area, but instead assume a share of the responsibility that befits the State to create equitable conditions so that civil society can effectively influence public policy.

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

Being that this year marks 20 years since the promulgation of our latest Constitution, responsible for enshrining popular participation as a right and for the prevision of various mechanisms for its exercise, it is very important for a critical assessment to be done on the practice of these in this period to be able to point out alternatives to the several challenges to the construction of participatory democracy today in Brazil. As we have seen such challenges are in place for all social and political forces of society, including those sectors that fought for their conquest.

We also observe that such challenges presuppose a broad political reform that could perfect the mechanisms of direct and participatory democracy, as well as introduce profound changes in the political party electoral system and capable of remodeling the exercise of representative democracy in the direction of republican practices aimed at responding to the legitimate interests of society founded on the principles of equality and social justice and at the deepening of the democratic construction. The democratization of information and of the means of communication is an essential condition for the advancement of citizenship education, which can go along incorporating greater and greater contingencies of people in the exercise of an active citizenship in relation to the *res publica*.

Thus we believe it to be important to raise these issues in the public debate in society and seek to construct a common agenda of alternatives in the sense of strengthening and deepening the process of democratic construction in Brazil today. We hope that this document contributes in this direction and stirs up new inquiries and propositions in the sectors committed to these causes.

NOTES

108. Pólis Institute's researcher and CEAAL's president.

109. Observatório dos Direitos do Cidadão (Observatory of Citizen Rights) is an Instituto Polis project directed at accompanying and analyzing the evolution of public policies in the city of São Paulo and bringing that result to the public. This project is supported by the Ford Foundation. It is conducted in partnership with the Instituto de Estudos Especiais da PUC-SP (Special Studies Institute of PUC-SP), with the Central de Movimentos Populares (Center of Popular Movements), the União dos Movimentos de Moradia (UMM) (Housing Movements Union), and the Fórum Municipal de Assistência Social (FMAS) (Municipal Fórum of Social Assistance). These organizations, together with Polis, comprise the Colegiado de Gestão do Observatório (Observatory Management Collegiate), whose object is to articulate the development of the project with the demands of social struggles, to be reflected in the publications' lineup.

110. This research was carried out in the scope of the Observatório dos Direitos do Cidadão. In this publication, we opt to translate only the text "O Papel do Conselho Municipal de Habitação na política de habitação em São Paulo" (The Role of the Municipal Housing Council in the policy of housing in São Paulo).

111. Translation Note – PPA, initials for Plano Plurianual (Pluriannual Plan), a mechanism that establishes for the Brazilian government budget the long term projects and programs.

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